«Tested Mettle - Canada’s Peacekeepers at war», Scott
Taylor and Brian Nolan, Copyright 1998 by Scott Taylor
and Brian Nolan, Esprit de Corps books, Ottawa.
2. On the ceremony held December 1st 2002 in Winnipeg,
Manitoba, soldiers of the 2nd battalion Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry (2PPCLI) have from the Governor
General and the commander in Chief the Right honorable
Adrienne Clarkson received Unit Commendation for their
bravery shown at the Medak Pocket battle.
3. “Nation Post” July 4th 2002 – Chris Wattie “Heroism
in Croatia” 1993 Canadian peacekeepers made history fighting
Croatian army at the fiercest battles Canadians have engaged
in since the Korean War.
4. Croatian weekly “Nacional” December 10th 2002, photocopy
of the Croatian Ministry of Defense official press release
issued and signed on December 6th 2002 by commissioner
Dušan Viro “…we state that the members of Croatian military
were not engaged in an armed combat with the Canadian
battalion within UNPROFOR. Therefore there could not have
been any casualties on either side.
5. Divoselo, (Lički) Čitluk, Počitelj – three villages
under the Velebit mountains, south of Gospić, mainly Serb
populated, surrounded by hamlets and smaller villages.
During WW2 Divoselo was a known rebel place – it was the
birthplace of many JNA generals (seven), it was a political
(communist) and nationalistic (radical Serb) stronghold,
which politically influenced the whole Lika region.
6. Medak, mostly Serb populated, important road junction
and the train station on the Gospić-Gračac-Knin line,
stronghold of Četniks, headquarters of Krajina Serb army.
Janko Bobetko in his book “Sve moje bitke”, page 381:
“…it is Četniks stronghold which was undefeated until
the end of WW2. (Partisans weren’t able to take it – author’s
note)… The Četniks were able to hold to Medak all the
7. Velebit Mountains – “Croatia’s Spine” – the mountain
which runs along the Croatian coastline from Senj, Vratnik
Pass to Obrovac, Zrmanja Canyon. It is 145 kilometers
long (aerial longitude 135 kilometers). It is a marking
point to divide Mediterranean from the continental interior,
mythical Croatian mountain sung about in “Vila Velebita”,
forbidden during communist Yugoslavia, important strategic
point, difficult to cross, National Park under protection,
maritime limestone from the south and thick wood from
the northern, Lika’s side. Ideal for guerilla warfare.
8. «The Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line» - the amputation
line which was intended to come into being by the imposed
Yugoslav king Alexander after the assassination of Croatian
national tribune Stjepan Radić in 1928. The remains of
thus amputated Croatia “would be seen from the Zagreb
Cathedral’s tower”. That line is also mentioned in Četniks’
plans during WW2 (Moljević, Draža Mihajlović), the line
mentioned by Serb radical politicians (Šešelj) and by
the JNA military strategists as the western border of
9. “Greater Serbia” is a project that would unite all
the territories populated by Serbs and therefore realize
a dream of a Serbian state whose ideator was at the beginning
of the 19th century the Serbian ideologist Ilija Garašanin,
and whose followers were members of the terrorist organization
“Crna Ruka” – Četniks, radicals, and Milošević’s socialists
– advocates of Serbian medieval empire.
10. Masleničko Ždrilo – narrow sea channel near Maslenica,
entrance to the Novigrad’s sea, crossed by bridge on Adriatic
highway near Zadar, which JNA destroyed in September 1991,
and by doing so has cut the direct continental connection
between Croatia’s north and south, an important strategic
11. “Sve moje bitke” by General Janko Bobetko, Zagreb,
1996, page 382: “…the battle for Velebit Mountains was
won, that was the strategic issue. I repeat, who holds
Velebit, holds half of Croatia. Who doesn’t control Velebit…
there Croatia is cut in half.”
12. “Professionalism under fire: Canadian implementation
of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia, 1993.” Lee A.
Windsor – www.cda.cdai.ca/library/medakpocket2.htm
“The Medak Pocket has given to the world the first credible
evidence that Serbia, though the most important, was not
the only perpetrator of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.”
13. Mark Arnold quotes Christopher Gunnes in the “Politics
and Prejudices” BBC Radio program: “The thesis of a long
standing ethnic strife in the Yugoslavia was kindled on
purpose, so that British and other governments would find
an excuse to firmly stand against Serb expansionism.”
Quote taken from the S. Power book “A problem from Hell”.
14. Robert D. Kapplan “Balkan Ghosts: A journey through
history”, First Vintage Departures edition, March 1994.
“… (The Balkans history) is a historical quagmire into
which one should enter…foreigners cannot do anything in
the region so deeply immersed into ancient hatred…” (Foreword,
Colin Powell, New York Times, October 8th 2002, “Why generals
get nervous?” “…(conflict) with deep ethnic and religious
roots that go back a thousand years” (quote taken from
S. Power book)
15. David Owen «The Balkan Odyssey» Zagreb 1998 «...the
characteristic of fighting (in Yugoslavia) was callousness…
History of the Balkans shows that it is a tradition to
solve conflicts in arms…” Introduction, page 37.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USA, Dick Cheney, CNN
interview, Newsmaker Saturday, August 1st 1992 – “…It’s
tragic but the Balkans have been a hotbed of conflicts…for
16. New Republic, Rescue Bosnia, August 17th and 24th,
1992 – There have been too many platitudes about the responsibilities
of “all factions”. This lazy language is an escape hatch
through which outside powers flee their responsibilities”
– quote taken from the book by S. Power “A problem from
Hell”, page 276.
S. Powers “A problem from Hell” page 502. “Serbs had been
the original aggressors in the wars in Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia and Kosovo, but their local leaders had emphasized
only their suffering.”
17. S. Power “A problem from Hell”, Basic book, New York,
2002, Preface XII quotes Warren Christopher, Minister
of Foreign Affairs as saying in an interview on CBS’s
“Face the Nation” in March 1993 – “The hatred between
all three groups – the Bosnians, and the Serbs and the
Croatians – is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying
and its centuries old. That really is a problem from hell.”
The last sentence also became the title to her book, awarded
by the Pulitzer Prize for 2002.
President George Bush – August 6th 1992, briefing journalists
in the White House – “…the war…a complex, convulsive conflict
that grows out of age-old animosities and century old
feuds” – quote taken from S. Powers book.
18. Evidence gathering in the Medak Pocket done by Canadian
battalion – shows photos and videotapes, witnesses, medical
reports, forensic reports, done by UNCIVPOL and pathology
reports became the standard proceedings later to be used
by UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia and other war conflicts.
David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja”, page 275 – “UN has relatively
thoroughly documented the case of human rights violations
in the Medak Pocket which (to Croatia) was rather harmful.”
19. Sean M. Maloney & John Llambias «Chances for peace,
Canadian soldiers in the Balkans 1992 – 1995 – an oral
history», Vanwell Publishing history, St. Catharine’s,
Ontario, Copyright 2002 Sean M. Maloney – «Somewhere around
the middle of September, there had been a lot of shelling
at the Croatian town of Gospić by the Serbs, so the Croats
decided that they were going to do another operation.
Their assessment was that they bite away at the Krajinas
piece by piece and get away with it, incrementally...
They launched an attack into this area», page 141. «Medak
was a Serb area, but the Croatians occupied it. » page
20. David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja”, Zagreb 1998, Hrvatska
sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest – “Everything
happened right under UNCIVPOL noses – that as their role
considered, so we were told, to passively observe and
report on local police and leadership activities and to
have good relations with all the population… It was impossible
to imagine how UN could be anything else but a laughing
stock in Croatia, someone nobody liked or appreciated…
UN wasn’t capable to return refugees to their homes until
all of the Serbian paramilitaries were disarmed, and UN
lacked the decisiveness or strength to achieve that by
force. A stale-mate position continued.” Translated from
Croatian, page 108.
21. Dayton tri-party peace accord on Bosnia and Herzegovina
reached on November 22nd 1995 and signed in Paris on December
14th 1995 – “The general frame-agreement on Bosnia and
22. Kosovo – “a cradle of Serbian state” – annexed to
Kingdom of Serbia in 1913 after the Second Balkans War,
majority (90 percent) Albanian population that never recognized
occupational forces. Albanians have been subjected to
harsh repression during the monarchist and communist regimes
in former Yugoslavia. After 1945 clashes in 1981 and 1989,
and 1997 till 1999. After Yugoslav army withdrew under
international protectorate. Serbia still considers Kosovo
to be the constitual part of Serbia and Montenegro; Albanians
reject any liaison and want their independent Kosovo.
23. NATO started air strikes on the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia on March 24th 1999. On June 3rd 1999 Milošević
“capitulated”. On June 9th 1999 an agreement on withdrawal
from Kosovo was signed by the Yugoslav army. From that
date on, international military forces (IFOR) are overseeing
peace and security in that region.
24. Elections held in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
October 2000 – democratic forces have won, downfall of
Slobodan Milošević followed in November 2002 he was arrested
and consequently deported to the Hague
25. Vjesnik, June 4th 2003 – HINA – report from the Hague
and quote of the protected witness C-47 – “…our army (Serbian)
was the aggressor on Croatian territory, it killed, destroyed,
occupied villages and cities, has ethnically cleansed
26. “The American agency CIA – its deputy director for
intelligence John Gannan – has on August 8th 1995 reported
that 90 percent of all war crimes during three and a half
years long war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia) were
committed by Serb paramilitary and military forces.” Source:
R. Holbrook “To end a war”, Random House 1998, New York.
27. Dr. Charles Reginald Shrader “The Muslim-Croat civil
war in Bosnia (A military history) 1992, Texas, East European
Studies, A&M University press.
28. Quotation, according to “Globus”,Goran Malić’s, August
8th 2003. – “From the documents I was able to see (P.
Shrader) several units of Bosnian army were stationed
in Ahmići… from Ahmići one could control and overrun central
communications posts in Lašva Valley, which was vital
for the Croatian enclave there, therefore Croatian defense
council had to defend that post at any cost… unfortunately
the price was a greater number of killed people… After
the military victory, the revenge killing of civilians
and prisoners followed. That phenomenon is not unknown
– it happened to American soldiers in Vietnam in My Lai…
I do not condone that mishap… But I understand why. Blaškić
couldn’t sanction that unit… because he would lose the
army… and consequently he would lose the war.”
29. The Hague indictment of general Rahim Ademi on July
26th 2001, case number IT-I12-46-I
30. The Hague indictment of general Janko Bobetko, September
20th 2002, case number IT-02-62-I
31. Colonel Richard Herrick, American military attaché
in Croatia from 1993 to 1997, specialist for the JNA and
Yugoslav affairs, stationed in Yugoslavia in the 1980s,
he prepared the military analysis of the Yugoslav military
power, unbiased witness, professional and independent
observer of all the major military operations in former
32. Minutes of conversation of staff general Janko Bobetko,
held with American military attaché Richard Herrick on
September 28th 1993 in the Croatian army HQ.
33. Vukovar – the far eastern city on the banks of the
river Danube, the theater of fierce three-months long
battle and heroic Croatian defense – the place that underwent
the greatest destruction in Europe since the end of WW2,
the place where, after the Serbian occupation, war crimes
on a large scale were committed. The symbol of Croatian
defense and martyrdom
34. See “Smrt oklopne brigade” by D. Marijan, “Sjećanje
ratnika” by M. Špegelj, “Sve moje bitke” by J. Bobetko,
Kadijević, Jović, Sekulić, admiral Domazet’s “Hrvatska
i veliko ratište”…
35. Dubrovnik – the Croatian Athens, situated at the very
south of Croatia, fiercely attacked by JNA, Montenegro’s
reservists, Serbian volunteers; a particularly vicious
attack happened on December 6th 1991, which has drawn
world’s attention on Serbia and Montenegro’s aggression
on Croatia, marked the breaking point in perception of
conflicts in former Yugoslavia and made the world public
opinion change as far as war in Croatia is concerned.
36. The Old bridge in the city of Mostar, synonymous to
be the link between the east and west, Islam and Christianity,
destroyed on November 11th 1993 under unclarified circumstances,
by Croats (the crew of a Croatian tank). That crew by
all available data had been paid to destroy the bridge
for three TV crews who were filming it to have a breaking
news story. The crew of the tank was identified, they
were indicted, the trial has started but it has never
37. Ahmići and Stupni dol in Central Bosnia – places where
Croats and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina clashed
in the spring of 1993, where Croats committed the alleged
war crimes. The unclear role the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
played in the ranks of the army were armed civilians and
soldiers. In his book “The Muslim-Croat war in Central
Bosnia 1992 – 1994” that question was addressed by Paul
Shrader: “A student of the military history should at
first glance notice the eerie similarity of the position
held by Croats on the floor of Lašva Valley with the fortified
French camp in Dien Bien Phu in 1954… the greatest similarity
being in equal, tactically unfavorable position in which
about 8,000 Croatian fighters at the valleys floor were
surrounded with multiple numbers of Muslim forces on the
surrounding hills… As was the case, Croats were defending
their homes and families but the French weren’t. One can
hardly blame Croats for wanting to avoid similar fate
(French in Dien Bien Phu) and for the decisive action
in order to secure the hills surrounding the Lašva valley
from the Muslim forces.” P. Shrader in chapter “Operational
38. “Bljesak” (The Blitz) – May 1st and 2nd 1995; Croatian
military and police action to liberate western Slavonija.
39. “Oluja” (The Storm) – August 4th – 8th, Croatian army
and police operation undertaken to liberate occupied territories
of the Republic of Croatia (except eastern Slavonija which
was peacefully reintegrated in 1998).
40. “Croatian aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina” Jean
Cot “Posljednji balkanski rat”, Zagreb 1997, Hrvatska
sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest “…it
will also be said how Croats have reached the same result
(ethnic cleansing) by using similar if not the same methods
in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia during the war with
Muslims in 1993” translated from Croatian, page 149.
David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja”, Zagreb 1998 “…Tuđman shouldn’t
be allowed to avoid the responsibility for spurring the
idea of Herceg-Bosna. Mostar was an ugly episode of ethnic
cleansing…” translated from Croatian, page 225.
41. SAS – Special Air Service – according to the witnessing
of Canadian soldiers in the book “Tested Mettle”, page
163, one SAS team was with them in the bunker during the
Medak Pocket operation. During wars in former Yugoslavia
there was a notable presence of all main intelligence
and security world services. Croatia at that time was
the center of a vivid intelligence activity.
42 Humanitarian organizations from Red Cross to UNHCR,
Red Crescent, El Haramein, Muwafaq… Islamic humanitarian
organizations that channeled the Mujahedin into Bosnia
and Herzegovina, later in Kosovo and Macedonia also.
43. “foreign mercenaries, the dogs of war” – one UN Security
Council report was dedicated to the role of mercenaries
participating on all sides in the former Yugoslavia conflict.
44. Samantha Power “A problem from Hell” – “The United
States and its European allies are continuing to pay for
their earlier neglect of the Balkans by having to grapple
with mounting violence that threatens the stability of
southeastern Europe”, page 513
Brendan Simms “Unfinest hour: Britain and the Destruction
of Bosnia” – Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London 2001
– David Owen in the USA to two senators answering to their
criticism of Owen’s peace strategy “You do not have troops
on that territory. I speak in the name of the country
(Great Britain) that has troops on the ground” according
to the Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian issue, The Bosnian Institute,
London, 2003, page 119.
45. On January 2nd 1992 in Sarajevo a Ceasefire Plan was
signed, which was implemented the next day, January 3rd
1992. UN Security Council resolution 727, dated January
8th 1992 “…welcomes the signing of the treaty to implement
the Sarajevo signed agreement on the modalities how to
unconditionally reach the ceasefire, agreed upon on December
46. On February 21st 1992, 743 UN Security Council resolution
on establishing the UNPROFOR for Croatia with one-year
47. April 7th 1992 – 749 resolution about troops deployment
to start in middle of May. UNPROFOR takes responsibility
in Sector East and after it in the remaining three sectors;
that is on the occupied Croatian territories.
48. On March 3rd 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina government
proclaimed their country’s independence. On April 7th
USA recognized the new Bosnia and Herzegovina republic,
which on May 22nd 1992 together with Slovenia and Croatia
became a member of UN. On April 5th 1992 the Sarajevo
siege began, marking the start of the war in Bosnia and
49. UN mandate enlargement to include Bosnia and Herzegovina.
752 Resolution on May 15th 1992.
50. 753 resolution on May 18th 1992. UN Security Council
recommended Croatia should become the UN member. On May
22nd, the Republic of Croatia becomes a full member of
51. According to the official UN reports during the UNPROFOR
mandate in Croatia, the so-called “Republika Srpska Krajina’s”
artillery fire on civilian objects caused the death of
about 600 Croatian civilians and the destruction of 210.000
houses outside the UNPA zones. The high commissioner for
human rights report (UNHCR) session on November 11th 1993
52. The UN implementation mandate – to re-integrate occupied
Croatian territories. 762 resolution on June 30th 1992
– “Pink Zones” as temporary solution until the Croatian
government full control over these areas should be achieved.
780 resolution on October 6th 1992 – “Import-Export and
transit on the Republic of Croatia territory under UN
protection (UNPA zones) can be done only with the Croatian
government’s permission… except humanitarian and medical
53. The agreement on cooperation between Republika Srpska
Krajina and Republika Srpska was reached on May 20th 1993
and the referendum about the annexation of RSK to RS was
held on forming of an unified Serbian state west of Drina.
The reference date was June 20th 1993. The question “Are
you for the sovereignty of RSK, unification with RS and
at a later date with the rest of the Serbian territories?”
was answered with “Yes” by 98.6 percent of vote. Before
that Serbian generals from Bosnia and Herzegovina and
from Croatian occupied territories had signed an agreement
on military cooperation in the case of an attack on any
part of the “Western Serbia”. “The unified defense of
the Bosanska Posavina corridor and Republika Srpska’s
army’s engagement in North Dalmatia and Lika defenses
in the 1993 is the most valuable part of Serbian military
krajina and Republika Srpska army’s relations” (translated
from Serbian, M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda
verlag 2000, page 167.
54. 802 resolution on January 25th 1993 condemned the
Croatian attack on Srpska Krajina – Maslenica operation
55. June 21st 1992 Miljevac plateau was liberated, so
that Dalmatian cities (Šibenik, Skrad, Vodice, Biograd)
would be spared from Serbian artillery attacks
56. On January 22nd 1993 the Maslenica operation enabled
Croats to build a pontoon and later build the new Maslenica
Bridge, the original being destroyed by Serbs in 1991
– the operation meant the end of Dalmatia’s transport
and communication isolation
57. January 27th 1993 – liberation of Peruča dam, into
which Serbian rebels planted explosives in order to cause
downstream massive flooding – several dozen thousand civilian
lives were endangered, and though the explosive was not
activated, the swift Croatian army’s action defused the
great ecological catastrophe.
58. 807 resolution on February 19th 1993 by which UN expresses
its decisiveness to ensure UNPROFOR’s security.
59. UN’s confidence in Croatian cooperativity – 908 resolution
on March 31st 1994 in which UN Security Council “assures
and confirms UNSC support of the Republic of Croatia territorial
integrity and sovereignty… Peace processes are plausible”
(in three instances Republic of Croatia is commended for
60. Limited military and police operations which rebel
Serbs called “mice bites” considering them a sign of Croatian
army’s weakness, as it was not able to engage in the battle
with the Serbian army – army of rebel Serbs in the Republic
of Croatia could of course count on the “brotherly help”
from Republika Srpska and Serbia/Montenegro
61. 762 resolution on July 30th 1992 which establishes
“Pink Zones”, Serb occupied zones bordering UNPA zones,
undisputed parts of Croatia that should be brought under
Republic of Croatia’s jurisdiction as soon as possible
62. “Real threat strategy” or “the strategy of revenge”
which was presented in Belgrade in August 1993 by lieutenant
general Radovan Radinović, ex JNA military theoretician,
head of the strategic studies and defense politics, department
of the Federative Republic Yugoslavia Ministry of Defense
– the strategy of military response using heavy artillery
and rockets on civilian targets in Croatia. That strategy
was devised as a final response to Croatia which was in
the strategically impossible situation and therefore “doomed
as a state to die after a prolonged agony” – R. Radinović
quoted from his strategic situation analysis
63. The unification of “RSK” and “RS” armies up to 1995
the combined forces and direct intervention of “RSK” forces
in “RS” during Bosanska Posavina battle in 1992, and battles
waged around the town of Bihać in 1994/1995; the “RS”
military have fought in Croatia – Lika, North Dalmatia
and Western Slavonia.
64. 891 resolution on October 4th 1993 – three subordinated
commands of UNPROFOR were established: HQ for Croatia,
HQ for Bosnia and Herzegovina and HQ for Macedonia. The
mandate for UNPROFOR was thus finally devised on three
65. Erdut agreement – June 15th/16th 1993
66. UN document S/2633 – annex to the Erdut agreement
on June 15th 1993, about Republic of Croatia’s military
and police withdrawal from the territory liberated in
Maslenica operation to be completed to July 31st 1993
the latest, when UN would take control
67. Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
dated January 1993
68. President Tuđman’s peace plan proposed to the UN general
assembly on September 28th 1993
69. International Conference for Former Yugoslavia – first
presiding Cyrus Vance, later David Owen and together with
him Thorvald Stoltenberg, special UNSC General Secretary’s
envoy. The conference was found on August 26th/27th. Vance
was the representative of the UN Secretary General. Later
his role was taken by Thorvald Stoltenberg. David Owen
was the EU Presidency representative. In Geneva ICFY should
decide the framework for achieving an agreement in the
spirit of the UN and EU political initiatives. 31 countries
in its governing board.
70. David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja” Hrvatska sveučilišna
naklada, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 1998,
page 78. “Unfortunately UNPROFOR could never really undermine
the power and the influence of the Serb paramilitary forces…
Croatian refugees and people expelled never stood a chance
to return to their homes which they have left during and
after 1991 fighting… It was a clear Vance Plan violation,
too long tolerated by UN and which was one of the factors
that made President Tuđman threaten to end the UN mandate…”
(Translated from Croatian)
71. Brendan Simms “Unfinest Hour”, page 20, Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian
edition “…UN sometimes felt that if they were to continue
their mandate they had no choice but to adjust to the
Serb prevailing force. Such was the case in Sector North,
in Krajina (Croatia) held by Serbs, where UN soldiers
soon started mingling with Serbs who on their hand despised
them.” That is an old problem, said the UN official in
Zagreb in December 1994. “…In Sector North Serbs are maltreating
our people and these have fallen in love with them. They
became aborigines” Ibid, page 114. “And really, when people
in the Sandhurst Royal military Academy talked about not
knowing the British officer that hasn’t sympathized Serbs,
that was only a slight overstatement”
Mark Almond, BBC Radio “The politics and the prejudices”
– quoted in Vjesnik 1992 by Jasna Zanić Nardini – “…Great
Britain and France especially had sentimental relations
with Serbia… Serbs were perceived as natural allies.”
72. Ibid, page 244, Sunday Telegraph, Con Coughlin, July
1993 “Many a western government, especially the new American
President, have preconceptions that Serbs are primordial
villains, while in reality Croats are an equally guilty
party” Ibid, page 20 – “MI6 anti-Muslim meddling was their
constant game… they do it all the time”
73. 727 resolution on January 8th 1992
74. 743 resolution on February 21st 1992
75. 749 resolution on May 18th 1992
76. 762 resolution on June 30th 1992
77. The “Pink Zones” concept was ideated as a solution
to occupied parts of Croatian territory that didn’t make
UNPA zones. They were undisputed parts of Croatian territory
and had to be returned under Croatian jurisdiction as
soon as possible – all Croatian military and police actions,
Miljevci, Maslenica, Peruča, the Medak Pocket, were in
those “Pink Zones” theatres, areas OUTSIDE UNPA ZONES,
therefore actions that were legitimate and justified
78. 769 resolution on August 7th 1992
79. 779 resolution on October 6th 1992
80. David Owen, “Balkanska Odiseja”, Hrvatska sveučilišna
naklada, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 1998,
pages 106 - 107
81. Ibid, page 107
82. 802 resolution on January 25th 1993
83. 743 resolution on February 10th 1993
84. Ibid, page 107
85. Ibid, page 108
86. 807 resolution, March 19th 1993
87. Coordinators – co-presiding David Owen and Thorvald
88. David Owen, “Balkanska Odiseja”, page 108
89. Ibid., page 173
90. 827 resolution, May 27th 1993
91. 847 resolution on June 30th 1993
92. The area of operation of the future Medak pocket military/police
93. David Owen, «Balkanska Odiseja», page 275.
94. Canadian Battalion 1 final report on Medak Pocket
95. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag
2000, page 69, translated from Serbian. “The unreadiness
of volunteers to fight in North Dalmatia was visible...
apart from it the unit from other corps were brought to
North Dalmatia. So the number of Dalmatian corps soldiers
has risen sharply to 27.984 men and officers… On January
25th, to that commanding area (Velika Bobija – Mala Bobija
– Visoka Glava – Marune) Željko Ražnjatović Arkan and
his men arrived. To the Benkovac theatre of operations,
apart from Arkan’s men, 600 fighters from Lapac brigade
also arrived (page 62).
96. “The vertical maneuver” in Maslenica action – the
reinforcement troops, the 1st Division of the 3rd Slavonija
Brigade was transported to the battlefield near Novigrad
and Kašić by helicopters – the Serb counter attack was
repelled and that marked the turning point in Croatian
victory in that battle.
97. General Janko Bobetko’s interview to the “Večernji
list” on January 29th 1994 – “Revealing the secrets when
in a war an attack would start is punishable by death,
and I did quite the opposite. Because of the situation
we were in, I ordered the commander of UNPROFOR’s French
Battalion to be informed when we were going to attack
Četnik forces, and that they had an hour to leave. The
French didn’t listen to me and didn’t withdraw… The French
Battalion was deterring the Serbs to arm themselves with
heavy weaponry, which was under a “double key”. The Serbs
broke into ammunition depots and stole it.
M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag 2000
– “Unfortunately, that same UNPROFOR members have behaved
like cowards and saboteurs during the Croatian army’s
vicious acts in Maslenica and Ravni Kotari areas, taking
care only about the security of their own men, and not
executing those duties assigned to them in Dalmatia… UNPROFOR
soldiers have rushed to the Serbian defense lines in order
to paralyze them. In such a way they helped the Croatian
side beyond any doubt” – page 65, translated from Serbian.
98. Liaison Office with the UN report on August 4th 1993,
Karlovac – “…Two months ago the major part of Krajina
Serb army has returned from Bosnia. They were sent to
Benkovac, Obrovac… every day a new obituary would appear…
the major part of Serbs from Topusko do not want to take
arms. In Topusko and Glina prisons 40 – 50 Serbs are incarcerated.
The Red Cross and UNHCR help is used to feed the army
and the police. Croatian villages are destroyed and burned,
99. M. Sekulić (translated from Serbian) “Knin je pao
u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag 2000 – “At that time Croatia
wasn’t military able to defeat RSK Serbs… (Our duty was)…to
establish and train the RSK army which would be able to
wage war without any help and to oppose Croats successfully”
(page 43) “…The deceit and falsehood continues, that of
RSK defense being an co-effort of army of Krajina and
Yugoslav army” (page 46).
100. “The integrated battleground” – about which admiral
D. Domazet writes in his book “Hrvatska I veliko ratište”,
Udruga Sv. Juraj, Zagreb, 2002.
101. Goran Hadžić, Eastern Slavonia Serb politician, leaning
on Slobodan Milošević’s politics.
102. After their own decision to negotiate the Western
Slavonia status with Zagreb, Serb politicians Džakula
and Zelenika were apprehended (caught) and imprisoned
in Glina prison.
103. Erdut agreement on June 15th/16th 1993 – the Croatian
army was to withdraw from the areas liberated in Maslenica
action, for them to be controlled by UNPROFOR.
104. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 74 “The
number of requests to leave the brigade (Drniš Brigade,
author’s note) is rising. They asked to be assigned civilian
duties. The number of requests for sick leave have increased.
250 men in uniform took such a leave. Soldiers are leaving
their units without authorization. 15 percent of soldiers
of a brigade have run away… The fighters find it to rot
in trenches and mud shelters to be unacceptable, while
at the same time those fighters that have left the battlefield
by their own will are seen in the streets of Knin, engaging
in contraband. (translated from Serbian)
105. “Captain Dragan” – Sneden Daniel, an ex member of
Australian army, born in Belgrade as Dragan Vasiljković,
an emigrant with Australian citizenship, who in “Alfa”
center in Bruška near Benkovac trained the so-called “Knindža’s”;
connected to the very top of FR Yugoslavia security services
(Jovica Stanišić) and to Milošević himself.
106. The “Knindže” – “Captain Dragan” special forces,
that combining the name “ninja” and “Knin” coined themselves
a popular nickname. The RSK volunteers smaller number
of them came from FR Yugoslavia territory, specialized
in reconnaissance and combat – considered to be an elite
107. JNA war-plans “S1” and “S2” source D. Domazet “Hrvatska
i veliko ratište”, Udruga Sv. Juraj, Zagreb, 2002
108. Counterintelligence JNA service – KOS, the military
counterintelligence service formed of the remnants of
WW2 KNOJ, a military service to fight and identify foreign
spies and internal enemies.
109. Cities in Lika where Medak operation was conducted
110. JNA has educated its officers in Great Britain, the
military experts took courses on the College for special
(psychological) warfare in England – such was general
Vuk Obradović – that applied the studied knowledge in
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo wars – disinformation,
indoctrination, artillery and air force attack threats,
crimes, physical and psychological torture.
111. Lt.General Marijan Čad, the commander in chief of
the 13th Rijeka corps, and the commanding officer of the
area “covered” by the corps – in negotiations with the
Croat side agreed on a peaceful retreat of his JNA troops
from Rijeka. The corps was transported to the Boka Kotorska
port in Montenegro by ships.
112. Major-General Trajče Krstevski, taken custody in
Gospić’s Kanjiža barracks, later released with his party;
his vehicle and arms commandeered by the Croatian national
113. Mile Kosović’s interview, given to Robert Bajruši,
“Nacional” on July 17th 2001 “…when talking about destructions
we often forget that in 1991 at one occasion we tried
to overtake Divoselo, but because of the peace talks we
had to withdraw. But then also a couple of houses were
destroyed, meaning that the major part of the village
was already destroyed when the Medak Pocket action began.”
114. Đorđe Božović – Giška, a criminal linked to Yugoslav
secret services fight against “emigrant extremists”. The
Serb paramilitary unit “Beli orlovi” leader, an armed
Serb radical party’s wing, operated in Lika but also in
the rest of Croatia (Slavonia, especially Vukovar), committed
a number of war crimes, like the one in Voćin.
115. Col. General Radovan Radinović, military theoretician,
author of “The real threat” strategy.
116. General Markač’s statement after talking to ICTY
investigators to “Vjesnik” on March 5th 2003 “According
to our intelligence sources, we gathered information that
the other side (under UNPROFOR protection) made preparations
to attack the wider Gospić area where strong Serb forces
were concentrated” – the same in “Večernji list”, March
4th 2003 under the title “Serbs planned to attack from
Medak Pocket” – “from the document seized in “Oluja” it
is obvious that Serbs planned an attack on September 9th
1993, 15 (fifteen) minutes before the Croatian army and
police attacked that area.”
117. The Document – 9th mobile brigade command; top-secret
number 100-1552 dated August 26th 1993 – military top-secret.
118. The Document – 9th mobile brigade command; top-secret
number 100-1632 dated September 3rd 1993 – military top-secret
(the document in addition).
119. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, vlastita naklada,
120. Ibid, page 367
121. Strategic peaks and Velebit Mountain ridges, addition
– special map
122. The cruelty of Serb rebels at the beginning of their
rebellion in 1941 is best described by an Italian commander
quoted in Vladimir Mrkoci article “The people of Croatia’s
rebellion on July 27th 1941” published in “Hrvatsko slovo”
on August 15th 2003. “In that action Serbs wanted to capture
Medak, they announced it to one of our (Italian – author’s
note) patrols overseeing the railway line; they assured
us they would spare the school in which the Italian detachment
was stationed. And really they burned the Ustaša house,
eliminating thus the small Croatian gendarme garrison
without touching the mentioned detachment. The Italian
commander forgot to mention that then some twenty alive
Ustaša, their allies at the time, were burned alive.”
123. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 367.
124. Ibid, page 367.
125. Southern Velebit Mountain peaks overseeing Obrovac
and the Gračac-Obrovac-Maslenica-Zadar main road.
126. The city on river Zrmanja under Mali Alan pass, the
junction of Zadar and Benkovac-Šibenik-Split road, an
important power plant is situated in its vicinity.
127. Colonel, later Major-General Mirko Norac, the founder
and the commanding officer of the 9th mobile brigade “Vukovi”,
wounded in a mine explosion during the Medak Pocket operation.
128. “Vukovi” – the 9th Lika mobile brigade – stationed
129. Lički Osik and Novi Lički Osik – cities in the vicinity
of Gospić on Otočac-Brinje-Josipdol-Zagreb road; where
Serb rebels came the closest to that vital communication.
In Novi Lički Osik an ammunition factory “Marko Orešković”
produced Serb ammunition up to the moment the “Oluja”
130. Perušić – a place in Lika on the same main road which
underwent severe Serbian forces attacks.
131. Gračac – mostly populated by Serbs, situated under
the Mali Alan pass from the Lika side of Velebit; the
Knin junction and the road crossing Velebit Mountains
connect Zadar-Benkovac-Split and the Croatian South.
132. Janko Bobetko “Sve moje bitke” page 378.
133. Ibid, page 379.
134. Ibid, page 380.
135. The Commander in Chief of the Croatian armed forces
– under the Croatian Constitution that function holds
the President of the Republic of Croatia.
136. Ministry of Defense documents – map symbols differ
from those in General Bobetko’s book “Sve moje bitke”
137. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 380.
138. Ministry of Defense documents again differ in labeling
139. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 380.
140. Ministry of Defense documents.
141. Janko Bobetko “Sve moje bitke”, page 380.
142. Ministry of Defense documents.
144. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 381.
145. Ministry of Defense documents.
146. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 381 – 382.
147. Ibid, page 383.
14830. Ministry of Defense documents.
149. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag,
2000, page 51.
150. 103rd Lapac light brigade HQ, September 6th 1993.
151. Praga – double-barreled 20 millimeter anti-aircraft
152. 2nd mobile brigade HQ – defense order, issued on
February 26th 1993.
153. Croatian army during the Medak Pocket operation confiscated
those three cannons.
154. “Globus”, October 4th 2002.
155. Attack on special forces (commandos) on the Velebit
Mountains – “Slobodna Dalmacija”, September 25th 1993,
Tomislav Klauški – “…the Medak Pocket operation itself
was triggered by the Serb killing and massacrating four
members of Croatian special police in the Velebit Mountains.
A couple of days later the order to attack was given and
Croatian special police were in the first echelons of
156. Ministry of Defense documents.
157. Document – to the 15th cops command – top secret
no. 152-293 on September 9th 1993.
158. 1/9th, 2/9th, 3/9th – military numerals of the battalions.
The first number denotes the battalion, second denotes
the brigade; e.g. 1/9th – 1st battalion of the 9th brigade.
159. From the interview with the special police forces’
member D. Jurendić, given to “Jutarnji list” on December
6th 2002 to Davor Butković under the title “The truth
and lies about the Medak Pocket” – “…we (the antiterrorist
police unit) have moved two hours earlier than others,
we were supposed to outflank the enemy by sneaking from
his flanks and back, and before the attack actually started,
we had our policemen wounded in the minefield… Major V.
M. had been wounded by the trip-mine… it was quite an
undertaking to bring a wounded man down the Velebit Mountains’
160. Ibid, “at 06:00 hours we continued advancing with
the artillery backup…we had many wounded…the enemy forces
were cut off at Divoselo…they tried to retreat to the
wooded slopes of Velebit and over Debela Glava…”
161. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page ?.
162. “Jutarnji list”, December 6th 2002, interview with
D. Jurendić – “Serb Krajina Army HQ has given a warning
order to the Lika corps under the Colonel Mile Šušuta
command seven days before the operation started… They
prepared themselves, the CIVILIANS WERE EVACUATED, women,
children and elderly were sent to Udbina…”
163. Ibid, “…they crossed the rough terrain during the
night in smaller groups. They knew that terrain intimately,
a large number of them were successful in doing it…by
day they used artillery fire to pound us, by night they
would cross the terrain…”
164. The minutes of conversation with members of the 103rd
Lapac brigade who pulled out of the “Ustaša” encirclement
– Serbian Krajina army HQ on September 15th 1993.
165. Or(a)nice – map sign appearing with a vocal and without
it – as in Ornice used in JNA maps.
166. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 380.
167. Ozren Žunec “Rat u Hrvatskoj 1991 – 1995 – drugi
dio: od Sarajevskog primirja do završnih operacija”, Zagreb
1998, “Polemos” – www.ffzg.hr/hsd/polemos/drugi page 5
168. “Vjesnik”, November 3rd 1993.
169. Ozren Žunec “Rat u Hrvatskoj 1991 – 1995”
170. “Novi list”, October 13th 2002, Marin Smolčić.
171. Božidar Javorović, “Velikorspska najezda i obrana
Hrvatske”, DEFIMI, Zagreb, 1995.
172. Ibid, page 242.
173. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 381.
174. “Jutarnji list”, December 6th 2002
175. Ibid, “…they raised the combat readiness of all “Serb
Krajina” army… with their artillery and rockets they fired
on Croatian forces…there were many casualties”
176. Ibid, page 381.
177. Ministry of Defense documents.
178. Serbian Krajina army main HQ – regular operations
report on September 12th 1993.
179. Ozren Žunec “Rat u Hrvatskoj 1991 – 1995” pages 5
180. Ministry of Defense documents.
181. Ozren Žunec “Rat u Hrvatskoj 1991 – 1995” pages 5
182. “Fokus” November 15th and 22nd 2002 – “Acquit Bobetko,
Ademi and Norac” by Gaup/Mataušić.
183. Martin Špegelj, “Sjećanja ratnika”, Znanje, 2001,
184. Ozren Žunec, “Rat u Hrvatskoj 1991 – 1995, drugi
dio: Od Sarajevskog sporazuma do 1995.”
185. Davor Domazet – Lošo, “Hrvatska i veliko ratište”,
Udruga Sv. Juraj, Zagreb, 2002
186. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, Zagreb, vlastita
naklada 1997, page 382
187. Ibid, page 380.
188. Globusov Vojni stožer, “Globus”, September 24th 1993.
189. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 379.
190. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 379.
191. Croatian UN liaison office protest, dated February
10th 1993 to the UNPROFOR sector North’s command “…because
of the volunteers from Serbia… in Vojnić 80 Russian volunteers
M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag 2000
– “…the repeated scenario (the arrival of the volunteers
during the Medak Pocket operation) with the volunteer
didn’t give any results…”, page 78.
192. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 382.
193. “Večernji list” September 27th 2002 – “General Stipetić
states: General Bobetko has ordered me to, as a permanent
member of Croatian delegation, to liaise with UNPROFOR,
sign the agreement on withdrawal of Croatian forces. I
argued that I am the Zagreb command post’s commanding
officer, therefore I couldn’t do something for which Gospić
commanding post was there, and I wasn’t briefed about
the action. Bobetko has asked me to sign the agreement
because it was so ordered by Commander in Chief, and when
I did it (Bobetko) said: “I would never sign it myself.””
194. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 383.
195. “Chances for peace”, page 156 – “We suspected that
there were Serbian infiltration groups all over the place”
– proves that Četniks insurged into the demilitarized
zone – the night scuffle between Croatian and Serb foot
patrols in the woods right in front of UNPROFOR soldiers
as described in the same book.
196. “Globus”, Davor Butković, September 17th 1993.
197. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 384.
198. “Globus” October 22nd 1993, “Globusov ratni stožer”
– “In the public opinion that action has compromised Croatia
because of the alleged war crimes. It is necessary to
point out that reports on the ground state that an eventual
breach of international war law wasn’t planned and especially
not ordered from higher instances.”
199. Davor Domazet – Lošo “Hrvatska i veliko ratište”,
page 115 – “…it was an example of how military force is
used to apply a strategic measurable relation, and which
would help to achieve the political objective…”
200. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, page 384.
201. Brendan Simms, “Unfinest hour” – the Serbophyle fascination
with JNA (page 144) – “…all in all British officers had
very pro-Serb feelings and I think that strong anti-Muslim
and anti-Catholic prejudices were present there.”
202. Ibid, page 144 – “Was that the contrast between the
Serbian military “touch” and Bosnians dressed in various
attire and wearing tennis shoes” (Warren Zimmermann) or
Maud Beelman: “…the contrast being in Bosnian army soldiers
wearing red tennis shoes and going to the battlefield
with only one bullet… and therefore had acquired zero
respect in military circles…”
203. Canadian and French have advanced quickly, and their
APC’s have entered the minefield – “Tested mettle” page
140 – “Calvin was instrumental in forcing a road passage
through to the pre-September 9th boundary. The haste of
advance took its toll in the form of mine strikes – three
French armored vehicles were disabled – but still Calvin
pushed his force forward.”
204. Bobetko – Cot talks – Cot spoke of “scorched earth”,
press release of UNPROFOR spokeswoman on September 19th
1993 “The Force Commander General Jean Cot has today been
in Sector South and the Medak Pocket assessing UNPROFOR
operation… “I have found no sign of human or animal life
in the several villages we passed through…”…”
205. During the press conference on September 26th 1993
Shannon Boyd quoted general Cot: “UNPROFOR would finish
its report on Medak in the next couple of days… for UN
peacekeepers there is no excuse for attacks on those who
we came to help.”
206. “Tested Mettle”, page 142 – “The UN commanders and
the Canadian operations cell knew that the 2PPCLI battle
group was playing out a dangerous bluff with the Croats
in order to establish UN Protection force as a credible
deterrent. There was no point in calling media attention
to a situation that might easily backfire into a costly
207. David Owen, “Balkanska Odiseja”, page 297 – “Washington
Post reported on January 11th about strenuous relationships
between Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali and UN
force commander for the Balkans French general Jean Cot,
who according to that newspaper several times ignored
or questioned the authority of civilians in the UN who
208. David Owen, “Balkanska Odiseja”, page 298.
209. “Fokus” weekly, November 15th and 22nd 2002 – “Acquit
Ademi, Gotovina and Bobetko”, Matarić/Gaupp.
210. Samantha Power, “A problem from Hell”.
211. ICTY doesn’t question the legality of the Medak Pocket
operation, but concentrates on the way which the military
action was conducted, and during which war crimes were
committed – said talking to the Voice of America David
Scheffer, former American ambassador in charge for war
212. Janko Bobetko – minutes from the HQ meeting on September
213. “Globus” – Vojni stožer, September 24th 1993.
214. The data about the number of Serbs killed during
war operations in Croatia from 1991 to the “Oluja” in
1995, including the data on the number of killed/disappeared
in the Medak Pocket – seized in the “Oluja” operation.
215. “Globus” – Vojni stožer, September 22nd 1993.
216. Swedish General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, UN forces second
commander from 1992 – 1993 (held that position for five
months), has accused France and Great Britain to use their
soldiers to carry out their political countries’ interests
on the ground and not to apply the UN Security Council
resolutions; after Wahlgren left all the UNPROFOR commanders
were either French or British (Cot, Lapresle, Janvier,
Morillon, Rose, Smith and Canadian Lewis MacKenzie).
217. Wahlgren has claimed that UN operations were not
directed from UN but from Paris or London, these two cities
and not the UNPROFOR commander had direct access to intelligence
information. When Wahlgren got the intelligence reports,
those were already processed and selected as those who
had gathered them suited.
218. Globus – Vojni stožer, September 24th 1993.
220. “Nacional”, Robert Bajruši, July 17th 2001
222. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 77 “In
Medak Pocket fighting Lapac light brigade has left their
battle positions on their own will and returned to Donji
Lapac. Because of such behavior the paramilitary and “vojvoda”
David Rastović, the Lika corps commander will issue an
order to prevent desertions of the subordinate units in
the theater of operation.”
223. “Nacional”, Robert Bajruši, July 17th 2001
225. The data from the President of the Republic cabinet’s
chief, dr. Ivica Kostović
226. “Hrvatski vojnik”, November 5th 1993, No. 50. – report
from Brigadier Drago Krpina press conference.
227. Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke”, pages 685, 688.
228. List of killed Serb soldiers in RSK up to “Oluja”
operation – data confiscated during the “Oluja” operation.
229. “Hrvatski vojnik”, No.50. on November 5th 1993.
231. “Večernji list”, September 21st 1993, M. Č.
232. “Hrvatski vojnik”, No.50. on November 5th 1993.
233. “Arena” weekly, No. 2216, on June 5th 2003
234. “Hrvatski vojnik”, No.51. on November 19th 1993.
235. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the
department commanders of the main HQ staff on September
236. “Večernji list”, September 27th 2002 – “Stipetić
warned Bobetko that Croatian forces couldn’t pull out
on September 15th because it is too short a time for such
an operation, therefore he made a deal with UNPROFOR for
withdrawal to last another two days.”
237. “Slobodna Dalmacija”, September 13th 2002, Tomislav
Klauški – “Domazet’s report could additionally accuse
General Bobetko” – the alleged Domazet’s report to the
President of the Republic and the chief command HQ.
238. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the
department commanders of the main HQ staff on September
240. Sean M. Maloney & John Llambias “Chances for
peace”, Vanwell Publishing Ltd., St. Catharine’s, Ontario,
2002 – page 183 – “There was a sort of a ceasefire, because
we were there. I guess one night Serb or Croatian patrol
bumped into the section up on the hill and there was a
huge firefight all around them. They were just dug in
and they could hear the patrol in the woods calling “Hey,
UNPROFOR! Hey, UNPROFOR!” and from the other direction
they could hear others coming and all hell broke loose
but no bodies were found. You could see flashes, and it
was like a platoon encounter.”
241. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the
department commanders of the main HQ staff on September
243. VONS – Vijeće Obrane i Nacionalne Sigurnosti – the
Defense and National Security Council transcript as published
in the American weekly “Harper’s magazine”, December 2001
issue, quoting General Bobetko as saying in the minutes
on September 12th and 19th 1993: “We have handed in 52,
so to say, identifiable Serb corpses, and the rest were
disposed of. There were some 50 to 60 bodies left in the
woods because it was difficult to transport them from
that position. But it may have been that they (UNPROFOR)
entered the theater too soon. They couldn’t have found
anything there, at least I think so.”
244. “Globus”, October 15th 1993, Davor Butković – “Why
has General Ademi, the man who successfully defended Šibenik,
been relieved of his duties? Brigadier Drago Krpina has
representing the Ministry of Defense political department
signed the decision to relieve General Rahim Ademi of
the duty of the commander of the Gospić commanding area,
and also he signed the decision to relieve the 12th homeguard
battalion Captain Mile Kosović – because of the most objective
investigation about some breaches of the international
war law conduct that might have been committed during
the Croatian army counteroffensive in the Gospić area
to be done.”
245. The anonymous witness from the Ministry of Defense,
an ex MP member.
246. The witness being the author of this case study himself,
then (in 1993) I held the position of the Ministry of
Defense SIS department chief.
247. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the
department commanders of the main HQ staff on September
248. The FR Yugoslavia Constitution voted on Žabljak in
Montenegro on April 27th 1992. The so-called “Žabljak
Constitution” which marked the end of the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia, and a new Social Republic of Yugoslavia
was formed, including Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro;
The decision to proclaim the constitutional charter of
the union of Serbia and Montenegro od January 1st 2003
caused the name of that state to change into the Serbia
249. Samantha Power, “A problem from Hell”, page 264.
250. “The Vancouver sun”, “MP’s listen in awe to story
of battle”, Ottawa, April 28th 1998, Jim Calvin’s presentation
in the Canadian parliament and also Rod Dearing witnessing
in “Tested Mettle”, pages 135 to 137.
251. The UN called for a ceasefire on September 14th 1993
(addition): “The Security Council expresses its profound
concern at the reports from the Secretariat of recent
military hostilities in Croatia, in particular the escalation
of the means employed, and the grave threat they pose
to the peace process in Geneva and overall stability in
the former Yugoslavia. The Council reaffirms its respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic
of Croatia and calls both sides to accept UNPROFOR’s proposal
of an immediate ceasefire. It calls on the Croatian Government
to withdraw its armed forces to positions occupied before
September 9th 1993, on the basis of that proposal, and
calls on the Serbian forces to halt all provocative military
actions” ,UN Security Council document marked S/26436.
252. The liaison office for the UN and EU reports, Zagreb,
September 21st 1993, about Serbs firing from the CANBAT
positions and bringing the Četnik reinforcements. “12
Četniks have at 12:15 hours embarked east of Medovača”
– the attempt to enter the demilitarized zone, the patrols
clashes as described in “Chances for peace”.
253. UNPROFOR, Sector South, September 15th 1993 – “The
situation is tense and likely to deteriorate by the 16th…if
the recent Serb reinforcement is anything to go by…then
the immediate scenario is going to be…Serb military action
to regain lost ground…”
254. The UN inefficiency… more than 600 civilians killed
during their mandate, the material goods being destroyed…
- Adalbert Rebić, the Chief of Government office for the
killed, missing and displaced persons report.
255. The UN (New York) warning to refrain from all further
actions – “…the UNPROFOR ceasefire framework to be accepted
recommendation” – UN Security Council document S/26436.
256. “Chances for peace”, page 153 – Captain David MacKillop
“…the Serbs and Croatians would exchange fire. There was
a Serbian position with their mortars, there were Serbians
intermingled with our forces…” – the report about Serb
commandos trying to enter the demilitarized area behind
257. CANBAT 1 Final report on Medak Pocket operation,
September 30th 1993 – “The cause of the Croatian fire
in some cases could have been attributed to Serbian force
sniping at Croatian positions and using UN forces as a
258. “By the end of the battle” Darah Hansen “Richmond
news” December 12th 2002, “Bravery in Croatia” July 4th
2002 – “…in a battle that was largest since the Korean
war”; “The Medak massacre: Canada’s trial by fire” The
Sunday (Toronto) star, November 1st 1998 – “Canada’s role
in the battle of the Medak Pocket”; RCMP News release,
December 2nd 2002 – “…the little-known battle for which
these soldiers were recognized…”
259. “Nacional”, December 12th 2002 “Canadian citation
for the inexistent battle they waged with Croatian army”
Robert Bajruši/Eduard Šoštarić – the title itself speaks
of the Canadian myth (the battle) which according to all
available facts never happened, and never caused 27 Croats
to be killed…but was the simple firefight by which CANBAT
broke the ceasefire.”
260. The visa regime in which Canada asks Croatians to
fill in forms, asking about details considered in all
civilized countries to be a military secret – like, whether
part in the Homeland war, in which war were, what was
the commanding officer’s name etc.
261. “Chances for peace”, page 219 – “…got to do patrols,
foot patrols, they called it “hunting Croatians””.
262. Sources speaking of Croatian “ethnic cleansing”:
“Tested Mettle”, “Chances for peace”, UN documents – Mazowiecki,
263. “Tested Mettle”, page 46 – “Hey, welcome to fucking
Croatia”, page 165 – “…we’ve been humiliated and threatened
long enough by these bastards” (Croats and others).
264. “Chances for peace”, page 145 – Major Tony Kaduck
– “…Are we doing any good? I thin we are (in Croatia)…the
fact that we are roped into a humanitarian support mission
without the ability to defend ourselves effectively means
that we are hostages to fate. We’ve had to make all kinds
of deals with the devil just to get the food through.
I question whether that mission has achieved anything,
but there is no question in my mind that the mission in
Croatia has achieved something.”
265. Momo Kapor – granny Danica, the story about the old
woman armed with mortar and a machinegun, originally from
Divoselo, published couple of days before the Medak Pocket
operation has started in the monthly “Vojska Krajine”
number 6 for September 1993 – “…in the military blouse,
which reached her knees, in the skirt – and the touchiest
detail of them all – wearing her slippers, the “pantofles”,
and manning her machinegun, she didn’t have time to chat.
Her gaze was locked to the bush and hedge way where the
enemy could appear…” quote from “Vojska Krajine”, April
27th 2001 – “Novi list” December 13th 2002, Marin Smolčić
– “Danica Obradović…Browning 12.7 millimeter and her 82
millimeter mortar she endearingly called “the Četnik”.
266. “Večernji list”, March 4th 2003 “Serbs planned to
attack from the Medak Pocket” – “General Markač has to
the ICTY given the documents according to which Serbs
have planned an attack on the Medak Pocket, and the Croat
forces have beaten them to it for only 15 minutes… according
to these documents it is visible that soldiers (Serbs
– author’s remark) in the Medak Pocket were mingled with
civilians” – same in the Canadian sources (“Tested Mettle”,
“Chances for peace”)
267. “The Vancouver sun”, The Canadian Press, The Calgary
Herald the report from Ottawa on April 27th 1998 – the
retired Lt.Colonel Jim Calvin speech to the Canadian MP’s.
268. The Canadian soldiers to regain their credibility
– Lee A. Windsor’s conclusion.
269. Military history: 1945 to present – Peacekeeping:
271. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire: Canadian
implementation of the Medak Pocket agreement”, The Ottawa
citizen/Novi list – “On September 15th in the Medak Pocket
battle 1000 Canadians and 1120 French fought. Although
Croatian army used artillery, it had to ask for a ceasefire
only two days after the battle started…this battle is
a textbook example of the peace imposing operation.”
272. The incident involving Canadian soldiers and Croatian
policemen in Garešnica – “Tested Mettle”, page 85 – “Garešnica
was technically outside UNPA, it boasted the best watering
hole in the vicinity…barroom brawl…five Canadians and
two dozens of Croats…four APC’s and heavily armed troops
roared into Croatian national territory – they had no
authority to cross into Croatia…that had practically sparked
a major international incident.”
273. Lee A. Windsor, “Professionalism under fire”.
274. UN Security Council appeal to reach a ceasefire of
September 14th 1993.
275. “Chances for peace” Sean M. Maloney & John Llambias,
page 129, Lt.Colonel Jim Calvin – “In my mind it was unique
operation in that it was almost like an offensive operation.”
276. Military history: 1945 to present.
277. “Chances for peace”, page 177 – “The Croatian police
dicked us around a bit”. “Yeah, in my experience the Serbs
dealt better with us.” – “Tested Mettle”, pages 85-86.
278. Ibid, page 141-142, Major Tony Kaduck’s account.
279. “Richmond news”, online edition, December 12th 2002
– “UN soldiers pinned as heroes” Darah Hansen – reserve
soldier Marc Lundie account – “The Croats were trying
to stop us by force of arms.”
280. “Chances for peace”, page 131 – “Even at the end
when we had gone through this thing with the Croats, they
were not our enemy. Our guys were able to sit there and
determine the fact that yes, they were shooting at us
and they tried to kill us. They were the enemy and we
were going to try to tune them before they tuned us. But
as soon as that was done and we sat up our checkpoints,
the Croats were no longer the enemy. We didn’t like them
but we were now a professional army doing a professional
281. “Tested Mettle”, page 139.
282. Ibid, page 140.
283. Jim Calvin’s disposition in the Canadian Parliament.
284. General MacKenzie according to the Branimir Gajić/Milorad
Ivanović article “Why we kept silent about the Medak Pocket”,
Belgrade, December 12th 2002.
285. “Tested Mettle”, page 126.
286. SITREP on September 16th 1993, signed by Colonel
Maisonneuve – “Croatian attitude is constructive and appears
genuine… Croatian forces showed good level of cooperation…”
287. Admiral D. Domazet – Lošo “Hrvatska i veliko ratište”,
page 154 – the French and the British meddling in how
to conduct UN operations was visible – “When General Wahlgren
claimed that these operations were not guided by UN in
New York but its operational bases were Paris and London.”
288. “Tested Mettle”, pages 125-126 – “There had been
a lot of bad blood generated between the Serb local population
and the French UN troops earlier that year. During the
January Croat offensive, the French prevented the Serbs
from rearming themselves with their own stockpiled weapons.
At the same time, the French had failed to provide any
physical deterrent to the attacking Croats. By the time
reinforcements, rushed up from the rear, had stabilized
the line, hundreds of UNARMED local Serb militia had been
captured or killed… With the replacement of the French
by the Canadians, it was hoped that this situation would
289. VOPP – Vance-Owen Peace Plan for former Yugoslavia,
the most part of it dedicated to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
290. General Cot flew to Gračac to meet Calvin on September
15th in the morning – “Chances for peace” page 121 – “Thank
God General Cot came down to visit. He came to the town
of Medak and for the next hour and a half or two hours
we wandered up and down the streets and he and I had a
little commander-to-commander chat.”
291. “Chances for peace” page 122-123 – quote of General
Cot’s disposition – “…how important it was for the UN
to have a successful mission in Medak… it was imperative
that the international agency retain a degree of credibility
as a deterrent to aggressors.”
292. “Chances for peace” page 123 – “…and they moved ahead
of the Serbs between 13:30 and 14:00. And just about immediately,
C Company in particular but to a lesser extent the French
company came under fire. It started off with small arms.”
293. “Tested Mettle”, page 135.
294. Ibid, page 136.
295. Blic news, Beograd, date unknown.
296. Minefield incidents on September 19th and 26th 1993
– the Generals’ Cot and Bobetko correspondence.
“Tested Mettle”, page 140 – “The haste of advance took
it’s toll in the form of mine-strikes – three French APC’s
were disabled but still Calvin pushed his force forward.”
297. “Chances for peace” page 153-154 – “There was a Serbian
position with their mortars, there were Serbs intermingled
with our forces… So from the Croatian point of view it
looks like the UN has moved in right beside the Serbians
who had been fighting. All day there had been exchanges
of small arms fire between the Serbians and the Croatians.
We were no more than 50 meters away from them, and they
were exchanging fire… I (Capt. David MacKillop) intensified
my negotiations on the ground to get these Serbians to
298. Military history,...
299. “Chances for peace” page 142, Major Tony Kaduck –
“…economic sanctions (against Croatians). This would be
death for the Croatians as they are essentially not under
economic sanctions, which boggles my mind. You have to
look at the Zagreb-Vienna-Berlin axis to understand that
300. Bonnie Korzienewski, MP, Provinces Parliamentary
Legislative Council member
301. “Nedjeljna Dalmacija”, Mirko Galić, October 25th
1996 – “UNPROFOR wounded in Serb minefields” – “In the
immediate aftermath of Croatian army’s victory (in the
Medak Pocket) the “blue helmets” have in September 1993,
been in a great hurry to divide the Croatian and the Serb
forces. This is how the French APC’s entered a field littered
by mines, but there was NO BATTLE WAGED, NOT TO SPEAK
OF THE ALLEGED UNPROFOR’S VICTORY OVER THE CROATIAN ARMY.”
302. “The Ottawa citizen”, October 8th 1996, David Pugliese,
as reported by “Novi list”, Rijeka – “The Croatian daily
denies the Canadian story that the Croatian army and ex
UNPROFOR clashed viciously in September 1993.”
303. The official Croatian data of 10 killed and 84 wounded
in the action from September 9th to September 17th 1993.
304. The Institute for forensic Pathology at the Rijeka
Medical faculty report, signed by doctors Renata Dobi-Bakić,
Petar Kalinič, Alan Bosnar (they did the autopsy on killed
Serb and probably Croatian soldiers also).
305. Sean M. Maloney “Canadian national values”.
306. “Chances for peace”, page 123, Lt.Colonel Calvin
– “…as the soldiers had just won the ground at a price,
and soldiers don’t like to be told by their bosses that
they are going to give up ground that they’ve just taken
307. “Večernji list” September 27th 2002 – General Stipetić
– “My task was not to control the retreat. But as an responsible
officer I wanted to see how that task was done on the
ground. My such intent was prevented, I was threatened
to be liquidated, therefore I gave up…”
308. “Tested Mettle”, page 126 – 127 – “Lt. Green wasn’t
pleased with the French set-up at the school. The digs
themselves were cozy enough (boasting with wine cellar)…but
UN post was located just 200 meters from the Serbian brigade
HQ. Green’s fears were proved well-founded when the first
morning in Medak they were awakened by a Croat barrage
raining down on the schoolhouse… Green found the suitable
house 100 meters away in the village, and instructed Sgt.
Tronholm to occupy it with his section… around their brigade
HQ a motley collection of “homeguard” Serb militia men
assembled…the retiring soldiers began drinking heavily…as
the tensions began to mount between the two Serb units,
first shouts, then shots rang out… the main part of the
commotion was just in front of Green’s schoolhouse HQ,
but armed groups milled all about the darkened village…
About 10 PM… one of the celebrants drunkenly fired a rifle
grenade at the crowd of milling homeguards’ men. Screams
echoed, the blast followed by an eerie silence… just then
a series of shots rang out at Trenholm’s location… a short
burst of C-6 machinegun fire from the school rooftop were
fired by private Trenalis into the front of the Serb HQ…
other Canadian soldiers in the school begun to open fire.
Approximately six (Serb) gunmen in a rough semi-circle
had began firing on the peacekeepers. Back at the schoolhouse
the few bursts fired had also been enough to dissuade
Serbs from furthering the hostilities.”
309. Gospić press conference on September 14th 1993, Brigadier
Drago Krpina mentioned the documents found on Serb volunteers’
bodies’ recovered in Medak Pocket; the statement of M.
Sekulić about arrests and punishments taking place after
Serbs were defeated at the Medak Pocket.
310. Gospić, September 16th 1993, at the Gospić commanding
area during Calvin and Ademi talks, mediated by General
Stipetić, the prolongement of the scheduled deployment
of Canadian and French forces in the Medak Pocket was
agreed upon. The late hour when the agreement was reached
could have caused the Croatian forces to be uninformed
and caused possible consequent misunderstanding.
311. “News release”, Land force Western area training
centre, November 25th 2002, Lt.Colonel Bryan Bailey –
“This operation once again proved the toughness and the
fighting spirits of Canadian soldiers…”
313. “Chances for peace”, page 150 – “…there was a bunch
of Serb M-84 tanks back here. There were four of them…
We knew they were operational because we knew they were
314. “Večernje novosti”, September 13th 1993 – “Warning
rocket attack – the so-called RSK PM’s statement after
the Zagreb suburb was rocketed.” – “Radio Beograd”, the
news on September 14th 1993 – “Our Petrinja correspondent
reports that in early hours the Croatian air force has
bombarded civilian targets in Kordun and the wider Vrgin
most area…the Serb Krajina Army anti-aircraft defense
units have shot down the Croatian MIG-21. The killed pilot’s
name was Miroslav Periš.” – translated from Serbian.
315. UNPROFOR SITREPORT on September 16th 1993, 23:59
– “Most of Croatian army units are withdrawn from these
lines (Lički Ribnik-Divoselo) with expectations that all
Croatian army forces will withdraw all their positions
in Medak region. After starting of shelling at 22:15 hrs
is quiet in this area at 23:45 hrs.”
316. Ozren Žunec, “Rat u Hrvatskoj 1991-1995”, 2nd part.
317. News release Land force Western area Training centre,
September 25th 2002, Lt.Colonel Bryan Bailey.
318. The ex “rotating” president of SR Yugoslavia Miroslav
Lilić’s testimony at the ICTY Milošević trial as reported
in “Jutarnji list”, June 18th/19th 2002, by the Hague
correspondent Augustin Palokaj: “Milošević made all the
important decisions during the war in Croatia himself.
At the supreme defense council meeting in 1993 Milošević
spoke about the RSK and RS situation…”using peaceful means
we should de facto accomplish what we have already achieved
on the ground”.”
319. Lt.Colonel Calvin’s disposition in the Canadian Parliament.
320. Art Eggleton, Minister of Defence speech in the Canadian
Parliament-April 27 1998.
321. Reliable anonymous Ministry of Defense witness.
322. The Medak UN official investigation about the Medak
Pocket events, based on CANBAT report and the detailed
report of the special review group “Operation Harmony”
323. Art Eggleton, Minister of Defence speech in the Canadian
Parliament-April 27 1998.
324. “The Ottawa citizen”, October 8th 1996, David Pugliese.
326. The Croatian Ministry of Defense liaison office with
the UN/EU Lika, Otočac, September 26th 1993, by Brigadier
Mezić: “Last night at 22:00 hours we were informed an
incident happened when CANBAT foot patrol encountered
an anti-infantry landmine which wounded two soldiers.
Later the Canadian APC, which was to help the wounded,
hit a tripwire mine and two more soldiers were wounded.
We have rushed our ambulance to that position and enabled
them to evacuate passing Podklisa.”
327. General Jean Cot was relieved of his duties – UN
SC Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali was not satisfied
with Cot’s avoiding UN civil affairs representative Cedric
Thornberry in Zagreb, and trying to, using French and
British connections, directly influence the UN SC decisions.
328. French General Bertrand de La Presle, UNPROFOR commander
329. “Chances for peace” page 123 – commander-to-commander
chat about the importance of a successful outcome and
returning the credibility to UNPROFOR.
330. Lt.Colonel Calvin’s disposition in the Canadian Parliament.
331. “The Ottawa citizen”, October 8th 1996, David Pugliese.
334. “The Sunday (Toronto) star” re-telling parts from
“Tested Mettle”, November 1st 1998.
335. “The Sunday (Toronto) star” re-telling parts from
“Tested Mettle”, November 1st 1998.
337. Detailed report of the special review group “Operation
Harmony” on June 16th 2000 – Coffee tampering incident
– “…allegation that soldiers serving under former warrant
officer (retired) Matt Stopford had attempted to poison
him… a number of soldiers in the platoon felt that his
aggressive leadership style could endanger their safety…”
339. Ibid. (“Tested Mettle”) page 130.
340. Ibid. (“Tested Mettle”) page 131.
341. Documents seized in Medak, as presented on Brigadier
Krpina’s press conference in Gospić, September 13th 1993.
342. Ibid. (“Tested Mettle”) page 132.
343. “Arena” weekly, June 12th 2003 – the General Mile
Mrkšić photocopied warning order on the necessity of civilian
evacuation to be prepared. These preparations started
immediately after the Medak Pocket operation in 1993.
344. Evacuation plans in local municipalities, Teslingrad,
Široka Kula, Ostrovica and Barlete – in 1993. The document
is not dated.
345. “The Sunday (Toronto) sun”, by Scott Taylor and Brian
Nolan, October 1st 1998.
346. “Tested Mettle”, page 134.
347. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire: Canadian
implementation of the Medak Pocket agreement”
351. “Tested Mettle”, page 135.
352. The Sunday (Toronto) sun.
353. “Tested Mettle”, page 135.
354. “Chances for peace”, page 151 “The Serbians were
a little antsy with what I (Captain MacKillop) was doing…this
was the basis of a lot of arguing and discontent between
me and Serbs over the next twenty-four hours…”
355. “Tested Mettle”, page 136.
356. “Tested Mettle”, page 137.
357. “Tested Mettle”, page 138.
359. “The Sunday (Toronto) sun”/”Tested Mettle”
360. The transcript of talks held to implement the agreement
– Jeannie Peterson, Civil Affairs, Zagreb HQ, September
16th 1993 – “Drew:…we’ve got to do is ensure that Serb
forces do not infiltrate in behind the Croatian forces
when they withdraw… Q: Back in Ribnik the Croats were
insisting that as soon as you got here on the ground you
turned your guns around towards the Serbian side. What’s
their concern? Drew: They don’t want to leave this area
without being covered to the South. And of course the
Serbians are to the South.”
361. The transcript of negotiations about UNPROFOR re-deployment,
Jeannie Peterson, Civil Affairs, Zagreb HQ, September
16th 1993. Rogulj: After taking over each position, just
to turn your weapons in the Serb direction. Calvin: Yes.
These weapons will all be facing the Serb side, all of
them. Rogulj: If they are not facing the Serb side, I’m
bringing back my tanks.”
362. UNPROFOR SITREP September 17th 1993, 19:50 hours
– report signed by Major Bignon. “CO CANBAT 1 reports
that CA forces delayed advance of CANBAT both days while
systematic and thorough destruction of villages… was carried
out… Buildings not damaged in previous fighting were flattened
and livestock destroyed.”
363. UN SITREP, September 17th 1993, 19:50 hours – report
signed by Major Bignon “Seven bodies were discovered on
initial sweeps and handed over to local civil auth in
Medak… Three Serb soldiers… presented themselves to CANBAT
tps… were handed over to Serb 9 BDG HQ at Medak…an estimate
100 Serb soldiers are still cut off in this area…”
364. “The Sunday (Toronto) star”/”Tested Mettle”
365. Ministry of Defense Main Staff HQ, September 28th
1993 – from the letter General Bobetko wrote to General
Cot: “…there are various interpretations in the press
of how the incidents in the Medak Pocket happened, as
well as the allegations that Croatian army had been shooting
on UNPROFOR members… we propose a joint commission to
be formed in order to establish the facts of what exactly
happened.” From Bobetko’s letter to Cot on September 27th
1993 – “…when your soldiers entered the minefield and
were consequently wounded, Croatian soldiers in order
to be noticed have shot a couple of warning shots in the
air and lit the area with flares…And concluded that wounded
were your soldiers… they offered them their help… everything
was agreed on at once and the Croatian army administered
the necessary help.”
366. Croatian Ministry of Defense liaison office with
the UN/EU report on September ? 1993.
367. CANBAT 1 Final Report on Medak Pocket Operations,
October 7th 1993
368. UNPROFOR Interoffice memorandum, October 10th 1993
– Responsibilities – Medak Pocket operation, J.O.M. Maisonneuve,
370. SAS – Special Air Service, the renowned British special
371. The bunker mentioned in “Tested Mettle” on page 163
– “There had always been a modest number of British SAS
and SBS teams operating in the former Yugoslavia. (A SECTION
OF THEM HAD SHARED A BUNKER WITH MAJOR DREW AND WARRANT
STOPFORD DURING THE MEDAK BOMBARDMENT).”
372. “Tested Mettle”, pages 162 – 163. General Sir Michael
Rose introduced “special force” squads in the region –
“…once Rose took command, he had given his former compatriots
a much freer rein. True to nature of this caliber of troops,
they had immediately made their presence felt throughout
373. “Tested Mettle”, page 163.
374. Brendan Simms, “Unfinest Hour”, page 149.
375. Brendan Simms, “Unfinest Hour”, page 149.
376. Brendan Simms, “Unfinest Hour”, page 149. “The air
strike would for sure convey Mladić a message – the catastrophic
message of first air strikes not being taken against the
main aggressors the Serbs, but against the Croatian scavengers.”
377. Brendan Simms, “Unfinest Hour”, page 149, plan on
air striking the Croats.
378. “Tested Mettle”, page 171-173.
379. “Chances for peace” page 107 – Major Pat Stogran
account – “Originally I wasn’t in the plan to go in (Goražde)
with them but I had established good relations with the
SAS soldiers, who were super soldiers and great guys.”
380. “Tested Mettle”, page 125 – “At the same time he
(Major Dan Drew) passed along an UN intelligence report
which said that the area should be very quiet over the
next few days…with the forecast for relative calm…”
381. “Chances for peace”, page 142 – “…This would be death
for the Croatians as they are essentially not under economic
sanctions, which boggles my mind. You have to look at
the Zagreb-Vienna-Berlin axis to understand that one.”
382. “Tested Mettle”, page 130 – “Croat special forces
and dismounted infantry launched a lightning pincer advance,
rolling up the surprised Serb pockets in a series of deadly,
one-sided fire-fights… (Canadians) watched retreating
Serb soldiers and terrified refugees streaming through
383. Lee A. Windsor, “Professionalism under fire”
387. UN analysis – artillery activity 1994, UN SC S/1994/674
document, May 27th 1994, pages 44 – 46 – “The Serb forces
have, therefore, concentrated their efforts on weakening
the city (Sarajevo) through constant bombardment from
surrounding hillsides…city has been relentlessly shelled…
random process of shelling throughout the civilian areas
of the city… has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian
388. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
389. Janko Bobetko “Sve moje bitke”, pages 685 – 688 –
Zoran Kovačević and Stipe Krnić, two “Vukovi” brigade
members killed during the Croat offensive on Serb positions
(Potkonjaci, Strunići, Divoselo) – Lt.Colonel Mirko Savić,
Serb tank company commander, killed in front of Medak.
390. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
393. “Chances for peace”, page 156 – “Captain David MacKillop:
“We suspected that there were Serbian infiltration groups
all over the place. So my warrant had sort of negotiated
for us. We have to move around. If we are going to move
around, we Canadians will mutter in English, and you the
Serbians will mutter in Serbian, and if anybody out there
is moving around and is stupid enough to mutter, then
obviously it’s either Serbian or Canadian. If somebody
is out there not muttering, we the UN are not going to
shoot them. You, the Serbians, well, we advise that you
don’t shoot them either. Good deal!”
394. The author was a Croatian army’s volunteer on the
battlefield of Sunja in 1991/1992.
395. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
396. “Tested Mettle”, page 142 – “…Came the news of Capt.
Jim Decoste’s death…had been killed in a head-on vehicle
collision with a Serb truck (on September 17th 1993)…
Decoste’s body has been looted by the Serb soldiers and
that the two other Canadians in the vehicle were similarly
violated as they lay injured in the road…” (sic!?)
397. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
400. General MacInnis, second in UNPROFOR command’s order,
issued on September 18th 1993 about upholding the agreement
and that UNPROFOR forces are not to enter the Medak Pocket
before designated time – the document is in possession
of Ministry of Defense liaison office with the UN/EU –
“…the immediate CANBAT halt on their present positions
is commanded. Negotiations with Croatian army to start
is ordered in order to establish whether CANBAT has surpassed
the (agreed upon) lines and to establish the damage done
by bulldozing our (Croatian) lines…”
402. The “Sagger” – antitank Soviet electronically guided
403. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
404. Ibid., page 139.
405. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
406. Samantha Power “A problem from hell”, NY 2002 – “…western
diplomats had at last come to the slow realization that
they were negotiating not with the gentleman (Slobodan
Milošević) but with evil. MILITARY FORCE WAS THE ONLY
407. Samantha Power/New Republic “Rescue Bosnia”, August
17th and 24th 1992 – “…there have been too many platitudes
about the responsibility of “all factions” for the war.
This lazy language is an escape hatch through which outside
powers flee their responsibilities…”
408. Zagreb Agreement, March 29th 1994.
409. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire” / Oehring.
410. S. Power “A problem from hell”, page 507 – “Milošević
saw that he had got away with the brutal suppression of
an independence movement in Croatia and reasoned he would
pay no price for committing genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo…”
411. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
413. Macleans Magazine, September 2nd 2002 – Michael Snider
with Sean M. Maloney – “Firefight at the Medak Pocket”
414. Nation post – Chris Wattie – “Bravery in Croatia”,
July 4th 2002.
415. The Ministry of Defense liaison office for the UN/EU
report from Karlovac about the transit of the Canadian
column through Turanj, June 26th and 27th. “…the CANBAT
on its way to Knin passed through Turanj. Column of 167
“Chances for peace”, page 116 – Lt.Col. Jim Calvin – “…I
did a 550 kilometer road move from Sector West with about
150 APC’s and in 36 hours we arrived in Sector South…
we arrived ready to do our job and General Cot couldn’t
believe it. He just about kissed me.”
416. !Chances for peace”, page 171 – Corporal Andrew Opatowski
“A Serbian army guy walked by with an AK-47 and shot our
dog, Buddy. He just walked by, locked and loaded and shot
the dog… There were other incidents with the Serbs…a mortar
struck about 50 meters away…”
Incident with Serbs in Medak – “Tested Mettle”, pages
417. UN SITREPORT for September 15th 1993 document with
the chronology of the September 6th to 19th 1993 events,
which General Jean Cot sent to the Croatian army main
staff HQ chief General Janko Bobetko on September 22nd
1993 – “22:15 CROATIAN ARMY ENGAGED CDN BATTALION WHO
418. Mr. Milisav Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda
Verlag GmbH, Bad Vilbel, 2000
419. Major-General Milisav Sekulić, born November 11th
1935 in Trbušnica, Serbia. Graduated at the military academy,
JNA’s political school, higher military academy, territorial
defense school and liberal arts faculty (philosophy).
Master of war sciences, specialty: operational HQ operations.
Published more than 200 professional and scientific works.
Wrote “Jugoslaviju niko nije branio, a Vrhovna komanda
je izdala” (Yugoslavia wasn’t defended by anyone, and
its military brass betrayed it) (Nidda Verlag, 1997).
Since the war started he was appointed a duty in the JNA
main staff HQ. After his colleagues, who already were
fighting in 1993 invited him, he joins them in Knin; takes
the duty of the head of the operational and educational
department, and is promoted to Major General. The first
hand witness of what went on in Srpska Krajina army, that
decided its fate, its relations with the political RSK
leadership and with Yugoslav army’s main staff HQ.
420. Milisav Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 45.
4210. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 73 – “…Among
combatants there is the dissatisfaction prevailing, because
the rotation troops didn’t really arrive to relieve them
being on the frontline for four months. Therefore the
combatants demand for their shift to come within ten days
the latest. If that is not done, they have threatened
to leave their positions and to come to Knin to picket
the core command and Krajina main staff HQ” (translated
from Serbian) – the 7th Dalmatian corps command’s report
to the Srpska Krajina army main staff HQ in the second
half of May.
422. Ibid, page 74.
423. The command for assuming full combat readiness to
the 9th mobile brigade HQ – top secret no. 100-1632 dated
September 3rd 1993; The 9th mobile brigade HQ order top
secret no. 100-1697 dated September 8th 1993.
424. M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 74.
425. Ibid, page 75.
426. Ibid, page 75.
427. Ibid, page 75.
428. Serbian Krajina army HQ – September 8th 1993 – Information
to subordinate units.
429. Ibid, page 75.
430. 9th mobile brigade HQ command – top secret no. 100-230,
Medak, September 15th 1993.
431. Ibid, page 75.
432. Ibid, page 76.
433. Ibid, page 77.
434. “RSK” HQ, top secret no. 61-227, September 10th 1993.
435. Ibid, page 77.
436. Ibid, page 77.
437. Ibid, page 77.
438. Ibid, page 78.
439. Ibid, page 78.
440. Ibid, page 80.
441. RSK, Serbian army HQ, top secret no. 38-788/1, September
18th 1993, the commission to establish military losses
– report to the commander in chief of the Serbian Krajina
army, top secret.
443. Annex to the report to the commission of RSK, SK
army HQ top secret no. 38-788-2 dated September 25th 1993.
449. RSK, parliamentary commission, report on September
8th 1993 events on the Divoselo, Čitluk and Počitelj area,
presented in Knin on October 15th 1993 – the members of
the commission Mile Paspalj, Neđo Mandić, Rade Leskovac
and Rade Čubrilo.
450. “Veritas”, 1994 – the publication “Krvavi septembar
u Lici 1993”.
453. The session of so-called RSK Parliament ,Government
and General staff of RSK,2.10.1993. Plitvice
454. “Politika ekspres”, September 27th 1993.
455. “Politika ekspres”, September 27th 1993.
456. TV Banja Luka, September 13th 1993.
457. “Vjesnik”, Željko Mataja, September 29th 1993.
458. “Tested Mettle”, page 134 – “As they rolled slowly
forward, Green’s men realized just how close the Serbs
had been to losing the town of Medak itself. The battle
debris and bodies indicated that at one point the Croats
had even managed to establish a foothold in the northernmost
buildings before being beaten.”
459. Savo Štrbac - “We are working as their (the Hague’s)
particular service, because we connected their investigators
with the witnesses…” “Slobodna Dalmacija”, March 27th
460. TV Beograd, 2.Dnevnik, on September 28th 1993.
461. “Veritas”, September 5th 1993.
462. TV Beograd, 2.Dnevnik, on September 16th 1993.
464. TV Banja Luka, September 21st 1993.
466. TV Beograd, 2.Dnevnik, on September 20th 1993.
467. TV Banja Luka, September 28th 1993.
470. TV Beograd, 2.Dnevnik, on September 28th 1993.
471. N. J. Marjanović – “Prah Divosela” – September 29th
472. “Tested Mettle”, page 129 – “A stream of badly wounded
Serbs leaving the embattled Pocket…”; “Chances for peace”,
page 219 – “…every now and then an ambulance would zoom
473. “Veritas” – Bulletin No.4, September 1999.
474. Indictment YU/SC-780-92/DOC-4/SI-177
475. “Veritas” – Bulletin No.16, September 2000.
476. “Krvoproliće u Medaku – rekonstrukcija jednog etničkog
čišćenja”, Vela Ilibašić and Rob Siebeling – based on
J. Tilder’s videotaped interrogation, UN and UNPROFOR
reports and interviews with a large number of witnesses
– represented by “Veritas”, September 2000, bulletin No.
477. The Blewit recommendation of “Veritas” (in addition):
“Letter of Endorsement concerning Centre for collecting
documents and information “Veritas”, March 2nd 2000” –
Graham T. Blewit, deputy prosecutor.
478. Savo Štrbac, after the General Gotovina indictment:
“The Ante Gotovina indictment redefines the history, or
as Račan likes to say “criminalizes the Homeland war”.
In the point 37 of that indictment RSK is recognized as
being a state, and not being called “so-called state”
which had an army. In the indictments point 39 the five
attacks done on the RSK, the territory under UN protection,
therefore Croatia, an UN member has for five times done
an aggression on UN. That opens a wide perspective! Because
if in the Hague the guilt of the commander of the main
Croatian military operation is established, and to what
we are working on, then such commanders would be war criminals,
and those actions they commanded would be war crimes.
The war in which war crimes were committed was not a homeland
and not a defensive war, but the criminal act and an aggression.
The state established therefore on such a war cannot exist
and its constitution should be redefined. That is a chance
for us Serbs to, by using legitimate and legal means,
win the right for the Republika Srpska Krajina’s statehood”
– Belgrade media reports.
479. International witnesses – it possibly concerns ex
civilian and military UNPROFOR members (such as General
MacKenzie), “foreign mercenaries”, journalists, humanitarian
480. “Balkan repository project – Yugoslav crisis 1993”
481. Though Stoltenberg’s declaration refers to the Bosnia
and Herzegovina, it is also applicable to the situation
in the Republic of Croatia.