Protecting Dayton’s Shared Governance by Countering Faux Narratives of Russia’s Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Volume 25, No. 1, 2024.)
12 tra 2024 05:59:00

Author: Marta Vrbetic


Original scientific paper

Received: January 21, 2024

Accepted: April, 12, 2024


Abstract: It is well-known that Russia seeks to undermine the Western order in the Balkans, such as supporting Serbs in their rejection of NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). However, some assertions of Russia’s influence discussed here show no merit and seem to have been brought to delegitimize the Western installed peace order vital to the stability of the region: the 1-2-3 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) with one state, Preuzmite članak u PDF formatu two entities, and three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats). The meaningless assertions include disinformation against High Representative Schmidt as a Russia man; the misrepresentation of the U.S. -E.U. led electoral reform as the one benefitting Russia; the frequently repeated falsehoods that NATO and EU member state Croatia is aligned with Putin or that some U.S. officials embrace Russia’s values. Such disinformation narratives do not show the ties between the supposed Russian assets and Kremlin, nor do they demonstrate that the alleged pro-Russian actors pursue pro-Kremlin policies. Instead, they tend to be based on the ludicrous claims that the very support for the Dayton categories of ethnic power-sharing reflects the embrace of Russia’s values under President Putin. Striking at the core of the Dayton peace bargain, the anti-Dayton unitarists want the DPA to guarantee BiH’s external borders, while urging the international community to dismiss the DPA designed two-entity state structure (important to Serbs) or ethnic power-sharing (important to Croats) to impose a centralized, unitary state with a majority rule, or the so-called “civic state.” However, besides thwarting (Serb) secessionism and (Croat) separatism, the purpose of Dayton has been to prevent (Bosniak) majoritarianism. The intensity of the debate surrounding the disinformation activities discussed here shows that--though the DPA still remains relevant to the BiH postwar peace and the Western Balkans stability--the consensus on what Dayton is or should be is now collapsing.


Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Agreement, power-sharing, Croatia, Russia, disinformation, liberal peace, nation-building.




In the weeks preceding Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russia had no intention of invading Ukraine (BBC, 2022). About 100,000 Russian troops had massed at Russia’s border with Ukraine before Russia’s Defense Ministry announced it would withdraw some troops in a sign of de-escalation (Rosenberg, 2022). Meanwhile, there were unmistakable signs of the imminent invasion as Western intelligence sources reported that Russia was building field hospitals near its border with Ukraine (BBC, 2022). On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, Russia’s deception and disinformation activities have been discussed at international conferences, such as the 2023 Zagreb Security Forum (Akrap, 2023) and the problems of the hybrid threats and concerns about Russia have gained broad recognition going well beyond the policy and scholarly circles. 

However, what still remains to be recognized is that some actors can exploit the well-established facts of Russia’s disinformation and Ukraine’s victimization to attract support for their own causes that in reality may have little to do with either Russia or Ukraine. It is such cases of misinformation or disinformation that will be reviewed here—the cases seeking to influence the West’s policies on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by presenting extraneous, incomplete, and even fraudulent narratives as part of the legitimate ongoing effort to constrain Russia. More precisely, discussed here is the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA or Dayton), together with various statements made by anti-Dayton unitarists to discredit the DPA-based BiH Constitution by portraying its ethnic governance as the one serving Putin’s Russia. While some of these misleading statements are intentional falsehoods, the majority of the faux narratives seem to be constructed around unfounded, partial opinions based on select evidence in disregard for the inconvenient data or counterarguments. 

Needless to say, there have been case studies addressing disinformation and hybrid warfare in the countries of South-East Europe (Nehring and Sittig, 2023). The Hybrid Warfare Research Institute of Zagreb also published an analysis of disinformation promoted by the Ljubljana based International Institute for the Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies (Akrap, 2022). In addition, some cases of disinformation originating in the Western Balkans are well-known. Thus, pretending to be a sovereign state—while existing as an integral part of the internationally recognized BiH state—the Bosnian Serb Republic, or Republika Srpska (RS), regularly submits unsolicited reports to the UN Security Council (Republic of Srpska Government, 2023). However, this article does not deal with such familiar cases of mostly Serb disinformation in South-East Europe and Russia’s support for the Serbs’ secessionist aspirations, both of which put well-recognized pressures on the DPA and the internationally recognized BiH’s borders. 

Instead, the hybrid threats analyzed here concern the less discussed cases of disinformation generally propagated by the self-described “pro-BiH actors” who, unlike Serbs, want the West to preserve the BiH state within its internationally recognized borders, while demanding, at the same time, that the West help them dissolve Dayton’s decentralized, shared ethnic governance and force a unitary state with a majority rule. This so-called “civic state” as demanded by the anti-Dayton unitarists--in particular those associated with the SDA-DF political parties--would inevitably empower the Bosniaks as the BiH’s majority constituting slightly above 50% of the total BiH population according to the last (2013) official BiH census (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013a), while disempowering the Serbs (31%) and the Croats (15%).  

Without denying the benefits of democratic civic governance or the existence of some BiH actors genuinely interested in a non-ethnic, pluralist society, the term “civic state” may be placed within quotation marks to highlight the anti-Dayton activism seeking to upset the Dayton’s shared governance in order to impose majoritarian rule, in disregard for the constitutional process and the conditions inappropriate for BiH’s transition to a democratic majority rule at this time. However, the term “anti-Dayton unitarists” will be used here most of the time to denote the supporters of such unconstitutional activities who have also engaged in faux narratives, whether intentionally or unintentionally. 

Supported primarily by Bosniaks and non-ethnically defined Bosnians,  as well as some left-leaning circles in Europe (Sarajevo Times, 2022c), a civic BiH state objective (in this context not placed within quotation marks) may superficially resemble non-ethnically organized Western liberal democracies, thereby holding some appeal in the eyes of certain actors in the West. However, a civic state contradicts the BiH Constitution and Dayton (the two terms can be used here interchangeably). Based on the DPA postwar settlement, the BiH Constitution was designed to prevent—in the interest of peace--majoritarian rule in the historically divided BiH society, where ethnic relations got aggravated postwar. 

Nevertheless, in the recent years, there have been several attempts to disparage the DPA and its supporters, by wrongly tying Dayton’s ethnic governance to the values of Putin’s Russia, thereby seeking to discredit not only the well-known pro-Kremlin actors like the Serbs, but also the pro-Ukraine, anti-Russia actors, such as some EU and NATO member states, including several high-level officials from both Croatia and the United States (Circle, 2022). These anti-Dayton activists claim that—in contrast to the West’s pro-democracy policy on Ukraine--the United States and Europe are betraying BiH by pursuing illiberal, pro-Russia policies such as supporting the allegedly disastrous Dayton-based BiH Constitution (Bassuener et al., 2023; Mujanovic, 2023b). However, BiH’s two-entity structure and ethnic power-sharing have been the tradeoff for keeping a single BiH state. This Dayton compromise has been crucial to ending the BiH war and maintaining peace, thus still enjoying, however imperfect, American and European support. 

Before discussing some anti-Dayton faux narratives, this paper will review the importance of the DPA, in particular its 1-2-3 peace bargain, followed by the discussion of the past Western-led nation-building and a current lack of self-sustaining peace in BiH. Next, the paper will discuss some examples of extraneous, incomplete, misinforming, and disinforming narratives used to undermine the DPA, the peace settlement important for the BiH postwar stability that the anti-Dayton unitarists now falsely portray as an agreement that empowers Russia’s proxies in BiH. 

To clarify, the “old” anti-Dayton activities not reviewed here are primarily those of the BiH Serbs, who notoriously rejected the DPA in the immediate postwar years and demanded full independence, thereby rejecting BiH’s external borders. Under Milorad Dodik, the BiH Serb leader originally helped to power by the United States (Associated Press, 2022) the Serbs’ attitudes began to change towards the acceptance of the DPA. However, upset over the forced revisions of Dayton in the direction of greater centralization, as well as the recognition of Kosovo, the BiH Serbs began threatening outright independence again, now with Russia’s encouragement. These “old,” enduring anti-Dayton activities are well-known and have earned the Serbs sanctions; the United States especially seems committed to curbing the Serb secessionist activities and Russia’s influence on the Serbs (Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, 2023). 

However, the cases reviewed here concern mostly the “new” anti-Dayton “civic state” advocacy that wants to break the Dayton’s 1-2-3 peace bargain by preserving BiH within its internationally recognized external borders while forcibly changing its internal state structure–entities, constituent peoples, or shared ethnic governance--through unconstitutional or undemocratic means. Connected primarily to some Bosniak nationalist circles--especially to the SDA-DF supporters--dismantling Dayton’s ethnic governance has also been embraced, most likely for very different reasons, by some Europe’s progressives (De Bruijn and Vrbetic, 2022). Hence, discussed here are various statements attributed to a politically wide range of actors who rhetorically denounce Russia’s proxies in BiH while in fact aiming at discrediting Dayton’s shared governance through cherry-picking evidence to construct misleading arguments. 


**** ****

For full version, please download pdf file


**** ****



1. Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina (ACBH) (2021). Bosnian American Diaspora Opposes German Push for New High Representative: ACBH letter to U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, 22 February 2021,     

2. Akrap, G. (2022). Security Analysis July 2022, Zagreb: Hybrid Warfare Research Institute, 26 July 2022,   

3. Akrap, G. (2023). Conclusions of the 8th Zagreb Security Forum. National Security and the Future 24(3), 1-17.   

4. Avdic, A. (2020a). Control of the Electoral and Judicial System: Russian Influence on Security and Intelligence Services in BiH. Zurnal, 31 March 2020,      

5. Avdic, A. (2020b). Berlin u saradnji s Moskvom: Njemačka ruši Inzka da dovede Schmidta. Istraga, 23 December 2020,  

6. Avdic, A. (2021). “Reforme” između dva HDZ-a: Izborni zakon na ruski pogon. Istraga, 28 October 2021, 

7. Ascic, M. (2023). Blizak SDA: Sve afere Osmana Mehmedagića Osmice, čovjeka sa crne liste Stejt departmenta. Dnevni Avaz, 15 March 2023,   

8. Associated Press (2022). How Bosnia's Dodik Went from a Moderate Reformist to Genocide-Denying Secessionist. NPR, 8 January 2022,  

9. Bajramovic, A. (2024). Premijer FBIH: Nikšić za "Avaz": Politika kompromisa dala je rezultat, toliko o "izdajama." Avaz, 12 March 2024,  

10. Bajrovic, R. (2021). Biden’s Betrayal of His Bosnia Legacy Is Bad Policy—and Bad Politics. The National Interest, 4 December 2021,

11. Bajrovic, R. (2022). Securing and Protecting Bosnia Amidst Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 29 March 2022, 

12. Bajrovic, R. (2023). Erdogan’s Weak Hand in the Western Balkans. The National Interest, 5 December 2023,   

13. Bajrovic, R. and A. Delkic (2023). Biden’s Shortsighted Policy in the Western Balkans. The National Interest, 31 March 2023,  

14. Bassuener, K. (2024). A Welcome US Course Adjustment – But Now the Western Balkans Needs a Full Policy Recalibration: The Upcoming Biden-Scholz Meeting Offers an Opportunity for a Shift. Just Security, 7 February 2024,    

15. Bassuener et al. (K. Bassuener, V. Perry, T. Vogel, and B. Weber) (2023). Gaslighting Democracy in the Western Balkans: Why Jettisoning Democratic Values is Bad for the Region and the Liberal World. Democratization Policy Council (DPC), 27 March 2023, 

16.   Bassuener, K. and S. Selo Sabic (2021). Peace Is Threatened Again in Bosnia, A Quarter Century after Dayton. Just Security, 22 October 2021,

17. Bassuener, K. and T. Vogel (2022). Bosnia’s Dangerous Path: How U.S. Policy Is Making a Bad Situation Worse. Foreign Affairs, 18 May 2022, 

18. Bassuener, K. and B. Weber (2022). US Reinvests in Ethnic Oligarchy in Bosnia, Abandoning Support for Integration. Just Security, 5 October 2022,

19. BBC (2022). Ukraine Crisis: Putin Says He Does Not Want War in Europe, BBC News, 15 February 2022, 

20. Begic, J. (2021). Sarajevo to Build Massacre Memorial without Naming Perpetrators. Balkan Transitional Justice, 27 October 2021,  

21. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (2013a). Census 2013, Bosnia and Herzegovina #49800,   

22. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (2013b). Census 2013, Entity: FBiH #19800,  

23. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (2013c). Census 2013, Entity: RS #29800, 

24. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (2013d). Census 2013, Livno, #10588,

25. Buyuk, H. F. (2023). Bosniak Politicians Campaign for Erdogan in Turkish Elections. BalkanInsight, 8 May 2023,  

26. Cagaptay, S. (2023). Erdogan’s Russian Victory: Turkey Is Shifting from Illiberal Democracy to Putin-Style Autocracy. Foreign Affairs, 29 May 2023,  

27. Camut et al., (N. Camut, J. Barigazzi, B. Moens and S. Lau) (2024). The EU’s Viktor Orbán problem: 9 times Hungarian leader has been a thorn in Brussels’ side. Politico, 31 January 2024,  

28. Cengic, I. (2022). Twitter post, 20 March 2022,   

29. Circle 99 (Krug 99), Association of Independent Intellectuals (2022). In Response to Statements Announcement by Circle 99 by U.S. Special Envoy Gabriel Escobar. Sarajevo: Circle 99/Krug 99, 16 April 2022,

30. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), U.S. Helsinki Commission (2022). Helsinki Commission Deeply Concerned over Latest Electoral Reform Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 July 2022,

31. Constitutional Court of BiH (2016). Decision U-23/14 (Ljubic),  

32. Council of the European Union (2023). Infographic: EU sanctions in response to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. European Union, 2023, 

33. Cowan, R. (2022). U.S. House Speaker Pelosi to attend Ukraine forum in Zagreb. Reuters, 23 October 2022,

34. De Bruijn, David (2023). For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Political Reform Cannot Come from the Bench., 21 September 2023,

35. De Bruijn, D. and M. Vrbetic (2022). Losing Balance on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Brussels Morning, 8 November 2022,  

36. Democratization Policy Council (DPC) (2024). Twitter thread and posts, 8 March 2024,,  

37. Depo (2015). Foto/Novi saziv Federalne vlade: Ko su novi ljudi na vlasti u FBiH: Pogledajte biografije izabranih ministara! Depo, 17 March 2015,

38. Dervisbegovic, N. (2020). Bosnia Parties Strike Landmark Deal on Governing Mostar. BalkanInsight 17 June 2020,

39. (2022). Gabriel Escobar: US Envoy: Civic BiH Can Be Discussed only after EU Accession., 7 April 2022,

40. (2024). Konaković: Izetbegović i Komšić spremni srušiti cijelu europsku priču, Dodik treba pokazati da nije ruska marioneta., 7 February 2024,

41. E.T. (2022). Konaković na Twitteru: Nikad nećemo pristati na koncept uređenja Doma naroda FBiH po uzoru na RS. Dnevni Avaz, 22 March 2022,

42. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (2009). Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Strasbourg, 22 December 2009,{%22itemid%22:[%22003-2974573-3281658%22]}.  

43. European Parliament (2022). 2021 Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina: European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2022 on the 2021 Commission report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021/2245(INI), P9 TA (2022)0283, 

44. (2023). Konaković: Kompromisi nužni upravo sa onima koji negiraju naša stradanja. N1 News, 2 September 2023,

45. Fena (2024a). Ćudić: Točka na priče iz opozicije koji su svaki naš korak ka Europi karakterizirali kao izdaju., 12 March 2024, 

46. Fena (2024b). Komsic razocaran? Ako daytonska BiH uđe u EU bi to bila pobjeda etno-nacionalista i njihovih šefova u Zagrebu, Beogradu i Moskvi., 12 March 2024,  

47. Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, U.S. House of Representatives (2023). Subcommittee Hearing: Stability and Security in the Western Balkans: Assessing U.S. Policy. Washington, D.C., Capitol Hill, 18 July 2023,

48. G.L. (2024). Forum mladih Kruga 99: U Sarajevu planirali prosvjed protiv Plenkovića s paraloma da "prizna UZP i izlaz BiH na more", predsjednicu Europske komisije nazvali "madam genocide.", 23 January 2024,

49. Gadzo, M. (2020). Why Biden’s victory may present an ‘opportunity’ for Bosnia. Al Jazeera, 20 December 2020, 

50. Gadzo, M. (2022). Time for Bosnia to ‘get rid of Russian influence’: Analysts. Al Jazeera, 28 February 2022,

51. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) (1995), 21 November 1995, 

52. Government of the Republic of Croatia (2024). Plenković says expects EU to secure €50 bn for Ukraine. Government of the Republic of Croatia Homepage: News, 18 January 2024,   

53. Grbavac, V. (2022). Not like other Croats? Emigration Patterns and Voting Behaviour of Herzegovinian Croats. New Eastern Europe, 25 November 2022,  

54. Grbavac, V. and I. Pepic (2022). Federal Option Offers Bosnia Way Out of Quagmire. BalkanInsight, 1 March 2022,   

55. Gudelj, J. (2022). The Example of Komsic Advisor: How Bosniak Politics Sabotages the Efforts of the U.S. and EU: Hebibovic, Avdovic and Mehmedovic “explain” why Bosniaks do not agree to any agreement with Croats - the goal is to “capture“ FBiH., 19 March 2022, 

56. Gursoy, A. E. (2020). Andrej Plenković: Moderate Politics in Croatia.  The McGill International Review, 6 December 2020,

57. Hadzovic, D. (2020): German politician Schwartz: Avdo Avdić writes trash about Merkel and Germany. Dnevni Avaz, 25 December 2020,  

58. Hadzovic, D. (2021). Bakir's man "worked in vain": Osmica did not stop Schmidt's election. Dnevni Avaz, 28 May 2021,  

59. Hamilton, D. S. (2020). Fixing Dayton: A New Deal for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Global Europe’s Working Group on the Western Balkans (D.S. Hamilton, R. Bajrovic, K. Bassuener, T. Bilalbegovic, M. Hatzel, R.B. Hitchner, M.A. Hoare, A. Ross Johnson, E.P. Joseph, D. Karabegovic, J. Mujanovic, M. Ruge, D. Serwer, F. Vehabovic, and H. Yee), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2020.

60. Hina (2021). Russia stands alone in opposing Schmidt’s appointment in Bosnia. N1, 30 June 2021, 

61. Hina (2022a). Croatia expels 18 Russian diplomats. N1, 11 April 2022,,administrative%20staff%20at%20the%20Russian%20Embassy%20on%20Monday. 

62. Hina (2022b). US, EU officials say Mostar example for Bosnia electoral reform. N1 News, 1 December 2022, 

63. Hina (2023a). Croatia so far approved aid in amount of €160 mn to Ukraine. N1 (, 26 February 2023,,to%20the%20Russian%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20was%20fulgurant.

64. Hina (2023b). US supports Schmidt's decision to unblock govt formation in Federation BiH. N1 News, 28 April 2023, 

65. Hina (2024). Croatia’s FM expresses support for Bosnian Croat leader Dragan Covic after US accused him of obstructing gas connection. N1 News, 27 January 2024,   

66. Holbrooke, R. C. (1999). To End a War. New York: Modern Library Paperback Editions, 1999.

67. House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2024). Deputies and Clubs 2022-2026,

68. Hybrid Warfare Research Institute (IIHS) and Institute for Social and Political Research (IDPI) (2004). Energy (in)dependence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and strategic partnership with the Republic of Croatia: Analytic View. National Security and the Future, March 2023-February 2024,

69. International Institute for the Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) (2020). Parlamentarni izbori u Hrvatskoj 2020: Hrvatska u još većem raskoraku između prošlosti i budućnosti. Ljubljana: IFIMES, 29 June 2020,

70. Interview (2021). Azra Zornic: Bosnia and Herzegovina Was Always, Is and Always Will Be Here, With Us, Its Citizens, In It. Interview, 16 November 2021,,one%20of%20the%20country%E2%80%99s%20three%20main%20ethnic%20groups.

71. Jones, M. G. (2024a). Brussels recommends opening EU membership talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Euronews, 12 March 2024,

72. Jones, M.G. (2024b). European Union leaders approve opening accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Euronews, 21 March 2024,

73. Kalan, D. (2023). Bosnia’s Peace Envoy Is Caught in a Political Tug of War. Constitutional changes orchestrated by German diplomat Christian Schmidt have led to stalemate, but he won’t compromise. Foreign Policy, 24 February 2023,

74. Knaus, G. and F. Martin (2003). Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj. Journal of Democracy, 14 (3), 60-74,

75. Konakovic, D. (2022). Tweeter post, 20 March 2022,  

76. Lakic, M. (2019). Dodik Urges Bosnian Serbs to Block Croatia Lawsuit. BalkanInsight,17 July 2019,  

77. Lozancic, B. (2022). Plenković: Milanović is either "Putin's useful fool" or something else is behind him. The Voice of Croatia, 20 October 2022,

78. M.S. (2022). Da li će saradnja Zagreba i Moskve u politici prema BiH biti olako zaboravljena. Klix, 2 March 2022, 

79. Malesevic, K. (1991). Marginalia about the 1990 Bosnia and Herzegovina Elections. Revija za sociologiju, 22 (3-4), 315-326, 

80. McLaughlin, D. (2018). Bosnian Muslim leader defends Erdogan plan for Sarajevo rally: Turkish president angry over EU states' ban on campaign events. The Irish Times, 11 May 2018,

81. Mikulic, M. (2022). Bosniak agitators are using the Ukrainian tragedy to promote their own hegemonic goals., 3 March 2022,

82. Milicic, K. (2023).  Ukraine: Prime Minister Plenković visits Bucha on liberation anniversary. The Voice of Croatia, 31 March 2023,  

83. Misetic, L. (2018). What Are Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina Complaining About Now? A Rebuttal to Jasmin Mujanović. Misetic Law, 26 October 2018, 

84. Mujanovic, J. (2017). Russia’s Bosnia Gambit: Intrigue in the Balkans. Foreign Affairs, 6 September 2017,

85. Mujanovic, J. (2020). Bosnia’s Constitution is Broken – Only the US Can Fix It. BalkanInsight, 3 November 2020. 

86. Mujanovic, J. (2022a). Tweeter post, 17 January 2022,

87. Mujanovic, J. (2022b). Biden’s Team Is Dangerously Messing in Bosnia’s Politics: Unwise interventions are pushing ethnic partition. Foreign Policy, 10 November 2022,   

88. Mujanovic, J. (2023a). How Biden Lost the Balkans. Foreign Policy, 4 May 2023,  

89. Mujanovic, J. (2023b). Bosnia’s U.S.-Authored Constitution Has Been a Disaster. Foreign Policy, 14 September 2023,

90. Mujanovic, J. (2023c). Croatia and Hungary as Malign Actors in the Western Balkans. New Lines Institute, October 2023, 

91.   N1 BiH (2022). Konaković: Neću pristati na koncept uređenja Doma naroda FBiH po uzoru na RS. N1 News, 20 March 2022,

92. N1 BiH (2023). SDA: Trojka novcem građana finansira Dodikov secesionizam. N1 News, 25 July 2023, 

93. N1 Sarajevo (2021a). Christian Schmidt appointed as new High Representative in BiH. N1 News, 27 May 2021,

94. N1 Sarajevo (2021b). Woman who successfully sued BiH for discrimination wrote to US envoy Palmer. N1 News, 27 October 2021,  

95. N1 Sarajevo (2021c). FBiH Entity Vice President Accused Palmer, Eichhorst of siding with HDZ BiH. N1 Sarajevo, 2 December 2021, 

96. N1 Sarajevo (2022a). US Embassy criticizes SDA for “attempting to block corruption investigations.” N1 Sarajevo, 9 June 2022,

97. N1 Sarajevo (2022b). MEP Strik: High Representative Schmidt no longer has credibility for office. N1 News, 10 October 2022,

98. N1 Sarajevo (2022c). US Embassy in Bosnia lobbying to oust SDA from power, Komsic tells FTV. N1 News, 27 October 2022,

99. N1 Sarajevo (2023a). Bosnia’s Federation entity finally gets new government. N1 News, 28 April 2023, 

100. N1 Sarajevo (2023b). US and EU ambassadors tell FBiH reps present opportunities must not be wasted. N1 News, 20 June 2023,

101. N1 Sarajevo (2024). Covic denies obstructing Southern Gas Interconnection, calls it a “strategic interest” of BiH. N1 News, 19 January 2024, 

102.   N1 Sarajevo and Hina (2023). US ambassador slams HDZ BiH leader over Southern Interconnection obstructions. N1 News, 23 June 2023,

103.   N1 Sarajevo and Hina (2024). Blinken tells BiH, Croatian FMs to press Covic over Southern Gas Interconnection. N1 News, 18 January 2024,  

104. N1 Sarajevo and N1 Zagreb (2022). US slams Bosnia for abstaining in UN vote condemning Iran’s protest crackdown. N1 Sarajevo, N1 Zagreb, 23 November 2022, 

105. Nasa Stranka (2024a). Twitter post, 16 April 2024.

106. Nasa Stranka (2024b). Twitter post, 16 April 2024. 

107. National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2021). What Matters to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Citizens? Public Opinion Poll. National Democratic Institute (NDI), December 2021,  

108. Nehring, C. and H. Sittig (eds.) (2023). Blurring the Truth: Disinformation in Southeast Europe, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,

109. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (2023). NATO Audience Research: Pre-Summit Polling Results 2023. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 7 July 2023, page 7, 14, 8,  

110. Nurkic, B. (2023). Kovacevic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Complete Guidelines for the Constitutional Reform in B&H. Strasbourg Observers, 12 September 2023, 

111. Office of the High Representative (OHR) (2022). OHR Statement by High Representative Christian Schmidt: Functionality Package, October 2, 2022, 

112. Pepic, I. and M. Kasapovic (2019). The Gradual Cyprusization of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Structural, Institutional and Process Assumptions. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 21:5, 553-575. DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2018.1506289.

113. Preradovic, Z. (2023). NIN: Interview with High Representative Christian Schmidt. Nin, 9 February 2023,

114. President of Ukraine (2024). Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Andrej Plenković in Tirana. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy Official Website, 28 February 2024,

115. Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013). Chronology of the Presidency of BiH,  

116. Republic of Croatia (2013). Odluka o odlikovanju Redom Ante Starčevića Hartmuta Koschyka Christiana Schmidta. Narodne Novine: Sluzbeni list Republike Hrvatske NN 84/2013, Odluka 1829, 3 July 2013,

117. Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA) (2022). BiH's EU, NATO membership, equality of Croats in Croatia's interest. BiH's EU, NATO membership, equality of Croats in Croatia's interest. Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA) Homepage: Press, 17 March 2022,

118. Republic of Srpska Government, Office of the Prime Minister (2023). Republika Srpska’s 30th Report to the UN Security Council, October 2023,'s%2030th%20Report%20to%20the%20UNSC.pdf.  

119. Reuters (2022a). Bosnian Croats Say May Push for Own Region Unless Election Law Changes. Reuters, 19 February 2022,  

120. Reuters (2022b). U.S. House Speaker Pelosi to attend Ukraine forum in Zagreb. Reuters, 23 October 2022,

121. Rose, J. (2021). Immigration Agencies Ordered Not To Use Term 'Illegal Alien' Under New Biden Policy. NPR, 19 April 2021,

122. Rosenberg, S. (2022). Ukraine-Russia Tensions: Russia Pulls Some Troops Back from Border, BBC News, 15 February 2022,  

123. Ruge, M. (2018). Electoral Crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The New Atlanticist, 8 March 2018,  

124. Ruge, M. (2022). The Past and the Furious: How Russia’s Revisionism Threatens Bosnia. European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022, 

125. S.M. (2022). Zajednicki pristup: Da li će saradnja Zagreba i Moskve u politici prema BiH biti olako zaboravljena. Klix, 2 March 2022,

126. Sarajevo Times (2022a). Negotiations completed in Neum without a concrete Agreement on Election Legislation of BiH. Sarajevo Times, 31 January 2022, 

127. Sarajevo Times (2022b). Konakovic: If no Agreement is reached, the entire Federation and BiH are threatened with “Mostarization.” Sarajevo Times, 10 February 2022 

128. Sarajevo Times (2022c). Strik: Schmidt changes the Election Law in favor of HDZ BiH. Sarajevo Times, 27 October 2022,

129. Sarajevo Times (2023a). The Council of Peoples of the Entity of RS to discuss the Law on Immovable Property. Sarajevo Times, 23 January 2023,  

130. Sarajevo Times (2023b). What will happen with the Law on immovable Property of Republika Srpska? Sarajevo Times, 2 February 2023, 

131. Sarajevo Times (2023c). Dodik: I am proud of the Award given to me by Vladimir Putin. The Sarajevo Times, 12 June 2023, 

132. Secrieru, S. (2019). Russia in the Western Balkans: Tactical Wins, Strategic Setbacks. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2 July 2019, 

133. Srpska Times (2020). Dodik: Return to the Original Dayton. The Srpska Times, 20 January 2020,

134. Stradner, I. (2021). Russia Is Playing with Fire in the Balkans: How Putin’s Power Play Threatens Europe. Foreign Affairs, 27 December 2021,

135. Stradner, I. (2023). Russia’s Influence in the Balkans. New Lines Institute, October 2023,  

136. Suljagic, E. and R. Bajrovic (2021). Analysis: A New High Representative in Bosnia? Anadolu Agency Turkish, 8 January 2021,

137. Tesija, V. (2023). Croatia Faces Fallout from Personal Animosity between President, PM. BalkanInsight, 16 March 2023,  

138. Trebesch et al. (Team: P. Bomprezzi, I. Kharitonov and C. Trebesch) (2024). Ukraine Support Tracker: A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2024,

139. Trkanjec, Z. (2021). US Envoy to Press for Long-Delayed Reforms in Bosnia. Euractiv, 27 October 2021,  

140. UN Security Council (2019). Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. United Nations, UN Security Council 8522nd Meeting (Security Council Meeting Records), 8 May 2019, S/PV/8522, 

141. U.S. Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2022). Statement of the United States on the High Representative’s Use of Bonn Powers, 2 October 2022, 

142. U.S. Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2024). Challenges and Opportunity: Assistant Secretary James O’Brien Speech at University of Sarajevo, 2 February 2024, 

143. U.S. Mission to the United Nations (2022). Remarks by Ambassador Jeffrey F. DeLaurentis at a UN Security Council Debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 November 2022, 

144. Vrbetic, M. (2022a). Electoral Reform Disarray Foreshadows Uncertain Future for Dayton Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Brussels Morning, 9 September 2022, 

145. Vrbetic, Marta (2022b). Can the European Union Save the Dayton Accords? The National Interest, November 7, 2022, 

146. Washington Agreement (1994). Peace Agreements Digital Collection. United States Institute of Peace, 1 March 1994, Washington, D.C.,

147. Woelfl, A. (2021). Bosnien-Experte Marko: Keine Wahlrechtsreform mehr notwendig. Der Standard, 11 March 2021,

148. Yugoslavia, National Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1943). [The Resolution of the First Session of the National Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina], 25-26 November 1943; quoted in Position of the SFRY Presidency, 18 December 1991. In S. Trifunovska, ed. Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its Creation to its Dissolution. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994. p. 477. 

149. Yugoslavia, Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) (1943). [Decision to Create Yugoslavia on Federal Principles], Jajce, 29 November 1943. In S. Trifunovska, ed. Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its Creation to its Dissolution. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994. 206-207.

150. Yugoslavia (1986). The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In G. H. Flanz, ed. Yugoslavia. Constitutions of the Countries of the World, ed. A. P. Blaustein and G.H. Flanz. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1986. 27-197.

151. Zornic, A. (2021). Biden’s US Must Renounce Undemocratic Policy towards Bosnia. BalkanInsight, 20 December 2021, 


Cite this article:

APA 6th Edition

Vrbetic, M. (2024). Protecting Dayton’s Shared Governance by Countering Faux Narratives of Russia’s Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. National security and the future, 25 (1), 213-286.


MLA 8th Edition

Vrbetic, Marta. "Protecting Dayton’s Shared Governance by Countering Faux Narratives of Russia’s Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina." National security and the future, vol. 25, br. 1, 2024, str. 213-286. Citirano DD.MM.YYYY


Chicago 17th Edition

Vrbetic, Marta. "Protecting Dayton’s Shared Governance by Countering Faux Narratives of Russia’s Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina." National security and the future 25, br. 1 (2024): 213-286.



Vrbetic, M. (2024). 'Protecting Dayton’s Shared Governance by Countering Faux Narratives of Russia’s Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina', National security and the future, 25(1), str. 213-286.



Vrbetic M. Protecting Dayton’s Shared Governance by Countering Faux Narratives of Russia’s Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. National security and the future [Internet]. 2024 [pristupljeno DD.MM.YYYY.];25(1):213-286.



M. Vrbetic, "Protecting Dayton’s Shared Governance by Countering Faux Narratives of Russia’s Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina", National security and the future, vol.25, br. 1, str. 213-286, 2024. [Online].


Gallery / Galerija slika
Nema galerije slika / No image Gallery