From
the events in the Medak Pocket, General Sekulić concludes
that “long-term consequences, unquestionable and disastrous
repurcussions followed: the Serb Krajina Army had been
surprised, and had lost the Divoselo, Čitluk and Počitelj
villages. The Croatian Army’s action had all the characteristics
of genocide. The villages taken were burned in accordance
with “scorched earth” tactics. The Croats handed over
71 corpses, among them 28 civilians (10 were women). Among
those listed as missing were 14 civilians (4 of which
were women). UNPROFOR did not do a thing to prevent the
attack on the Medak Pocket and the consequent genocide
over the civilians. Only General Jean Cot would defend
his own honour, by accusing the Croatian Army of genocide.”438
“The poor effects of RSK’s defence were due to no co-ordinated
action between the Serb Krajina Army, Army of the Republika
Srpska and Yugoslav Army. In the end, no one had taken
responsibility for that defeat and tragedy. The commanders
of the 9th brigade and the Lika corps, the Serbian Krajina
Army’s main staff HQ all kept their duties…”439 In an
operation analysis,, General Sekulić confirms his basic
thesis that the Medak Pocket fell in 1993, as Knin did
in 1995, because of the disbelief by RSK politicians,
military officers and the population, that other Serbian
armies would come to their aid. He also points out the
RSK’s irresponsibility, the lack of morale and lack of
perspective. “The RSK’s top officials did not seem to
grasp the situation’s core. The Serb Krajina Army was
more able to face Croatia at the very moment of its formation,
than in any later period. As time progressed, the ability
of the Srpska Krajina Army had weakened, and that of the
Croatian Army became greater.”440
The
“RSK” government, the representatives of the Serbian Army
HQ and the presidents of the Serb municipalities met in
Plitvice on October 2nd 1993 in order to discuss the losses
at Divoselo. The commission was formed with the task of
analyzing all the facts linked to that significant RSK
defeat.441 Already on September 18th 1993, (pending the
Serb Krajina Army commanders’ order given on September
16th), the following report was made which confirms that
“the brigade battalion and lower commands and combatants
had already been informed about the organization, strength
and possible variation of enemy build-up and its targets.
All levels of the command received combat documentation,
orders and general line documents.”442 The Serb Krajina
Army denied the thesis about a “sudden attack”, about
Serb forces being unprepared, about weak Serb forces and
lack of armour.” On the contrary – three Serb combat groups
had been formed that had been ordered to continue the
forceful reconnaissance missions and the provocation of
Croatian forces. That was proven by the fact that “on
the day the attack was carried out, the brigade commandant
had ordered the forceful recon and combat missions towards
the Velebit Mountains to take Bukova Glava (t.p. 671)
and Jelovac.” The actual order for battle readiness had
been issued at 08:00 hours on September 9th 1993. In order
for the Serb forces to deploy on the Velebit Mountains,
the mine line (114 mines) had been removed in the Čitluk
brigade’s area of responsibility. In the village of Medak,,
one battle group of the 3rd mobile brigade had been given
orders to engage in the forceful reconnaissance… therefore
the maximum alert and readiness for the battle had been
ordered.” The order was issued on September 3rd 1993.”
The Croatian Army and police had been subject to sudden
attacks.
Is
the claim of the small number of Serb defence forces in
that area valid? “During the attack the 2nd mobile brigade
and its reinforcements list 541 combatants. At the perimeter
there were 500 combatants (in the annex of the Serb commission
report… “to prevent surprises, the Divoselo defence line
had been strengthened. In comparison with the previous
period, Divoselo had the greatest number of soldiers.“443
The defence region had been solidly fortified, and the
anti-armour and anti-aircraft defence had been well organized.”444
What
was the reason for the Serb defeat? The commission concluded
that it was caused by the “inadequate commanding skills
of the battalion commander, Reserve 1st Class Captain
Dušan Preradović, and the Čitluk unit commander Branko
Krajnović, and the evacuation of the Čitluk unit soldiers’
families and their possessions.”445 “Army conscripts of
the 2nd mobile brigade had lived in their houses and worked
their fields which had kept them away from their defence
duties and their combat positions.”446 The commission
assessed that “in combat activity, according to the available
data, 60 individuals were killed, eight were captured
and an unknown number were listed as missing.”447 One
should note the commission’s objectivity. It’s members
professionally analyzed many elements, they reproached
the Serbian Krajina Army’s lack of professional commanding
officers, it’s paramilitary organization, desertions,
the territorial military organization and the troops unsteady
morale. The commission’s report is not written in ideological/nationalistic
terms. It does not use terms like genocide, ustaša and
criminal characterizations when depicting the Croatian
Army and police. It speaks only of “destroying and burning
the infrastructure of the Divoselo, Čitluk and parts of
the village of Počitelj. It refers to the favourable situation
and the Croatian choice of attacking, targets, time and
manoeuvres. By spearheading the attack, the Croatian forces
secured a favourable balance of forces, strong artillery
backup, securing a tactical advantage and realized the
planned objective of the attack. The attack was carried
out by professional units.”448 On October 15th he RSK
parliament would also form a parliamentary commission
that reported on the September 8th (sic) 1993 events in
the Divoselo, Čitluk and Počitelj area. That commission
would find the reasons for the development of events as:
“inadequate command, senior officers leaving the front,
not enough discipline, alcoholism. It reproached the 9th
brigade command for not allowing 1000 combatants to assist
in helping the soldiers and civilians caught in the encirclement.
It confirmed the minefield in the Brine-Kruškovača region
was cleared and that mortars were turned towards the Velebit
Mountains, to protect the Ornice-Poljari area (to backup
the forceful recon – authour’s remark). Therefore the
defence on that line was weakened.”449 The conclusion
of the parliamentary commission was the request to relieve
duties of all the key figures in the RSK – its president,
the main staff HQ commander, the commanders of the corps
and brigades. The blow the Croatian Army and police action
caused was much stronger. It had shaken the already weak
RSK structure, which the international community and UNPROFOR
tried to protect and preserve.
Other
Serb analysts, especially journalists, would analyze the
Medak Pocket and all those concerned with it. “This month
Serb forces were taken by surprise in the so-called Medak
Pocket in Lika. The Croatian Army wiped off 11 Serb villages
and hamlets, more than 100 Serb soldiers and civilians
were killed. An indecisive counteraction and resolute
protests tried to cover up the defeat. Top RSK officials
tried to find an alibi in the behaviour of UNPROFOR. They
never came to the area or to Knin. (Goran Hadžić and Mile
Paspalj). UNPROFOR arrived only after evil had already
taken place. Or they ran away (i.e. at Maslenica) leaving
the combatants to fight. A day after the Croatian aggression
struck Medak General Cot did not look worried. A couple
of days later when he visited the burned villages, he
said he could not find any traces of life.” On September
25th 1993, this is how Banja Luka’s TV program “Serb Krajina
Chronicle” summarized Serb public opinion concerning the
action that took place two weeks before. Apart from “the
surprise and the shock”, “indecisive actions and decisive
protests/press releases”, were used by Serbs during the
war only when they were defeated in the battlefield. The
accusations had started. Krajina politicians were accused
of being afraid to face their people. UNPROFOR was accused
of “running away” (as in Maslenica), or “did not show
up at all, letting the combatants fight”! The Serb side
linked the Medak Pocket events with World War ll: like
“a continuation of the Croatian criminal policy that had
happened during that time.” “During the advance, the Croatian
Army had looted, burned, destroyed houses, killed and
massacred soldiers and policemen. From the city of Gospić
death was sown like it had been during the 1941 – 1945
fascist tyranny. The current war was the continuation
of World War ll and the result of a Croatian violation
of history.”450 “Divoselo was again a crime scene like
in 1941, when only 907 Serbs were killed in Divoselo.451
“Today, when the outnumbered and surprised Serb side relied
on UNPROFOR’s protection - the aggressor was able to quickly
overrun the region.“452 “The defence lines were in disarray
and the civilian population was left to the mercy of the
Ustaša.” Proof of this complete disarray is shown by the
“postponed date of the so-called RSK Parliament session.
A complete report of the events in the surrounding Gračac
villages on September 9th had not yet been completed.
It was necessary to establish how the defence was before
the Croatian aggression, the consequences of it, as well
as the number of victims and material losses.”453 The
Serb military organization sometimes fell apart. The panicked
flee from Medak, the armed scuffles (the evening of September
9th in Medak), desertions on the defence lines, the disintegrating
Lapac brigade, was followed by punishment of those guilty
for the defeat. Serb politicians blamed for treason were
arrested – like the arrest of David Rastović, the vice-president,
and Rade Čubrilo, member of the Serb Democratic Party’s
main board. They were allegedly linked to the “Croatian
aggression” on Divoselo.454 To the international media,
a message was sent about the Croatian Army and police’s
new “aggression” on the Serb state of RSK as proof that
co-existence with the Croats was impossible, and how the
RSK had been established to protect the Serbs from Croatian
abuse.455 The Serbian Krajina Army threats followed. After
that they attacked along the entire frontline and behind
it – cities along the Croatian coast and strong economic
and communication centres like Sisak, Karlovac, Kutina
and Ogulin were shelled or rocketed. The reinforcements
from Krajina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and SR Yugoslavia
were quickly summoned. The Serbs were afraid of the continuous
Croatian Army and police advancement towards Medak and
Gračac. They feared Croats taking the Ljubovo pass which
would allow them to descend to Udbina and the Krajina
Serbs airbase. This would result in a threat against Korenica
and eventually the large city of Knin. Special pressure
was exerted on the UN. Threats were made that the war
would spread to all the UNPA zones, the Serbs would retaliate
for Croatian “aggression” and would therefore undermine
the entire peace plan. UNPROFOR had soon accepted the
Serb interpretation of the Republic of Croatia as the
“aggressor” on the RSK, “a state of equal status.” The
UN and the international community were seriously worried
because of the worsening of the military situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now the threat of all-out war
was spreading to the entire territory of the new states
– the republics of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The aggressor – Croatia – should therefore be stopped
and punished.
On
the basis of situation reports sent from the field to
Zagreb and New York, and after learning a lesson at Maslenica,
the UN Security Council and its Secretary General started
exerting pressure on the Croatian political and military
leadership to withdraw its forces from the three liberated
villages surrounding areas. During the first day of the
Operation, the UNPROFOR commander, General Cot, conveyed
the Serb protests and his ceasefire propositions to the
Croatian side. This was done on September 9th at 09:00,
11:00, 12:00, 13:00, 15:00 and 17:00 hours. The next day,
Cot sent his special emissary to the Srpska Krajina Army’s
main staff HQ chief, General Novaković. A journalist with
the daily newspaper “Borba” wrote an article in the September
11th/12th issue entitled: “Spaljen Čitluk i Divoselo.”
In it he writes: “The commander of the Serb Krajina Army,
via an UNPROFOR emissary, sent an ultimatum to Croatia:
“By 13:00 hours, if UNPROFOR does not enter Divoselo,
the Serb Krajina Army will start shelling military targets
in the Republic of Croatia.” On September 13th, Belgrade
TV reported on “the newest aggression on the RSK which
lasted for a fifth successive day.” Đorđe Bjegović, the
Krajina government’s Prime Minister sent a letter to the
UN Secretary General.” In the same TV program UN forces
were accused of “an UNPROFOR platoon in the area of aggression
that did nothing to protect the Serbian people, but instead
ran further into the RSK territory.” The accusations could
not be proven. UNPROFOR’s sources, the Croatian side,
or foreign press reports did not report this. The Canadians
did not run away, they stayed on their positions where
they had arrived the day before – on September 8th in
Medak. The reporter continues: “because of this, negotiations
via UNPROFOR were frozen, and the UNPROFOR representatives
were forbidden to move into the war zone.” “The RSK main
staff HQ stated that in the Lika area fierce attacks by
the Croatian forces continued, although President Tuđman
ordered a ceasefire. The Croatian forces regrouped and
brought reinforcements. According to updated reports,
one Serb soldier and one woman were killed. The Serb forces
managed to stop the Croatian Army and establish the defence
line on the Lika battlefield.”456 There were no reports
or access to the lost territory. A retreat occurred and
troops ran away. This kind of reporting could have been
war propaganda – to make the number of victims smaller
and the enemy’s larger. The data about one soldier and
one woman being killed served such a function. On September
12th and 13th the Serb side still kept the military option
open, believing that by launching a counterattack it would
defeat the Croatian Army and regain it’s lost positions.
The data about “own losses” was not published, because
it could further damage the soldiers’ morale. “Serb propaganda
had been telling us about one killed and five wounded
until 52 corpses were handed over.”457 It is unusual that
on September 9th and 10th, the Serbs did not know about
the numbers yet killed. The Canadians reported on those
killed in front of Medak upon advancing in front of Serb
lines.458 The Canadian witness accounts speak about “people
being killed there.” The situation changed when UNPROFOR
entered the area between the Croatian and Serb forces.
Suddenly the Serb interpretation of the Medak Pocket events
changed. The handing over of 52 Serb soldiers and civilian
bodies marked that turning point. Suddenly the fabricatoin
about the Croatian – Canadian battle appeared, the UN
protection forces were engaged, “on whom each attack was
punishable.” This became more for Croatian guilt to be
established. Not only had they been guilty of crimes committed
over the Serbs, but they dared to attack the UN as well.
They should be punished – they should be charged with
war crimes and genocide. Their state should be taken away.459
Serb actions could be justified and finally their desire
to form an independent Serb state within the state of
Croatia could be realized.
This
study does not question the existence of crimes committed
in the Medak Pocket. It tries to reveal manipulations
of those crimes for political gains. At the ICTY in the
Hague, the accused Slobodan Milošević, while cross-examining
a protected Croatian witness asked him: how come all Croatian
war crimes are so well evidenced, witnesses called and
cross-examined, material sent to the Hague, while Serb
crimes are not even documented? Interesting question?
Were the Croats not able to hide their “ill deeds”? By
posing such a question, Milošević suggests Serb crimes
did not exist in the measures they are attributed to the
Serbs. And the Croats, because of evidence were far greater
villains than the Serbs. If a realistic assessment does
exist (i.e one by the CIA’s) in which 90 percent of all
crimes in former Yugoslavia were committed by the Serb
Army or Serb paramilitary. The latest discoveries reveal
the subsequent continuation of hiding the bodies of war
victims, in which the JNA, the Yugoslav Army, police and
state government took part. We learn more about the tacit
understanding of UN forces, who knew about these facts
but did not intervene. Rare are the anonymous tips when
Serbs themselves would reveal the locations of mass graves
in which Croats, Bosnians or Albanians were buried. Serb
officials continued to hide these mass graves at places
where they liquidated and buried their adversaries after
World War ll ended. The system of co-ordinated state politics
in hiding is opposed by sporadicism, non-systematical,
accidental, individualism, anarchy, crimes committed out
of blind revenge or hatred, own endangered life, and fright
for the biological existence of one’s own nation, and
not one individual. I’m not excluding the pathology, sadism
or enjoyment in the suffering of others, but in percentage,
equal is the number of such cases bordering the human
normality in all societies and in all armies, therefore
in the Croatian or in the Serbian army. There is a big
imbalance of those systematic crimes committed by groups
or individuals on the Serb side, and such committed by
all the other sides. What is indicative is the systematicizm
in which the Serb side deals with this dark side of the
war. It is best illustrated by “Veritas” organization,
initiated and led by an ex judge Savo Štrbac, who was
in 1991 the JNA Knin corps military prosecutor. In so-called
RSK he was the head of the Office for killed and disappeared
persons. After his parastate crumbled, he left for Belgrade,
and with the SR Yugoslavia’s official full backing he
founded the NGO, gathering all the data about the Serb
victims of wars in former Yugoslavia. This, primarily
humanitarian work, was often misused for political purposes,
even for the crimes cover-ups. Savo Štrbac has after only
ten days passed since the Medak Pocket operation was undertaken,
gathered documents and materials; he made a film460 and
has shown it to the Belgrade foreign press. Without any
serious investigation or any proof, he has immediately
accused Croatia for crimes and genocide. Only after the
victims’ bodies were handed over (on September 18th on
the Šajnerica pass in Otočac) did the Serb side spoke
of a forceful, battle-ready entrance of the UNPROFOR into
the area – “the UNPROFOR members, after engaging in a
direct battle entered that area.”461 That new meaning
given to the firefights and scuffles when UNPROFOR has
been taking over the area has more and more backed the
credibility of the general accusation about the Croatian
and Croatia’s guilt and their inborn genocide behavior.
The Serbs have “forgotten” their previous accusations
of the UNPROFOR’s “running off from the battlefield” and
their “leaving the Serbs at Croatian army’s mercy.” Now
Serbs and UNPROFOR have taken the same side, and together
they blamed the Croatians for everything that has happened
in the Medak Pocket, even for that that didn’t happen
at all – as the Croatian battle waged against UNPROFOR.
“Croatian army hasn’t fulfilled its promise of its forces
to withdraw from Počitelj, Čitluk and Divoselo, and for
UNPROFOR to be deployed in (those) named areas. The Croatian
army has thus defied the UNSC demand and continued their
battle operations462. “Members of the CANBAT have today
started entering villages Počitelj, Čitluk and Divoselo.
UNPROFOR’s CANBAT commander has said that his soldiers
have been subjected to the sniper fire for 90 minutes
while taking their positions. When they have put up the
UN flag the fire became more intense. Unofficial sources
report that yesterday the UNPROFOR members, when entering
those villages, had three of their soldiers wounded.”463
The Serb journalists use and misuse the unconfirmed informations
in order to make the tensions against the Croats mount.
The news about Croatian shooting at the UN flag, about
three wounded Canadian soldiers, should have suggested
that the Croats attacked “blue helmets” on purpose, and
did not refrain from anything (not even from attacking
the UN). The news wasn’t true of course, it could have
referred on the wounded in the minefield only, but it
was accepted as newsworthy by the foreign press and international
community’s members. “The report from Knin states that
in the village of Medak, area some ten kilometers from
the occupied villages, since yesterday the strong UNPROFOR
forces have been deployed, and are ready to, after the
Croatian forces withdraw, enter Čitluk… Apart from not
retreating yet, the Croat forces on the Lika battlefield
do not respect the agreed ceasefire, they, Croatian forces
opened a fierce artillery and infantry fire on RSK’s civilians
and soldiers. The Serbian army command has protested to
UNPROFOR and its Sector South.”464 The so-called RSK’s
Prime Minister Đorđe Bjegović too on September 16th 1993
states that “…Croatian forces have engaged UNPROFOR”,
forgetting to mention that the Serb forces were “intermingled”
with the Canadians and sometimes only 50 meters away from
them, and behind Canadians back opened fire on Croatians
in order for Croats to think they are fighting two armies
– the Serb one and the Canadian – French one. For TV Banja
Luka on September 21st 1993 a member of CANBAT has confirmed
during an interview that “two companies, 250 soldiers
of the Canadian and French battalion in the Medak Pocket
area have been the target of the Croatian fierce fire
from infantry armor and were forced to fire back. The
peace force has made an ultimatum to the Croatian forces
to withdraw to the lines agreed in the Withdrawal Agreement
signed on September 15th, which they did, but only in
the late hours of that day. Today (September 21st) at
15:30 the Croatian forces have shelled Gračac… 15 grenades
of a great destructive force fell…”465 TV Beograd reports
that UNPROFOR commander General Cot has visited the area
of the Medak Pocket. “He confirmed that the area is under
UNPROFOR control, but didn’t find any signs of life in
couple of villages he passed by… the destruction was complete,
done on purpose and systematical… the majority of it was
done when UNPROFOR was still deploying.” The Zagreb Voice
of America’s correspondent pointed out that “the Croatian
forces have planned to kill Serb civilians in the vicinity
of Gospić.”466 Đorđe Bjegović knows for sure that “52
persons were massacred, most of them were civilians, 12
persons were exchanged via UNPROFOR, 8 have been taken
prisoner and transferred to Rijeka, and 12, from mixed
marriages, paid the price of their freedom by satanizing
the Serbs in the media, while 22 persons are still missing.”
“UN has confirmed that it was investigating the massacre
of the civilians in the vicinity of Gospić.”467 “The UNPROFOR
members are controlling recently burned villages Čitluk
and Divoselo under the Velebit Mountains, and have found
three more victims of the Croatian aggression. In Gračac
on the way is the process of identification of the victims,
and one more victim has been identified. Thus the number
of victims of the Croatian aggression has risen to 72.
This fact confirms the fears that the number of killed
is not final yet. That is to say, a fate of 25 missing
citizens and 8 soldiers from Divoselo, Počitelj, Čitluk
and Donji Lapac is yet unknown.”468 In that moment, for
the political and military Krajina leadership the question
of utmost importance was to prolong the UNPROFOR mandate,
which on its hand was a strong guarantor of their state’s
existence. The killed and the disappeared, the ever so
greater a slander of the Croats, the ever new details
about their behavior in opposition with the humanitarian
laws of war, have served that purpose. “UN Security Council
has yesterday (September 27th 1993) had consultations
about the UNPROFOR mandate prolongement in Croatia… the
new prolongement has been endorsed by Russia, Great Britain,
Spain – opposed was only Hungary.”469 The so-called RSK
has hoped that in the new situation, when Croatia was
under the pressure for committing war crimes, RSK would
gain the greater political endorsement of great powers
(Russia, France, and Great Britain) and in the UN Security
Council would manage to legalize their parastate. However,
that didn’t happen.
“Veritas”
will, in its “Bulletins” from 1993 on, each year on the
anniversary of the “aggression, tragedy, crime, massacre”
publish new informations – the number of killed and the
witnesses’ reports on the Medak Pocket operation. “In
the international press centre the brochure has been presented
under the name “The bloody Lika’s September of 1993”,
and the documentary film will be shown about the crimes
committed during the last three attacks on “Krajina”…
those documents will be handed over to the UN Security
Council in hope that they would become official UN documents.”470
“The aggression under the name “scorched earth” has resulted
with almost a hundred massacred and burned victims and
a multitude of disappeared and imprisoned Serbs. This
was a bloody invasion – without wounded taken.”471 The
journalist Marjanović doesn’t speak the whole truth there,
there were many wounded Serb soldiers, because the Canadians
saw them leaving Medak, there were many ambulances taking
them out of Medak.472 The Croatian sources also speak
of a great number of doctors coming from Banja Luka into
Gračac and Knin, and of wounded being treated in the Republika
Srpska and SR Yugoslavia hospitals.
The
so-called Krajina has indicted those responsible at its
courts for the crimes in the Medak Pocket. The local court
in Knin, on demand of its District Attorney, has conducted
an inquiry of the crimes committed in the Medak Pocket,
involving 43 persons. “Among them are the staff General,
Janko Bobetko, Croatian army main staff HQ commander;
Major General Tomislav Merčep, police special forces commander;
Mirko Norac, second in command of the 9th guard brigade
“Vukovi Like”; Agim Krasnići, Colonel, the HQ’s commander
of the same brigade; Josip Krmpotić, Lieutenant, commander
of the commando unit of the 9th guard brigade; Johannes
Tilder, second in command of the same company. After the
inquiry, the DA’s office has indicted all these mentioned
persons because of the committed crimes against the humanity,
international law violations, and the genocide, war crimes
over civilian population and war crimes of killing wounded
and ill people.”473 In the document coded YU/SC-780-92/DOC-4/SI-177
some incriminations are quoted: “Čitluk, Gospić, September
11th 1993… at about 12:30 to 15:30 the perpetrators (Croatian
soldiers) have during the Medak Pocket operation hidden
on the Čitluk graveyard. They ambushed unarmed Serb civilians
hiding in the Debela Glava woods, from where they have
been driven out by Croatian Ministry of Interior special
police… after they came out of the woods they were shot
at by infantry weapons… over 30 unarmed civilians were
either killed or wounded. Johan Tilder has commanded all
wounded to be killed… Čitluk, September 11th: From Krajinović
house the fire was opened…three elderly women were killed;
the fourth person (a man) who surrendered (put his hands
above his head) was gagged, tortured and finally killed…
Čitluk, September 9th to September 13th: An elderly woman
was killed. Čitluk, September 10th: A family was killed
– parents and two children.”474 In Septermber 2000 the
“Veritas” bulletin reprinted Canadian journalist David
Pugliese’s “Ottawa Citizen” story. “A couple of days earlier
in Medak, (before September 9th), General Cot had met
with Lt. Col. Calvin and informed him that a force of
2500 Croatian soldiers and tanks had built-up in an area
about 35 kilometres around the Medak Pocket. An estimated
525 shells fell where the Canadian observers were situated
at Medak. At noon on September 15th UNPROFOR started deploying
between the Serb and Croat frontlines. The Serbs had been
watching UNPROFOR move, but did nothing. The Croats opened
fire.” Captain Wayne Eyre and Ian Hunt witness: “On September
17th Canadians moved forward. There was no shooting but
there was a tense build-up between the Croats and the
Canadians.”475 The key evidence on which “Veritas” bases
its proof was attained by then prisoner, member of the
recce commando group of the 9th guard brigade, Dutchman
Johannes Tilder. He was a “mercenary” and one of the “dogs
of war” fighting in Lika. There were many contradictions
linked to Tilder – his role as a double agent, his capture,
his confession and finally his death. According to an
anonymous witness working with one of the Croatian security
services, the Serb Colonel Šoša (sp?), who negotiated
the exchange of prisoners with the Croats after Tilder’s
capture, stated that Tilder would not come out alive,
because “he worked for several intelligence services –
the Dutch, the British, the German and the Croatian.”
The circumstances of Tilder’s death were also unclear.
According to one version, a bomb was thrown into his cell,
according to another; he was killed when trying to escape
from the car transporting him from one prison to another.
Tilder’s witnessing, full of gruesome details, could have
been extracted by force and afterwards he might have been
liquidated. His witnessing is immensely documented and
used as evidence at the ICTY: “Tilder had received his
second-in-command post (sic) of the 9th brigade “Vukovi”
during the summer of 1993. His task was to probe and secure
a pass through the minefields. He stated that UNPROFOR
had been giving reports and information to the Croatian
Army.” On the basis of Tilder’s witnessing, journalists
Vela Ilibašić and Rob Siebelink wrote: “The bloodshed
at Medak was the reconstruction of ethnic cleansing.”
Josip Krmpotić, the recce unit commander (not unit but
a platoon) on the evening of September 8th summoned a
meeting where he conveyed the command of Medak be attacked.
“We were to commence with the Action at 23:00 and not
at 06:00 hours (on September 9th). We had to be on the
bridge near Rogići. At that moment artillery started firing
on the Serb positions, which was a sign that we could
start with our attack. The special police started hunting
civilians who were hiding on Debela Glava. They tried
to run away, towards Rajići, Rajčevići and Čitluk. We
were at the well at the Raičevići cemetery.”476 The data
Savo Štrbac and “Veritas” provide about the killed and
missing Serbs served to first initiate the inquiries and
later indict the Croats. Books, bulletins, and co-operation
with the ICTY which considers “Veritas” to be a valuable
source,477 have become a key factor in proving the Croatian
and Muslim crimes with long-term political consequences.
Savo Štrbac does not hesitate to, in the case of General
Gotovina, say this openly. The indictment of General Gotovina
points a finger at the Republic of Croatia for being responsible
for ethnic cleansing. Štrbac calls the beginning of the
end of the Croatian state due to its criminal activities.
The “RSK” will be born again.478 “Veritas” helped to initiate
the ICTY’s wider interest in the Medak case. The work
of Hague investigators began under the code name “Congress”
in June 1997. They visited Yugoslavia three times in 1998.
They heard depositions from 27 witnesses – inhabitants
of Čitluk, Počitelj and Divoselo, who had survived the
Medak Pocket hell. The investigators took documents from
the “Veritas” archives. Savo Štrbac claims a few dozen
“international witnesses, members of units directly participating
in the Action” were interrogated and gave witness reports.479
UNPROFOR gave the first such report on the Medak Pocket
Operation to the UN Security Council on October 7th 1993.
In December 1994, the UN expert commission finished its
report on Medak Pocket. In May 2000, 11 bodies were found
in a septic hole in Gospić. The missing from the Medak
Pocket were identified.
The
Yugoslav crisis chronology September/October 1993: “Balkan
repository project – Yugoslav crisis 1993”480
September
9th 1993 – The army of the Republic of Croatia attacked
the territory of the RSK and took (by force) the Serb
villages of Divoselo, Čitluk and Počitelj in the vicinity
of Gospić. The Serb side answered by opening fire on the
suburbs of Sisak, Karlovac and Duga Resa.
September
10th – Thorvald Stoltenberg, co-president of the International
Conference on the former Yugoslavia asked Franjo Tuđman,
the President of Croatia to order his forces to stop attacking
the territory populated by Serbs and to withdraw from
villages they have captured in Lika.
September
12th – Franjo Tuđman the President of the Republic of
Croatia ordered his military forces to stop firing in
order to enable a ceasefire with the local Serb forces
in the Krajina.
September
14th – In an extra(ordinary) statement, the government
of the SR Yugoslavia “most sharply condemns the latest
aggression of Croatia on the Republic of Srpska Krajina…
the government of SR Yugoslavia hopes that the Croatian
side will realize that it is also in its interest to stop
with the aggressive attacks… and to search for solutions
with the RSK within the Geneva negotiations.” The UN Security
Council accepted the presidential statement in which “we
express the deepest concern for the renewed military confrontations
in Croatia. We ask both sides to immediately agree to
the UNPROFOR proposal for an immediate ceasefire to be
reached. The Council also requires that the Croatian Government
withdraw its military forces to their September 9th positions,
before the undertaken offensive.”
The
ceasefire was agreed upon under the control of the UN,
because the Croatian side agreed to withdraw from the
villages it occupied on September 9th and 10th.
President
Tuđman in his speech delivered on September 28th in the
UN General Assembly, asked that special Croatian demands
be included into the new UN Resolution text, dealing with
the UNPROFOR mandate extension: “The Serb forces demilitarization,
the Croatian jurisdiction in the “pink zones” in Krajina
should be established, the lifting of sanctions imposed
on SR Yugoslavia should be linked to the new peace plan
for Croatia. If within 48 hours the UNPROFOR mandate is
not implemented according to those demands, the Republic
of Croatia will ask the UN to stop all operations on its
territory.”
October
5th – The UN Security Council establishes the 871 Resolution.
October
7th – After it was revealed that 70 civilians were killed
and 48 disappeared, the UN asked the Croatian government
to explain the Serb civilian massacre by the Croatian
Army in the Medak Pocket area on September 9th. The UN
report on the “intentional killing of Serb civilians”
was published in Geneva and Zagreb, and sent to Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, the special UN human rights commission correspondent.
Franjo Tuđman ordered an inquiry to start in connection
with the UN report.
October
8th – Žarko Domjan, the deputy Croatian Parliament speaker
said that the “Croats had to overcome a psychological
barrier and agree to Serb autonomy in Croatia, which was
the precondition for Croatian sovereignty to be reinstated
on the occupied territories.”
October
12th – Tadeusz Mazowiecki confirmed that Croat forces
systematically and deliberately destroyed houses, livestock
and other property and killed 67 civilians, while retreating
from the Medak Pocket in Krajina. Mazowiecki asked the
Croatian Government to resume a detailed inquiry. In his
response, deputy PM (and Republic of Croatia Foreign Minister)
Mate Granić, said that the victims in Divoselo, Počitelj
and Čitluk had been killed during the battle, they were
armed, wore military uniforms and fought against the Croatian
Army forces.
November
2nd – Secret negotiations between the RSK and the Republic
of Croatia delegates are held in the Vicinity of Oslo,
Norway. The main issues discussed were a ceasefire and
end of hostilities, the re-establishing of communication
and economic ties between the Krajina and Croatia.
November
17th – The first ICTY session in the Hague.
November
18th – Thorvald Stoltenberg reports to the UN Security
Council on the situation in the former Yugoslavia and
the possibility of ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
He concludes that UN efforts are providing results but
that peace, its primary goal, has not yet been achieved.
Stoltenberg declares: “There is no longer any sense to
speak of a (Serbian) aggression,481 since it is a civil
war not including the elements of interference from the
neighbouring states of Serbia and Croatia.”Thorvald Stoltenberg’s
declaration is applicable to the situation in the Republc
of Croatia-Republika Hrvatska Hrvatska.
End
of part 1
