This article examines the evolution of Russian hybrid warfare against Poland between 2022 and 2025, arguing that Poland has become both a frontline target and a testing ground for Moscow’s adaptive toolkit of coercion below the threshold of open war. It situates Russia’s activities in the context of Poland’s strongly pro Ukrainian posture, its role as the principal logistics hub for Western military assistance, and the expanding presence of NATO infrastructure on its territory. Conceptually, the article engages with debates on hybrid warfare and sabotage, treating Russian operations as part of a long-term continuum rooted in Soviet doctrine and updated for contemporary conflict. Empirically, the study combines analysis of official documents, media reporting and existing scholarship to reconstruct a sequence of operations: the weaponization of migration on the Polish-Belarusian, and a series of espionage and sabotage cases involving both classic HUMINT assets and expendable “single use” agents. Particular attention is devoted to two recent incidents - the September 2025 drone incursion into Polish airspace and the November 2025 explosion on the Warsaw-Lublin railway line which are interpreted not as isolated episodes but as escalatory steps in a broader strategy of coercive ambiguity toward NATO’s Eastern Flank. The article concludes that Russian hybrid operations in Poland pursue not only military and logistical objectives, but also the gradual re engineering of public attitudes, especially toward Ukraine. It argues that effective responses require integrated counterintelligence, the protection of critical infrastructure, and allied fusion mechanisms, alongside careful management of public communication to avoid amplifying the Kremlin’s narratives.

At the future-ops section of the Land Information Maneuver Center (LIMC) of the Dutch MoD, an experiment had taken place to integrate qualitative analysis by humans and deep learning. In this experiment, qualitative analysis executed by humans focused more on establishing causal relationships. The deep learning focused more on establishing correlations. In order to integrate qualitative analysis and deep learning a gap had to be bridged. The Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) served as a bridge between the two. To make this work, so-called plug-ins were introduced in the CLD. These plug-ins represented either deeper layers and/or calculations. It prevented the CLD from become unreadable complex. With the plug-ins, the CLD became de facto a three dimensional diagram. Early Warning and Early Response analysis were also integrated within the CLD by a plug-in. This calibrated version of the CLD facilitated the cross-fertilization between qualitative analysis and deep learning. Now, human analysis can form the starting point for the selection of data and indicators to be used for deep learning. Thus the number of variables used in the deep learning effort could be reduced. Also, deep learning uncovered causal relationships that went unnoticed until then. It led to regrouping of drivers within the CLD. By integrating deep learning, the future-ops section had the possibility to calculate backwards. For example, it could be calculated which measures and interventions at what point in time would be most effective. By that, it was possible to reach a maximum effect in pushing back a threat while keeping the impact for society as low as possible. In short, by calibrating the CLD, LIMC was able to merge early warning, early response, system analysis, and deep learning into a single, but layered, system analysis. It was an attempt at Augmented Intelligence – in which the cognitive process is improved and enhanced by the combination of human-machine design and assessment. Its program had never been carried out fully, as its activities were halted in November 2020.

The opening ceremony of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games became the target of one of the most successful cognitive attacks of the decade. A festive scene celebrating French fashion, diversity, and the Dionysian tradition was deliberately reframed by an information attacker, as a blasphemous parody of Leonardo da Vinci’s “The Last Supper.” Within hours, the false narrative went viral globally, provoked institutional responses, and caused sustained reputational damage to France, the Olympic movement, and Western liberal values. This paper demonstrates, through chronological reconstruction and narrative analysis, that the scandal exhibits all the hallmarks of a planned cognitive operation: rapid seeding, bot amplification, selective editing of official statements, and exploitation of existing cultural cleavages. The primary beneficiaries, Russia (banned from the Games), domestic far right movements, and conservative political forces in the United States, are clearly identifiable. The case constitutes a textbook example of contemporary cognitive warfare executed in the open-source information environment.

Ukraine faces unprovoked and illegal military aggression by Russia, representing the culmination of hybrid warfare strategies. This article examines the country’s resilience in the context of a long-term, large-scale war with a superior adversary. Drawing upon a nationwide survey and comprehensive analysis, the study highlights the current challenges to national resilience, evaluates the effectiveness of societal and institutional responses, and proposes strategic measures to strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to withstand ongoing aggression. The findings underscore the importance of both domestic mobilization and international support in sustaining national endurance and security.

The Central Asian Republics (CARs), strategically situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, hold significant geopolitical importance due to their abundant reserves of oil, natural gas, and minerals. Their resource wealth and geographic location have made the region a focal point of rivalry among major powers, namely Russia, China, and the United States. Russia seeks to preserve its historical dominance and influence in the area, while the United States endeavors to advance energy infrastructure projects that align with its broader strategic and geopolitical goals. Following the 2022 war in Ukraine, Russia was forced to reassess its policies to address the economic repercussions of international sanctions. One of its key responses was to redirect its energy trades and initiatives away from Europe, focusing instead on other regions like Central Asia. However, these actions have created ripple effects, particularly by hindering the progress of China’s Belt and Road Initiative within the CARs. The competition for influence over Central Asia’s energy resources and policies poses a significant challenge for Russia in its attempts to maintain regional hegemony. This situation is exacerbated by the challenging management of the intricate dynamics of its relationship with China, while concurrently addressing the geopolitical countermeasures implemented by Western powers. Thus, this paper critically analyzes the geopolitical ramifications of CARs’ energy security policies in relation to Russia. Specifically, it seeks to examine whether Russia can sustain its influence in the region while navigating its strategic relationship with China, or if the evolving geopolitical landscape provides an opportunity for Western powers (U.S. and European Union) to challenge Russia’s dominance in Central Asia. This research uses public information, data from reputable sources, and expert interviews to sustain its arguments.

This paper examines the structure, dynamics, and effects of hybrid threats, focusing on Montenegro's experience and positioning with respect to NATO and the European Union. Using a comparative and empirical framework, it analyses institutional vulnerabilities, the role of proxy actors, cyber-attacks, and regional resilience practices. The study draws on policy documents and reports from NATO, the EU, the UK FCDO, and local research centres, the Digital Forensic Centre (DFC) and the Centre for Democratic Transition (CDT), as well as comparative data from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania. Through a case study of Montenegro, the paper maps key vectors of hybrid action: cyber-attacks targeting electoral processes and critical infrastructure, media-narrative campaigns aimed at delegitimising Euro-Atlantic integration, the operation of proxy actors linking domestic political and religious structures to external centres of influence, and economic and energy penetration that constrains institutional autonomy. A comparative regional analysis reveals shared patterns of sequential attack, whereby initial cyber incidents are amplified by subsequent disinformation campaigns, while highlighting differences in institutional resilience across the Western Balkans. The findings indicate that Montenegro's primary weaknesses lie in the fragmentation of its security sector, insufficient inter-institutional coordination, limited digital literacy, and a reactive rather than preventive approach to hybrid threats. The paper concludes with policy recommendations centred on the establishment of a national hybrid-threat monitoring centre, the introduction of digital and media literacy programmes, greater transparency in financing flows, and enhanced regional and international cooperation.

Account Takeover (ATO) fraud is an escalating threat in online marketplaces, but research progress remains limited due to the absence of domain-specific, publicly available datasets. This gap hinders benchmarking and reproducibility, slows methodological innovation, and prevents systematic comparisons between classical probabilistic models and modern deep learning approaches. This paper proposes MAATO, a new marketplace ATO dataset and a conceptual roadmap toward robust ATO detection by outlining the design principles for new synthetic datasets, intended to emulate realistic behavioral patterns and fraud scenarios. In parallel, we introduce a benchmarking framework grounded in the CRISP DM methodology to support reproducible evaluation across model families, feature engineering strategies, and anomaly scoring paradigms. Instead of reporting empirical findings, this paper articulates hypotheses regarding (1) the relative importance of engineered behavioral features, (2) the comparative performance of classical vs. deep learning architectures, and (3) the scalability of per-user versus global detection models. The work aims to guide future empirical studies and establish a foundation for shared community standards.

Western-centric and Russian-centric views of Truth exist in fundamentally different epistemological universes: a cognitive division that stems from the rationalism of the Enlightenment, compared to the Byzantine Orthodox concept of “Sophia”. The article examines how a clash between the Western concept of Truth as an objective, empirically verifiable search for knowledge through reason (Kant, 1784/1996) and Russian epistemology, which places a strong focus on holistic wisdom, spiritual insight, and ideological coherence (Florensky, 1914/1997), causes conflict. The epistemic gap itself creates structurally open conditions for disinformation tactics and information operations. While rational discourse in the West assumes a commitment to truth-seeking, Russian strategic communication thrives in a paradigm, where Truth is instrumental, subordinated to power, and ultimately pluralistic in Nietzschean terms (Nietzsche, 1873/1979). In part inspired by philosophy (Kant, Heidegger, Foucault), theology (Florensky, Lossky), and security studies (Giles, 2016; Pomerantsev, 2014), the article details the friction between Enlightenment rationality and Slavophile Eurasianist holism and its impact forn the current information threats. In particular, the analysis illustrates how this bifurcation facilitates the adoption of both disinformation tactics and reflexive control techniques (Thomas, 2004) that exploit Western epistemological presuppositions. And familiarity with this gap is crucial for constructing effective response models and enhancing democratic resilience in the face of hybrid threats and interferences.

Humans in the Cyber Loop: Perspectives on Social Cybersecurity is a valuable and innovative contribution to the developing field of social cybersecurity. The main thesis emphasizing the need to shift focus the emphasis from technical infrastructure to the human as an active participant and beneficiary of digital security strategies is both convincing and well-argued. The book stands out for its interdisciplinary approach and its ability to synthesize knowledge from various fields, which makes it relevant to both theory and practice in cybersecurity. Its analyses of disinformation, public opinion manipulation, and the ethical aspects of algorithms address some of the most pressing challenges of our time. At the same time, the publication does not exhaust all aspects of this complex issue. The limitations mentioned, from insufficient operationalization of concepts to gaps in economic and cultural analysis, create space for further research. However, they do not undermine the fundamental value of the monograph, but rather indicate promising directions for future research. In the context of dynamically evolving digital threats and the growing complexity of cyberspace, this publication constitutes a significant step towards a more human-centric and socially oriented understanding of cybersecurity. Despite the noted limitations, it deserves recognition as a strong foundation for further discussion and research on the role of the human in the digital security ecosystem. The practical relevance of the publication is evident in its potential as a reference for a broad range of audiences: academics dealing with cybersecurity, IT professionals, policymakers, and anyone interested in the complex relationships between technology, human behavior, and digital security. The monograph may also serve as a source of inspiration for developers of technical solutions, encouraging them to place greater emphasis on the active involvement of the user in protecting IT systems.

Terrorism and ideologically motivated violence constitute a persistent threat to global security, prompting extensive scholarly inquiry into the processes of radicalization and deradicalization. This article employs a systematic and comparative analytical approach to elaborate on the key theoretical models of radicalization and deradicalization, with the aim of deepening the understanding of the psychological, social, and ideological factors that contribute to these phenomena. The methodological framework is grounded in a qualitative analysis of available academic and professional literature, incorporating comparative examinations of prominent theoretical models, as well as secondary analysis of reports and evaluations of existing programs. Through theoretical review, critical interpretation of current findings, and the development of conceptual models of radicalization and deradicalization, this study seeks to enhance comprehension of both the potential and limitations of contemporary approaches to these complex issues.

This paper examines the role of intelligence operations as one of the pillars of national security in the context of contemporary challenges such as hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, organized crime, and terrorism. Through comparative analysis, case studies, and a descriptive methodological approach, the research analyzes the intelligence system of the Republic of Croatia and compares it to the established models of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Special focus is placed on the intelligence cycle and the application of strategic analysis in security-related decision-making. The findings show that Croatia has developed a stable and functional system comprising the Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA), the Military Security and Intelligence Agency (VSOA), and the Office of the National Security Council (UVNS). However, the system faces challenges related to technological modernization, the need for specialized analytical capacities, and stronger parliamentary oversight. The comparison with the U.S. and German systems highlights the importance of enhancing cyber capabilities, increasing transparency, and establishing AI-driven analytical centers capable of processing complex data for early threat detection. The study concludes that further development of intelligence strategies and expansion of international cooperation are essential for effectively responding to new security threats, while maintaining democratic values and institutional accountability.

The article traces the main lessons of Russian-Ukrainian war as of 2025. Recognizing the conflict in its continuity since 2014 as transformative for contemporary international relations, it offers a structured periodization and names the important stages. Five key lessons are identified: the return of industrial-scale warfare, the importance of strategic communication, fragmentation of the existing global order, the crisis in strategic imagination as well as the risks of conflict spillover. The study concludes that international relations are in the era of great-power competition with no clear vision of a sustainable security order.

Local dynamics are crucial for uncovering Russian influence operations and understanding how Russia operates. In Serbia, pairing memory politics with state capture strategies proves to be a powerful tool for both local elites and Russian activities. Memory politics enables Serbian elites and nationalists to exploit historical grievances, garnering support and legitimizing their narratives, which often hinders democratic progress and social cohesion in both Serbia and its neighbouring countries. State capture facilitates this by enabling media, judiciary, and security institutions to propagate the regime’s ideological agenda. This troubling dynamic extends beyond the ruling party, as large parts of the Serbian opposition also embrace nationalist narratives, thereby limiting democratic pluralism and prolonging the influence of nationalism, even in the event of potential regime changes. Serbia uses its ethnic minorities in Bosnia and Kosovo as proxies to stall statebuilding and exacerbate divisions, perpetuating identity-based conflicts that impede institutional stability in the region. The vulnerabilities of the Serbian nation across its borders create opportunities for exploitation by Russia, especially in the context of recent events in the Balkans and the Ukraine War. Moreover, Serbia's situation highlights similar risks in divided countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Montenegro. To effectively counter Russian foreign policy, it is crucial to understand the local causes, drivers, and potential triggers of instability.

Today, national security services of EU member states are faced with a situation in which they must preserve their own integrity but at the same time elevate intelligence cooperation in response to increasingly global threats and an increasingly global array of accessible data. The main obstacle to the development of intelligence cooperation at the Union level is the lack of trust—both of member states towards the Union, and among the member states themselves. On the other hand, external threats have always exerted a cohesive influence on this aspect of member state cooperation. In order to successfully balance these two tendencies, such cooperation should be based on common interests. Furthermore, this cooperation should not be too formal, and it should be regulated either by national laws or bilateral/multilateral agreements. The intelligence cooperation of the Union member states within the Union should not be formed by taking over the rights of member states as guaranteed by Union law, but rather within existing forms of cooperation.

Recent Statements by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis have emphasised the security concerns as a result of the threats posed by Russia (NATO, 2025a; Ukrainian World Congress, 2025). While European intelligence agencies traditionally operate within limited public visibility, they increasingly communicate about Russian threats through public reports – not merely for transparency, but as part of their institutional role in democratic societies. As the primary entities responsible for monitoring such threats, intelligence agencies play a crucial role in shaping public understanding. This research examines how European intelligence agencies communicate about the Russian threat through their 2025 annual reports and threat assessments. By analysing publications from Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Finland, Latvia, Sweden and the Netherlands, the study investigates the communication strategies used to inform and influence public perceptions of Russian activities. Employing intelligence communication theory as its primary analytical lens, the study explores how intelligence agencies convey complex threat information to their audiences while balancing transparency and operational security (Petersen, 2019). By focusing on a specific year and a selected set of European countries, the study provides a comparative snapshot of intelligence communication practices in response to Russian security threats. The research applies thematic analysis to identify key themes, narratives, patterns and frames used within the reports (Braun, & Clarke, 2022). This method allows for a systematic examination of how intelligence agencies articulate threats, structure their messages, and frame Russian activities for public consumption. The findings contribute to a better understanding of the role of intelligence agencies in public discourse, offering insights into the intersection of intelligence, media and strategic communication (Schrijver, Nietzman, & Pijpers, 2025). This research will be of interest to scholars of intelligence studies, security studies, and political communication, as well as practitioners seeking to refine intelligence messaging strategies. The findings also hold relevance for policymakers on how to communicate security threats in democratic societies.

The Southern Gas Interconnection project is conceived as an energy link between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, carrying significant geopolitical and economic potential to reduce BiH's dependence on Russian gas. Despite its strategic importance, the project faces internal political disagreements that reflect a broader framework of hybrid action through energy policy. This paper analyzes how energy interests and international influences shape internal political attitudes and decisions in BiH. Croatian political actors support the Southern Gas Interconnection project as part of their pro-European and security policies, with an emphasis on reducing energy dependence on Russia and strengthening regional energy security. On the other hand, the Republika Srpska represents a pro-Russian position, favoring existing energy flows that enable the maintenance of Russian influence on the local market. Bosniak political actors take a pragmatic and flexible approach to the project, adapting their positions and decisions to current political interests and strategic benefits. Methodologically, the paper will include the analysis of media discourse, political statements and relevant documents. In the first part of the paper, the chronology of the project will be presented in detail, as well as the attitudes of domestic political actors towards it. Furthermore, the geopolitical context in which the entire process takes place and how broader geopolitical forces are refracted within BiH will be presented, precisely on the example of the Southern Gas Interconnection. The second part of the paper is devoted to the qualitative analysis of media content within the media space of BiH. It will present the internal "narrative dispute" and different interpretations of the effects that the mentioned project could have both for BiH and for the wider regional energy and security structure. The emphasis will be on the informational dimension of hybrid threats, pointing to the role of the media in shaping the perception of the public and political actors. The paper will provide a basis for further discussions on energy connectivity as a means of strengthening the resistance of NATO and the EU to Russian influence in South-Eastern Europe, it is expected that the research results will contribute to a better understanding of energy policies as a tool of hybrid influence and their implications for regional stability and safety.

This research study aims to monitor and analyze how Africa's borders have been managed this process, which is one of the most important internal processes in which many disciplines of social sciences are intertwined, traditional Preuzmite članak u PDF formatuboundary positivist approaches have addressed their various problems by focusing on the line as the main analysis unit s borders ", where these approaches focused on limiting the phenomenon of State borders to political factors, It treated it as a mirror of neighboring States' military, economic and political forces, but post-boundary studies shifted the focus to practice as an alternative unit of analysis of the line, By examining the social and spatial functions of those lines, the borders, according to Mark Salter, are only a set of human structures, and thus derive their function and meaning from the population that occupies them.

Traditional conceptions of crime are challenged in the digital age: cyberspace has blurred the historical divide between civilian and military responsibility, creating a new landscape that demands unprecedented levels of communication and cooperation. To provide a grounded understanding of how the digital realm influences contemporary governance structures; real-world dynamics that define cybersecurity efforts need to be captured. Croatia provides a compelling European lens to examine the international power dynamics shaping cyberspace. Its resilience-focused strategy reflects an acute awareness of regional geopolitical dynamics, particularly in light of growing Russian cyber activities. The country's efforts underscore how smaller nations navigate the tension between national sovereignty and the need for transnational cooperation in a domain without borders. Hence, this article charts Croatia's cybersecurity architecture using qualitative methods to uncover the main frameworks, key actors, and critical collaborations that that define its approach. By leveraging the Croatian case study, this research contributes empirically to the broader discourse on the governance of security in cyberspace. It addresses the pressing challenges confronting European security frameworks as they adapt to the evolving realities of policing cyberspace, offering valuable insights into the intersection of criminology, technology, and governance.

The book Croatian Dissidents and the Dissonance of the West, edited by writer and translator Julienne Bušić, was published in 2024 by the publishing house Školska knjiga in Zagreb. This volume is written in both Croatian and English, making it accessible to a broader Croatian and international audience. It consists of a preface, two introductory texts by editor Julienne Bušić and historians Zlatko Begonja and Luka Knez, four sections in which various historical sources are integrated, and a postscript.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of ten states located close to the regional hegemon and at the center of the Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN has a balanced relationship with China, the dominant power, as it is the primary trading partner for most member states. ASEAN and China have a strategic alliance until 2030 and have reaffirmed their relations with the union and the member states through joint military exercises for counterterrorism and maritime security, and agreements for sustainable agriculture cooperation. However, states like Philippines and Vietnam and western commentators such as the European Union (EEAS, 2024) have questioned China’s strategies in the region. They have alleged the employment of coercive practices such as the militarization of the South China Sea, disregard for international law, use of disinformation campaigns in ASEAN societies, and disruptions of supply chains. Therefore, this study aims to examine the relationship of ASEAN and its member states with China and, subsequently, analyze China’s exertion of influence within the association. This research focuses on the complex dynamics of how ASEAN member states manage their cooperative relationship with China in the face of significant challenges arising from territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Moreover, a section is dedicated to examining the influence of Western presence (US and Europe) in the region. This analysis will situate the issues faced by the China-ASEAN partnership in a wider perspective. Within the complex geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia, the study aims to unravel the nuanced strategies employed by these nations to strike a delicate balance between fostering economic integration and addressing the geopolitical complexities arising from contested maritime territories. This paper utilizes public information, data from reliable sources, and expert interviews to substantiate its arguments.

Social networks have become powerful media and communication tools that provide adequate support to state actors in cyberspace when planning and execution of influence operations. In this context, new patterns in planning and conducting covert offensive information operations will be presented, where artificial intelligence systems used by social networks play a crucial role. On a tactical level, these systems are utilized to exploit users' personal data on social networks regarding their political, ideological, and religious beliefs, as well as tendencies towards violent extremism, radicalism and terrorism, to create hybrid threats. The main hybrid threat presented here is automated and anonymous disinformation that adapts to these beliefs and tendencies. Hybrid intelligence is depicted as a key factor that has enabled the use of this category of user data for the creation of hybrid threats in cyberspace. The article aims to underscore that artificial intelligence systems used by social networks have enabled more effective exploitation of weaknesses in political and social systems based on personal data about the beliefs and tendencies of social media users who are not sufficiently aware of it. The application of hybrid intelligence has further complicated the counteraction and timely recognition, mitigation, and deterrence of the potential harmful consequences of hybrid threats.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the first official document on the position and role of women in armed conflicts, peace processes and activities related to peace and security. It marked a turning point in the direction of strengthening a comprehensive approach to security and opened the way for the realization of the specific contribution that women can and should make to world peace policy. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia are an example of a modern military organization in which women participate equally. According to data from the Annual Report on Defence for 2022, 14% of the Armed Forces are women, more than the average of NATO member countries. However, only a small number of women are in leadership positions. The military organization is known for its strict hierarchical structure and rules of behaviour and communication. Throughout history, the military was primarily intended for men. Nevertheless, women fought for equality and today, in most armies of developed democratic countries, they have become part of military organizations. The aim of this paper is to investigate how many women are represented in the educational work of the Croatian Army, how many of them participate in the teaching of the undergraduate and graduate university programmes in military leadership and management and military engineering. In addition to the above, the paper will investigate how they are accepted among their male colleagues and how much easier/harder it is for them, due to their private obligations (motherhood), compared to their male colleagues.

Umjetna inteligencija dio je računalstva koji se bavi razvojem sposobnosti računala za obavljanje zadatka za kojega je potrebna određena razina inteligencije (Hrvatska enciklopedija,2024). Njezinim razvojem raste i potencijal za zloupotrebu na raznim područjima. Umjetna inteligencija kao sredstvo pomoću kojega se mogu stvoriti vrlo uvjerljive protuobavijesti u komunikaciji dovodi do većih mogućnosti manipuliranja javnim mnijenjem. Ova pojava nije nepoznata i sve je raširenija kako raste popularnost korištenja društvenih mreža. Brzina širenja protuobavijesti nastalih umjetnom inteligencijom, povećava mogućnost širenja neistina protiv kojih je potrebno boriti se. Ovaj rad u uvodnom će dijelu pojasniti svrhu protuobavijesti stvorenih umjetnom inteligencijom, zatim će donijeti pregled izabranih slučajeva širenja protuobavijesti u javnosti u svrhu stvaranja alata za hibridno ratovanje u bližoj povijesti do danas – od Domovinskog rata u Hrvatskoj, rata SAD-a u Iraku do nedavno započetog rata između Ukrajine i Rusije. U zaključnom dijelu rad će se baviti pitanjem može li umjetna inteligencija koja čovjeku služi za stvaranje protuobavijesti i hibridno ratovanje biti oružje za borbu protiv takvog ratovanja. Može li umjetna inteligencija biti oružje protiv same sebe u ratu protuobavijestima.

This article revisits the Global War on Terror (GWOT) two decades after its declaration, critically assessing its strategic achievements and failures. It examines the evolution of terrorism as a threat and the shifting focus to state actors like Russia and China in a multipolar global order. We highlighted the limitations of militarised responses to terrorism, which have often resulted in regional instability, increased radicalisation, and diminished international trust. In addition, we described the strategic paradox of pursuing absolute security while neglecting socio-political root causes and explored how the GWOT shaped global military and political landscapes. Drawing on historical and strategic frameworks, the analysis reveals a mixed legacy of counter-terrorism efforts, suggesting the need for a balanced approach that integrates military action with diplomacy, economic development, and cultural understanding. The findings underscore the importance of reassessing global security strategies to address contemporary threats effectively in a fragmented and interdependent world.

The present article deals with the transition period in Serbia in the period from 2000 to the present. Institutional reforms and the endemic occurrence of corruption at all levels are concomitant phenomena of this period. The authors try to provide answers to certain questions concerning: the causes of weak institutions in the transition period of Serbia, the possibilities of strengthening the institutions, the explanation of corrupt behavior and the lack of legislation in the supporting segments of public and economic life. The general hypothesis suggests that weak institutions and corruption are in correlative relationship: weak institutions cause greater corruption, and vice versa, stronger institutions suppress corruption. In scientific terms, this article seeks to provide answers to basic questions about the relationship of institutions and corruption, to describe the status of the studied phenomena (corruption and weak institutions) in the transition period of Serbia and to offer solutions for the problem situation. The social relevance of this study would be: identification of the problems, pointing to their harmful, and even fatal, consequences to the society and its population and, thus, contributing to the overcoming the criticality of present situation.

Technical progress and technological development have enabled us to adopt innovative approaches in the fight against terrorism. Intelligence services plays a unique role in this fight. Their main task is to collect and analyze data and information on terrorist organizations, groups, and individuals. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other new working methods are increasingly being used in the work of intelligence services. The bearers of terrorist threats posed by terrorist perpetrators or malicious actors in modern circumstances use everything at their disposal, especially in the form of cyberterrorism. Likewise, the Russian full scale aggression on Ukraine on 2022 has employed the massive use of drones. An identical situation exists simultaneously in the Middle East, where state sponsors of terrorism, namely Iran, are also using drones on a massive scale, primarily through proxy networks in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. Russia uses its proxies via Iran to the Houthis in Yemen to attack cargo ships and thereby terrorize international shipping traffic. It logically follows that terrorists will increasingly use drones of diverse types along with AI in the future to support their operations. Intelligence services must improve in all ways to promptly detect such threats. We can speak about the New Craft of Intelligence in modern circumstances, given that the entire data collection, processing, analysis, and prediction cycle depends on understanding and adapting intelligence services to these new challenges and sophisticated technologies.

In this article, we focus on a new perspective for asymmetric red teaming. In asymmetric red teaming, there are two issues that are problematic to deal with. Firstly, to red team it is advised to bring in external people for a fresh view, but this may cause problems for reasons of sensitivity. Secondly, although creativity is highly valued, there is an implicit rationality bias in the thinking of most professionals. In the Netherlands, a method has been developed – and tested – that has a high potential to address both issues at the same time. Firstly, the exercise is designed such that it will detach the security officers from their daily routine and thinking. As part of it, the participants have to invent – and play – a mythical persona, with mythical powers, that are a threat for the interests they must protect. This approach will get the officers out of their daily routine, and lead to a free way of thinking – detached from their daily work. Above that, the mythical powers of their persona trigger a creative approach on finding possible new modus operandi. This way, the first issue – just to work with your own team and at the same time come to fresh creative views as if you are an outsider – can be addressed. Secondly, also the rationality bias will be addressed. By developing and playing mythical persona, the process of creativity taps in into a deeper, subconscious, level. You tap in to the deeper level of archetypes and non-rationality. The participants can leave behind their rationality bias that permeates the western (labor) culture. Thirdly, an extra element has been built in the method. By handing out cards, the participants are asked to reflect on certain emotions and sins in the context of their security issue. It leads to an additional layer of creativity on top of the other ones. In one of the exercises, for example, a participant drew the card on vanity. The outcome was that if someone like a prime minister would visit the organization, the head of security would not leave the welcoming to the subordinates, as it should be conforming the protocol. The head of security would personally come downstairs instead to welcome this guest, as this visit would be the career highlight. Meaning that when the stakes are the highest – the most vulnerable guests possible are visiting your organization – the coordinator is not in place when something happens. The exercise can be carried out within two hours. If a guided come-back-hour within a week is held, this will lead to additional results. The method needs special attention in the way it is carried out. Firstly, the framing of the exercise – before the actual exercise is started – is crucial. Only then the free-thinking process really takes off. Secondly, during the exercise, the facilitator of the exercise never at any moment interferes with the contents of the process.

Influence operations as a method for achieving geopolitical goals are not new. An integral part of intelligence operations is the projection of influence and shaping of public opinion with the aim of achieving the desired behavior of the victim society and the state. Influence operations as a choice of tactics for achieving political goals can direct their action towards public opinion and political decision makers. The key thing in this conception is the creation of an environment in which the making of political decisions is blocked due to the opposition of public opinion.

Russian utilization of reflexive control plays a pivotal role in advancing its foreign policy objectives. This strategic concept involves shaping an adversary's perception and decision-making processes to achieve desired outcomes without direct confrontation. The Russian government employs reflexive control across various domains, including intelligence, strategic communication, and diplomacy. The EU has recognized these manipulative methods and labelled them as Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). This paper endeavors to conduct an in-depth analysis of Kremlin's application of reflexive control to influence decision making processes in Serbia. The study closely examines how Russia successfully manipulated the information landscape to its benefit by understanding and shaping the internal dynamics of its partner and leveraging existing fault lines. By capitalizing on the internal tensions, Russia made Serbia permissive to the reflexive control manipulation and influenced the outcomes in a way that aligns with Kremlin’s own foreign policy objectives. This paper analysis contributes to a better understanding of the intricate dynamics between reflexive control strategies and their impact on the national and international political landscape.

Artificial intelligence is a part of computing that deals with the development of the computer's ability to perform tasks that require a certain level of intelligence (Hrvatska enciklopedija, 2024). Its development also increases the potential for misuse in various areas. Artificial intelligence as a tool that can be used to create very convincing disinformations in communication leads to greater possibilities of manipulating public opinion. This phenomenon is not unknown and is becoming more widespread as the popularity of social networks grows. The spread of disinformation created by artificial intelligence increases the possibility of spreading falsehoods that need to be fought against. In the introductory part, this paper will clarify the purpose of disinformation created by artificial intelligence, furthermore it will provide an overview of selected cases of the dissemination of disinformation in the public in recent history to the present day - from the Homeland War in Croatia, the US war in Iraq until the recently started war between Ukraine and Russia, with the purpose of creating tools for hybrid warfare. In the final part, the paper will deal with the question of whether artificial intelligence, which serves humans to create disinformation and hybrid warfare, can be a weapon to fight against such warfare. Can artificial intelligence be a weapon against itself in the disinformation war?

This article examines the growing role of disinformation in hybrid warfare, centering on its use in social media during the 2024 United States Presidential Election. While disinformation is as old as time, the methods and its mediums have evolved rapidly since Cold-War era propaganda and towards social media infiltration. These social media campaigns, first notably observed in the 2016 United States Presidential Election, highlights a new age of conflict and foreign meddling, highlighting the global shift from classical military warfare to more subversive tactics. The article argues that disinformation, as a form of hybrid warfare, that emphasizes exploiting a target’s societal vulnerabilities, exacerbating them to ultimately weaken the target from the inside-out and destabilizing, eroding, or even destroying, their political systems. Via an analysis of the 2024 United States election disinformation interference, following a recapitulation of its first presence in the 2016 election, this article examines the geopolitical dimensions and draws of disinformation warfare, the motives behind the foreign actors’ interference, and the destabilizing results it fosters within the general public. Additionally, it begins a discussion of how similar disinformation strategies can be and have been utilized across other democracies in Europe, Asia, and beyond, threatening the current global order of liberalism and democratic superiority. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of nations to invest into understanding and countering these new technological warfare tactics in order to properly protect, defend, and safeguard the integrity of their democratic governance. With disinformation and information hybrid warfare, amongst social media in particular, becomes the increasingly preferred method of confrontation with adversaries due to its low-risk, high-reward quality, it poses possibly the largest threat to global stability and threatens to upend the entire system, necessitating direct and immediate attention to address this vulnerability of our global infosphere.

A common myth about terrorist attacks is that they are random incidents that can occur anywhere in the world. While it is true that such attacks can happen globally, they usually exhibit discernible spatiotemporal patterns that could be analysed using criminalistics techniques, methods, and analytic tools. Numerous studies have shown that analysing the spatial and temporal patterns of terrorist attacks can uncover the modus operandi of terrorist organisations and shed light on their strategic objectives. By identifying the operational methods of specific terrorist groups, it becomes theoretically possible to create models that predict the spatiotemporal dispersion of their movements and actions. Such models can potentially indicate sites of future attacks, including bombings, arsons, assassinations, hijackings, abductions, sabotage, kidnappings, and more. The paper aims to examine and provide a concise explanation of why the application of criminalistic techniques is possible in the prediction of distinct aspects of urban terrorism.

During the last decades, Salafi-Jihadi groups have exploited the proliferation of social media to create a persistent and ideologically cohesive presence online. Yet, Salafi-Jihadi individuals connected online to form a new dispersed network of ‘media mujahedeen’ based on loose affiliations, moving from the ‘one-to-many’ to a ‘peer-to-peer’ structure described by Ali Fisher as the Swarmcast Model. The Swarmcast model can be adopted to understand the current media war held by media mujahedeen online. Given this context, experts observed a new centrality of non-institutional media houses, which spread jihadist propaganda and/or produce propaganda content. During the last decade, Telegram was Salafi-Jihadi organizations’ main messaging platform for both institutional and non-institutional media houses. However, in late November 2019, the 16th Referral Action Day coordinated by EUROPOL took place and forced Salafi-Jihadi propaganda operators to adopt what was described by Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha as the Multiplatform Communication Paradigm (MCP) to create a more resilient digital network. Among the messaging platforms, there was Rocket.Chat, which became their primary launchpad and digital safe haven. In late March, inside the Islamic State (IS) server on Rocket.Chat, the first massive use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) was individuated, which was aimed at producing what can be described as a news broadcast in Arabic of IS’s wilayat operations all over the world made by a pro-IS non-institutional media house. The producer inserted all the main characteristics of news broadcasts created through the support of AI. From that day to now, the user posted ten different propaganda videos employing the same production techniques, albeit with some graphic and content differences. Against the backdrop of the evolution of Salafi-Jihadi communication that occurred in the last decades, this paper seeks to illustrate the use of AI inside IS’s server on Rocket.Chat and trace possible countermeasures to prevent using such technologies to produce Salafi-Jihadi propaganda.

Traditionally, the radicalization phenomenon has been explained as a process of individually or collectively incorporating a violent ideology based on extremism of various factors (ethnic, political, religious) in order to achieve objectives contrary to democracy and the rule of law in a state or society. The wave of extremism implies a thematic tendency in which the energy of massive groups of people is directed to extremist ends. In this article, we analyze the elements of a new wave of expanding extremism generated by the crisis in Gaza. Thus, the article analyzes this event as a turning point for the international security architecture, in comparison with the wave of radicalization initiated by ISIS in the past decade. So, the premise of the article emphasizes that the Hamas terrorist attack represented a trigger for a new wave of extremism with global reverberations. By using a methodology based on a comparative analysis, the article intends to extract the lessons learned from the wave of terrorism generated by ISIS in relation to the new elements identified in the wave of extremism in development determined by Hamas. The purpose of the research is that, by comparison, we can extract the lessons learned from the experience of a retreating wave of terrorism generated by ISIS. In this sense, in order to draw attention to some early warning aspects, the elements we propose to be analyzed consist of the transnational character, the new-media impact, directing the energy of massive groups, extremist beliefs and desires for societal change.

U radu autor sistematizirano i kronološki prikazuje i analizira medijske izvještaje o operativnom djelovanju stranih obavještajnih službi u Republici Hrvatskoj u periodu 2002.-2022. s posebnim fokusom na maligne aktivnosti Bezbednosno-informativne agencije (BIA). Na temelju novinskih članaka dostupnih u digitaliziranim arhivskim bazama vodećih hrvatskih i srbijanskih mainstream medijskih kuća (Nacional, Vjesnik, Telegram, Index.hr, Dnevno.hr, Tportal, Slobodna Dalmacija, Novosti, Jutarnji list, Net.hr, Express, Globus, Večernji list, Politika.rs, Telegraf.rs, Ekspres.net, Republika.rs, Blic.rs, Kurir.rs itd.) autor izrađuje kvantitativno/kvalitativnu kronološku Excel bazu koja sadrži informativne podatke o člancima za dati period, njihovoj postotnoj i brojčanoj zastupljenosti po medijskim kućama koje su kategorički svrstane po pojedinim zemljama porijekla (Hrvatska i Srbija) te sadržajima izvještaja. Detektiranje i razumijevanje dominantnih i aktualnih tema koje su bile predmetom izvještavanja u medijima kroz dati period, predstavlja osnovno težište znanstvene teorije rada i metodološkog pristupa. Kronološkim proučavanjem podataka, identificira se učestalost i vrsta izvještaja koji su obrađivali aktivnosti spomenute obavještajne službe. Također, važan element istraživanja čini i analiza povijesnog, sigurnosnog i nacionalno-regionalnog društveno-političkog konteksta koji predstavlja elementaran okvir za shvaćanje određenih pojava pri čemu se autor konzultira relevantnom domaćom i stranom znanstvenom i stručnom literaturom te provjerenim internetskim izvorima i podacima. Rezultati istraživanja trebali bi praktično i teorijski pružiti uvid u medijsku percepciju i zastupljenost aktivnosti stranih obavještajnih službi, poglavito BIA-e u medijima tijekom navedenog razdoblja. Prema tome, osim kvantitativno-statističkih pokazatelja, istraživanje se fokusira na razumijevanje prijenosa informacija, dezinformacija i misinformacija prema javnosti. Kombinacijom kvantitativnih i kvalitativnih podataka, pokušava se stvoriti cjelovita slika o tome kako su se aktivnosti stranih obavještajnih struktura u Republici Hrvatskoj, posebice BIA-e, reflektirale u medijskim izvještajima tijekom posljednja dva desetljeća. Ova analiza pruža temelj za daljnje istraživanje o percepciji mainstream medija i javnosti o stranom obavještajnom djelovanju i njegovom stvarnom empirijskom, tj. teorijskom utjecaju na političke i sigurnosne procese u Republici Hrvatskoj.

Democracy and the rule of law are classified as “national interests” and ”critical assets” in Sweden’s National Security Strategy and Military Strategic Doctrine. These assets are targets of a range of challenges and attacks. For instance, foreign powers seek to create confusion and polarization through disinformation and influence operations. Domestic violent extremist groups promote conspiracy narratives in order to divide society and create mistrust of authorities. Meanwhile, social phenomena such as serious organized crime and honor-based violence undermine and counteract the basic principles and functions of both democracy and the rule of law and, additionally, are actively exploited by malicious actors. Importantly, these challenges frequently overlap and interact. This paper gives an overview of Democratic Security, a model created in order to answer to two primary questions: what does it mean to posit democracy and the rule of law as critical assets? And, how does one operationalize the defense of values and principles? It is an approach to understanding threats and challenges democracy and the rule of law, within which these principles and processes are seen not only as core critical assets but also as normative for effective and democratically sustainable counter-measures. This enables analysis of both vulnerabilities and threats that is highly granular.

This article synthesizes the authors’ earlier research on strategic communication in Ukraine during its first year of enduring Russia’s full-scale invasion and the subsequent war of aggression in 2022. The analysis is framed within the academic fields of strategic communication, military innovation theory, and theories on the mediatization of war. It aims to provide a nuanced understanding of Ukrainian strategic communication by focusing on how it is shaped and functions within specific historical, cultural, political, and social milieus, thus offering a holistic view of its evolution and impact during wartime. The article highlights the importance of approaching strategic communications as an all-encompassing task, engaging government bodies and the wider academic society for an evidence-based policy-based lessons-learned approach. It is argued that the Ukrainian case illustrates that effective strategic communication is deeply intertwined with consistent action, societal unity, political strategy, and national identity.

The amount and promptness of data associated with instant communication applications has completely reshaped the information environment. External malign actors who seek to exert their influence on public opinion no longer need to dispose illegal radio stations and secret distribution of literature; it is enough to have Telegram. The Telegram application represents a significant vector of Russian influence in the Western Balkans. The application dominantly operates in nine languages. With its technical characteristics, it represents a medium between a social network and a space-communication application. Telegram does not have technical solutions that would protect users from dangerous and fake content as Facebook and Twitter do. After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Telegram became a basic tool for distributing viral videos of armed conflicts, but also a tool for information shaping. The phenomenon of Telegram influencers further complicates protection against informational influence operations. Through interaction, these influencers build a relationship with an audience that does not have the capacity to verify the large number of claims which are made nor their veracity. The consequence of influence operations through Telegram leads to the creation of the ideological engine model. Over time, the public adopts the disputed narrative as its own rational tool for interpreting contemporary international relations and the nature of Russian aggression. Telegram's technical solutions make it suitable for conducting influence operations. Sufficiently sophisticated users can skillfully hide their identity. On the other hand, users who do not hide their identity and represent the bearers of Russian propaganda are not obstructed in propagating harmful content. In this paper, we tried to look at the characteristics of information operations through the Telegram application.

Donald Nuechterlein's matrix for researching the intensity of national interest holds a pivotal position in the field of national interest research within international relations and security sciences. Widely adopted, this matrix serves as a fundamental tool for theorists, either in its original form or with various modifications tailored to enhance precision in measuring investigated phenomena. This paper presents both Nuechterlein's original matrix and several of its adaptations. The primary contribution of this paper lies in the author's modification of the matrix, resulting in the creation of a tailored analytical framework for investigating national security issues. By incorporating the parameter of internal stability of homeland, this adapted matrix becomes particularly adequate for examining a state's national security policy. The recognition that national interest encompasses both internal and external dimensions, related to the political stability and order of the state as well as its international position and security, underscores the paper's significance. This enhanced matrix offers researchers and policymakers a more comprehensive tool for nuanced analyses of national security concerns.

Društvene su mreže postale snažna medijska i komunikacijska sredstva koja državnim akterima u kiberprostoru pružaju adekvatnu potporu prilikom planiranja i izvođenja operacija utjecaja. U tom kontekstu prikazat će se novi obrasci u planiranju i izvođenju prikrivenih napadačkih informacijskih operacija u kojima ključnu ulogu imaju sustavi umjetne inteligencije koje koriste društvene mreže. Na taktičkoj razini ovi se sustavi koriste kako bi se osobni podaci korisnika društvenih mreža o političkim, ideološkim i vjerskim uvjerenjima te sklonostima nasilnom ekstremizmu, radikalizmu i terorizmu iskorištavali za stvaranje hibridnih prijetnji. Kao glavna hibridna prijetnja prikazane su automatizirane i anonimne protubavijesti koje se prilagođavaju takvim uvjerenjima i sklonostima. Hibridna inteligencija prikazana je ključnim čimbenikom koji je u kiberprostoru omogućio da se ova kategorija korisničkih podataka koristi za stvaranje hibridnih prijetnji. Člankom se želi ukazati na to da su sustavi umjetne inteligencije koje koriste društvene mreže ljudskom čimbeniku omogućile učinkovitije iskorištavanje slabosti političkog i društvenog uređenja na osnovu osobnih podataka o uvjerenjima i sklonostima korisnika društvenih mreža koji toga nisu dovoljno svjesni. Primjena hibridne inteligencije dodatno je otežala protudjelovanje te pravovremeno prepoznavanje, ublažavanje i odvraćanje potencijalnih štetnih posljedica hibridnih prijetnji.

The contemporary cyber threat landscape presents a complex tapestry of challenges, featuring diverse actors ranging from non-state entities like organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations to state-sponsored operatives affiliated with nations such as China, Russia, and Iran. Motivations driving these actors span from financial gain to ideological pursuits and geopolitical objectives, resulting in a wide range of cyber operations aimed at individuals, businesses, and governments worldwide. These high-profile incidents underscore the disruptive potential, and strategic implications need of a comprehensive Shipping Industry's Cyber Counterintelligence approach, to safeguard critical assets and operations in an increasingly digitized environment.

Bosna i Hercegovina i ostale zemlje Zapadnog Balkana kao najvažniji dugoročni strateški cilj postavile su ostvarivanje punopravnog članstva u EU. U ožujku 2024. godine Bosna i Hercegovina je dobila odobrenje Europske komisije za otvaranje pristupnih koraka, što zasigurno predstavlja veliki korak, ali istodobno i značajan izazov u procesu prilagodbe europskom gospodarskom i socijalnom sustavu. Pritom, veliki napori bit će usmjereni na prilagodbu suvremenoj europskoj razvojnoj paradigmi temeljenoj na ulaganjima u istraživanje i razvoj, obrazovanju te ostvarenju održivog razvoja. Cilj provedenog istraživanja jest pregled teorijskih aspekata ulaganja u istraživanje i razvoj kao čimbenika gospodarskog rasta te analiza gospodarskog stanja te stanje ulaganja u istraživanje i razvoj u Bosni i Hercegovini. Svrha je, pregledom teorijskih postavki te analizom ulaganja u istraživanje i razvoj, identificirati znanstveno utemeljene mjere i instrumente nužne za implementaciju društva znanja u Bosni i Hercegovini te za definiranje i implementaciju strukturnih promjena. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju na značajna zaostajanja gospodarstva Bosne i Hercegovine za razvojnim razinama EU, kao i na nepovoljno stanje ulaganja u istraživanje i razvoj i ostalih suvremenih izvora gospodarskog rasta. Daljnji napredak gospodarstva Bosne i Hercegovine te ostvarenje punopravnog članstva u EU uvelike će ovisiti o implementaciji dostupnih financijskih instrumenata te stvaranju uvjeta za provedbu strukturnih promjena, temeljenih na zahtjevima održivog razvoja te zelene i digitalne transformacije.

After the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina (1992 – 1995) and of the armed conflicts in Albania, (1997), Kosovo (1998 – 1999) and North Macedonia (2001), the unchecked influx of dozens of extremist Islamist organizations from the Middle East began. Those organizations invested millions of Dollars to propagate a radical ideology and stoke religious hatred in all Western Balkan countries populated by Muslims. Furthermore, subversive activities of Islamic organizations have been observed since the beginning of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine. Those organizations support Putin openly and disseminate negative propaganda against the Western world, in line with certain doctrines pertaining to expanding Russian influence in the Muslim world. Additionally, they foster interreligious hatred in the region.

Zaštita okoliša tijekom provedbe vojnih aktivnosti u obalnom području na primjeru Rta Kamenjak obuhvaća sagledavanje i definiranje suvremenih izazova i strategije zaštite važnih interesa RH kao suverene države na primjeru vojnog modela uporabe i zaštite vrijedne mikro-lokacije na Jadranu kao što je zaštićeno područje Rt Kamenjak. U početnom dijelu poglavlja je opisana flora i fauna na kopnenom i morskom prostoru te su opisane odgovornosti, mjere i postupci svih korisnika radi zaštite okoliša. Opširnije je opisano područje Kamenjaka koje je zbog svojih posebnosti proglašeno značajnim krajobrazom. Opisani su uvjeti uporabe i zaštite prostora, područja primjene posebnih mjera uređenja i zaštite prostora uključujući položaj i posebnosti s kvantitativnim pokazateljima, koji su definirani Prostornim planom Istarske županije. Kako bi se što bolje razumio odnos vojne organizacije pri uporabi ovog prostora, posebno su razmotreni i opisani postupci planiranja, provedbe i nadzora utjecaja vojnih aktivnosti na okoliš.

It is well-known that Russia seeks to undermine the Western order in the Balkans, such as supporting Serbs in their rejection of NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). However, some assertions of Russia’s influence discussed here show no merit and seem to have been brought to delegitimize the Western installed peace order vital to the stability of the region: the 1-2-3 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) with one state, two entities, and three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats). The meaningless assertions include disinformation against High Representative Schmidt as a Russia man; the misrepresentation of the U.S. -E.U. led electoral reform as the one benefitting Russia; the frequently repeated falsehoods that NATO and EU member state Croatia is aligned with Putin or that some U.S. officials embrace Russia’s values. Such disinformation narratives do not show the ties between the supposed Russian assets and Kremlin, nor do they demonstrate that the alleged pro-Russian actors pursue pro-Kremlin policies. Instead, they tend to be based on the ludicrous claims that the very support for the Dayton categories of ethnic power-sharing reflects the embrace of Russia’s values under President Putin. Striking at the core of the Dayton peace bargain, the anti-Dayton unitarists want the DPA to guarantee BiH’s external borders, while urging the international community to dismiss the DPA designed two-entity state structure (important to Serbs) or ethnic power-sharing (important to Croats) to impose a centralized, unitary state with a majority rule, or the so-called “civic state.” However, besides thwarting (Serb) secessionism and (Croat) separatism, the purpose of Dayton has been to prevent (Bosniak) majoritarianism. The intensity of the debate surrounding the disinformation activities discussed here shows that--though the DPA still remains relevant to the BiH postwar peace and the Western Balkans stability--the consensus on what Dayton is or should be is now collapsing.

It is explored in what ways we can warn in order to protect our way of life and our critical infrastructures. From a methodological perspective, we could warn in four different ways. For to assess there is a threat, warning scenarios are composed for which critical indicators are developed. Subsequently, these critical indicators are monitored. It seems suited for a broad range of issues where access to information is limited. For to assess there is no threat, a barrier model can be constructed, focusing on critical chains of the process or production to be interrupted. It will lead to interventions for which politics must be willing to bear the costs. For to refute there is a threat, the adversaries modus operandi (AMO) are broken into visible activities during the preparation and execution of the hostile act. It is monitored though suspicious indicators, in which it is tried to refute that these indicators belong to a certain AMO. It seems suited to protect people and objects – like airports. For to refute there is no threat, the threat is broken down into its composing variables. For each variable, assumptions are formulated as if there is no threat. Subsequently, it is tried to falsify these assumptions. It seems suited for a wide range of issues, and can include both events and drivers in its analysis.

The advent of the digital revolution has introduced several means for the collection, spread, and dissemination of information within the realm of communication, thus transcending geographical and time constraints. The swift digitization and transformation of contemporary societies have created an unusual security landscape, exerting its influence across every facet of human, societal, economic, and political life. Technology stands as a pivotal variable in the dynamic evolution of terrorism. Cyberspace has emerged as a fertile domain for the amplification and continuation of terrorist activities, representing a profound “transformation” at the operational level over recent decades. Terrorists have adeptly seized upon the potential of cyberspace, strategically imitating successful tactics employed by like-minded, assimilating lessons from past mistakes, and adapting to exigencies of both the present and future. The extensive deployment of information communication and technologies (ICTs) has substantially facilitated terrorists’ activities in a multitude of ways. This includes cost reduction, the generation of operational efficiencies, broader access to novel target demographics, the provision of anonymity, heightened security measures, the dissolution of organizational barriers, and the amplification of the scope and reach of their actions. The full spectrum of cyber activities conducted by terrorists can be comprehensively encapsulated within a model titled the “Digital Jihad”. This paper intends to apply this model in the context of examining the activities and strategies of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

This article explores the intricate web of Russo-Serbian influence operations in Montenegro, examining their multifaceted nature and their profound impact on the country's politics and society. It investigates the joint efforts of Serbia and Russia in shaping narratives that significantly influence Montenegro's social dynamics, its political processes, identity politics, religious identification and inter-ethnic relations.

This interdisciplinary paper undertakes an in-depth analysis of the intricate dynamics characterizing Salafist networks and their nexus with terrorism in Albania, positioned within the tumultuous milieu of the Western Balkans. The resurgence of Salafist ideologies in the Western Balkans region has engendered apprehensions regarding its conceivable repercussions on regional security and stability. This study concentrates on Albania as a specific case, presenting a meticulous exploration of the diverse factors that underpin the proliferation of Salafist networks and their subsequent engagement in terrorist activities. Through a systematic examination, this research aims to provide a thorough understanding of the complex interplay of elements contributing to the emergence and operationalization of Salafist networks in Albania, contributing to a nuanced comprehension of the broader implications for regional security within the Western Balkans context.

Crisis situations are sudden and unforeseen situations that require a rational and calm response to the crisis and a strategic approach to its management. This includes not only verbal communication but also non-verbal communication. The image that a person projects to the outside world is a decisive factor in how the environment reacts to him. Image is always important if you are trying to attract the attention of the environment. However in some situa-tions it is a hidden success factor. The presidents of the countries know this, and with their verbal and non-verbal communication they create their own image and indirectly the image of the country they lead. This paper provides an analysis of the content of public appearances and a comparison of the verbal and non-verbal communication of presidents Zelensky and Putin during the Ukrainian - Russian war and the reaction of the EU countries and the USA to the president's communication in the media.

Pod aktivnošću privatne zaštitarske djelatnosti podrazu-mijevamo poslove zaštite osoba i materijalnih sredstava putem tjelesne ili tehničke zaštite. Tjelesna zaštita se obavlja putem zaštitara koji neposredno štite i osiguravaju konkretne osobe i imovinu, bez uporabe značajnijih tehničkih sredstava. Možemo kazati kako ne postoji država čiji sustav sigurnosti nema segment čiji su nositelji privatni subjekti u organizacijskoj strukturi, kao neovisni sudionici ovakvih aktivnosti. Ključne osobine tvrtki koje se bave privatnom sigurnošću jesu težnja za dobiti na temelju pružanje usluga (unutarnje) sigurnosti i zaštite. Glavnina tvrtki iz ove industrije su manje po brojnosti osoblja. Usredotočene su na suzbijanje i sprječavanje kriminalnih radnji i osiguranje od prekršaja usmjerenih protiv javnog reda i mira, kao i na usluge privatne sigurnosti na unutarnjem tržištu. Postoje i velike tvrtke ovakve naravi koje su nazočne globalno na nekim kontinentima. Menadžment privatne sigurnosti traži posebna znanja, umijeća i sposobnosti. Izazovi globalizacije, terorizma, digitalizacije i cyber napadi samo su dio suvremenih izazova za tvrtke koje se bave privatnom sigurnošću. Ovaj rad prikazuje bitne značajke tvrtki koje se bave menadžmentom privatne sigurnosti, odnosno značajnu ulogu tvrtki za sigurnost društva u cjelini.

The war in Ukraine introduced new methods of combat. Washington Policy institute notes that 2,000-2,400 drones were ordered from Iran, while being launched towards Ukrainian infrastructures as electricity, according to Kiev. Iran had also used unmanned drones targeting civilian population centers. Through feedback and military buildup, Iran implements the noted strategy in parallel arenas via proxies as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah had already threatened the Israeli gas rig Karish in July 2022. The noted combat drone tactics were implemented towards Israel in the Middle-Eastern arena, following the October 7th 2023 massacre and its subsequent war.

Current technological progress offers mankind a feeling of finding a panacea for almost all problems. The collapse of bipolarity at the end of the 20th century brought about an upheaval in international relations, which was also a catalyst for a change in the approach to the study of security. The peace secured by a single global actor, after the collapse of bipolarity in the late 20th century, also fundamentally influenced the thinking of many experts in that a broader approach to the study of security was favored, with an emphasis on non-military threats. Armed conflicts around the world in recent times highlight the increasingly important, and undiminishing role of military power for state security. The importance of strategy remains unchanged and is an essential defining tool for state actors to exert power effectively, which cannot be properly executed without apt military support even in today's age of technological conveniences. Strategic studies are not a relic after all and continue confirming their adequacy for examining the evolution of international security relations.

The article by Ukrainian authors provides their view on preparation, execution and future prospects of the Russian-Ukrainian war. They examine the most significant military aspects of the Russian military’s preparation and execution of its escalated invasion of Ukraine; the most important military aspects of territorial defence and recent counter offensives; the further prospects in the coming months., the Russian church in Ukraine, the distribution of pro-Russian content in the information field of Ukraine etc. All of these events were elements of Russian "soft power" against Ukraine which created favorable conditions for the final blow by the so-called 2nd army of the world.

The goal of today's information operations is to over-throw reality, i.e. to establish an imposed perception and understanding that lead to the same thinking, which will ultimately cause the desired action. Therefore, the mass media no longer transmit only interpretations of past events or model a narrative, but also teach the target audience how to think correctly, thus producing a behavioral outcome of a political and social character. Consequently with the political-security evolution, communication has become a means of a new hybrid war where the goal is cognitive superiority as the ultimate tool of subjugation and rule. This paper deals with the theory and research of the term information operations and cognitive superiority in Bosnia and Herzegovina through a sociological field survey of residents with the aim of inductively determining the level of knowledge and awareness of the public about them.

Cilj današnjih informacijskih operacija je svrgavanje realnosti tj. uspostavljanje nametnute percepcije i shvaćanja koji vode do istog razmišljanja, a koje će u konačnici izazvati željeno djelovanje. Stoga masovni mediji više ne prenose samo interpretacije svršenih događaja ili modeliraju narativ nego i uče ciljanu publiku kako pravilno razmišljati time producirajući bihevioralni ishod političkog i socijalnog karaktera. Posljedično političko-sigurnosnom evolucijom, komunikacija je postala sredstvom novog hibridnog rata gdje je cilj kognitivna superiornost kao ultimativni alat podčinjavanja i vladanja. Ovaj rad se bavi teorijom i istraživanjem termina informacijskih operacija i kognitivne superiornosti u Bosni i Hercegovini kroz sociološko terensko anketno ispitivanje stanovnika s ciljem induktivnog utvrđivanja stupnja znanja i svjesnosti javnosti o istima.

This study examines strategic importance and use of disinformation and propaganda narrative of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Russia) about foreign citizens fighting in the war conflict in 2022 on the side of Ukraine. With that regard, Russia uses disinformation as a tool of the information warfare or as a non-lethal weapon and operationalizes it in accordance with „4D Concept - dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay “. Thereby, the disinformation placed by Russia represents a classic example of fake, false, and distorted information designed and distributed with the intention to cause a targeted strategical, operational, or tactical effect. This research is focused on the analysis of distributed disinformation and its media/propaganda effect on the abovementioned topic in the following countries: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Montenegro. The research methodologies used in this study are content analysis and social network and instant messaging (IM) services analysis. The research has led to the conclusion that a systematic, continuous, and synchronised distribution of disinformation in a form of disinformation campaign can have negative impact on public opinion and trust. Therefore, such designed disinformation efforts require a quick and systematic reaction of the government since one of direct objectives of disinformation is to spread confusion among the public, undermine confidence in public institutions and Government and compromise the process of strategic decision making of the targeted country. To conclude, the likely effect of such disinformation campaign significantly increases as it spreads in a planned, synchronised and aggressive way through official and unofficial sources/communication channels and popular social networks and instant messaging (IM) services.

U ovome radu sintetiziraju se i sistematiziraju dosadašnja istraživanja sigurnosno-obavještajnog sustava Hrvatske te se daje kraći prilog poznavanju razvoja sigurnosnih studija u Hrvatskoj s naglaskom na proučavanje povijesnog, djelatnog, organizacijskog i institucionalnog uređenja sigurnosno-obavještajnog sustava Republike Hrvatske za period od 1991. do 2022.

Druga agresija Rusije na Ukrajinu pokrenuta u veljači 2022., u odnosu na onu iz 2014. pokazuje svu brutalnost ruskog režima i nepoštivanje dogovorenih mehanizama suradnje u procesima upravljanja krizama s ciljem izbjegavanja snažnijih sukoba i ratova. Je li potrebno, kao posljedica ove Ruske agresije mijenjati postojeću svjetsku sigurnosnu arhitekturu u potpunosti ili je pak treba nadograditi? S obzirom na hibridnost postojećih i budućih sukoba i ratova, društva i države se trebaju pripremiti na te izazove integriranjem vlastitih sposobnosti na nacionalnoj i međunarodnoj razini. U tom procesu, bitnu ulogu ima i zaštita kritičnih infrastruktura. Posebno onih koje se smatraju ključnim kritičnim infrastrukturama.

Russia's second aggression against Ukraine launched in February 2022, compared to the one in 2014, shows all the brutality of the Russian regime. In same time aggression disregard agreed cooperation mechanisms in crisis management processes with the aim of avoiding stronger conflicts and wars. Is it necessary, as a consequence of this Russian aggression, to change the existing global security architecture completely or should it be upgraded? Considering the hybridity of existing and emerging conflicts and wars, societies and states should be prepared for these challenges by integrating their own capabilities at the national and international level. In this process, the protection of critical infrastructures plays a significant role. Especially those that are considered as a key critical infrastructure.

Pojam sigurnosti proširio se izvan okvira vojno političkih odgovora. Postavljena je nova paradigma koja uz pojam sigurnosti usko veže rizike i izazove nastale iz opasnosti kao što su migracije, terorizam, epidemije zaraznih bolesti, prirodne i tehnološke nesreće i katastrofe, organizirani kriminal, trgovina drogom, klimatske promjene, kiber sigurnost itd. Novi izazovi zahtijevaju nove sigurnosne politike te sustave koji moraju pružiti sposobnosti ranog upozorenja i preventivnog odgovora na njih. U suvremenim uvjetima sve je više neizvjesnosti i nepredvidljivosti koji utječu na učinkovitost u području sigurnosnog upravljanja. Modeli upravljanja više nisu organizirani samo na kapacitetima države i sustava nacionalne sigurnosti, već se razvijaju platforme partnerstva između države, društva i pojedinaca u svrhu provođenja preventivnih aktivnosti i stvaranja otpornosti društva.

The concept of security has expanded beyond the framework of military-political responses. A new paradigm has been established that closely links the concept of security to the risks and challenges arising from dangers such as migration, terrorism, outbreaks of infectious diseases, natural and technological accidents and disasters, organized crime, drug trafficking, climate change, cyber security, etc. New challenges require new security policies and systems that must provide early warning and preventive response capabilities. In modern day society there is more and more uncertainty and unpredictability that affect efficiency in the field of security management. Management models are no longer organized only on the basis of the capacities of the state and the national security system; partnership platforms are being developed between the state, society and individuals for the purpose of implementing preventive activities and creating the resilience of a society.

Ukraine became the object of military aggression by Russia, which became the realization of the final phase of hybrid aggression. This aggression has been carried out without stopping all the time since the independence of Ukraine. Economic blackmail, gas wars, the Budapest memorandum, internal destabilization, the 5th column and Russian citizens in the Ukrainian government, the Russian church in Ukraine, the distribution of pro-Russian content in the information field of Ukraine etc. All of these events were elements of Russian "soft power" against Ukraine which created favorable conditions for the final blow by the so-called 2nd army of the world.

In the conditions of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, an important issue in science and practice is to determine the patterns of the aggressor's transition from hybrid to wartime actions and to determine lessons learned from conducting war at sea. Therefore, in this work is considered the hybrid and military actions of the Russian Federation at sea and main lessons learned, cooperative countering and prospects.

To defeat the enemy, which has a significant ad-vantage in means of air attack, missiles, artillery and other weapons, the Army's military formations are forced to act non-standard, non-template, sometimes defiantly. The chosen courses of action must be as effective as possible, unexpected for the enemy and inflict maximum losses on the enemy, provided that friendly forces are maintained in a combat-ready state.

The aim of this research was to find out if the war in Ukraine affects the Russian society and Sino-Russian relations and if Beijing is capable of saving the Russian economy from destruction. With regards to research methods, a document analysis method was used to obtain valid information about the socio-economic consequences of the war. A wide range of documents and scholarly articles were analyzed in order to obtain reliable and objective information. The research revealed that the war has devastating effect on Russia’s economy and could cause aggravation of socio-economic problems in the future. Russia could become an isolated and impoverished country. The war has also negative effect on Sino-Russian relations. Despite having close ties with Russia, Beijing refuses to support Russia during these difficult times and does not offer financial, economic and military assistance to Kremlin. Indeed, China’s ability to save Russia from economic disaster is limited.

The action of the mass media can be viewed not as a mere factor in transmitting information about reality but, more importantly, as an active component that creates social, political and cultural reality, with the mass media being both part and product of those realities. In this context, media functions appear as very important in the process of constructing social reality, ie as important activities within ideological and historical matrices where images of events from (hyper) reality are created, as well as notions and ideas about a new complex political reality. Based on this, the mass media create messages in which the communication event becomes new real events, ie the mass media participate in modeling narratives in which dominant social values are identified and meaningful discourse is produced. The analysis of information operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their impact on cognitive cognition through misinformation, lies and deception results in new hyper reality and permanently disrupted interethnic, interfaith, and interpersonal relations.

This study aims to highlight the significant role played by the escalating security policies in obstructing development efforts in the African continent, despite the tremendous financial support of international donor institutions with the aim of advancing development in the continent; the process of imparting security to the internal scene in these countries remained for decades diverting all those allocated budgets towards the sectors of militarisation, armament and security, by using a discourse that carries within its core all forms of existential threat, such as promoting the threat of international terrorism, which allows these countries to use exceptional methods in dealing with such dangers, while ensuring the international approval of the donors involved in these policies by virtue of the advantages they benefit from that are related to the other side of the hidden agenda of the process of securitisation of development, which provides them with a guarantee of the continuation of their economic interests.

In accordance with technological advancement and innovation in the contemporary digital business world, it has come to the Authors attention that technology focused protection and generally advancement is the “easy”, “temporary” and “fast” solution to growing digital security problems of modern data-gathering and data-processing organizations. In the Authors opinion, a socio-cultural change is needed as a foundation for these technological (technical) security measures. The said statement is gaining momentum in the scientific community, and therefore, the Author conducted a literature review as to further investigate. The problem primarily concerns the security culture of an organization which heavily relies on human factors, precisely the BEHAVIOUR factors. By taking in the human factor, combined with the knowledge factor and technical factor concerning data handling and defense against digital threats - this research tends to prove as to how, in the post COVID digital world, it is not enough for an organization to just implement technically, but it also needs to implement socio-culturally.

The article is devoted to the problematic issues of determining the strategy of using military and non-military forces and means to counter "hybrid" aggression. The principles, goals, forms and methods of integration of military and non-military forces and means of counteraction are defined. The article proposes the Concept of integrated use of military and non-military forces and means to counter "hybrid" aggression (threats of "hybrid" type)

The article examines Russia's political goals and military scenarios for Ukraine, as well as options for supporting Ukraine that are available to the United States, its allies and partners in the event of an invasion. New developments and information need further analysis to better understand Russia's intentions and consequences.

The EU, NATO and the Eastern Partnership countries are facing a range of security challenges and risks. Hybrid threats are a permanent feature of today’s security environment and a part of the current EU, NATO, and the Eastern Partnership countries security landscape. In a period of rapid changes in the security environment and external pressures, it is important to intensify cooperation between the EU, NATO, and the Eastern Partnership countries and to make further progress on common collaborative approaches against hybrid threats. The paper focuses on different areas of the EU-NATO cooperation against hybrid threats and argues that shared resilience against shared threats can lead to a better synchronization of efforts in countering hybrid threats. A case study on the Eastern Partnership countries is introduced in this research and is examined in the paper.

The war in Ukraine is characterized by personal decision-making processes: President Putin who was born and raised in the Soviet-Union while witnessing its collapse, hence his prism is of reviving his country's status versus the west. President Zelensky of Ukraine is an actor who played the "role of his life" on a TV series, only to be elected genuinely for this position. The war catapulted his status as he visited his troops in the front waring uniform. Some key characteristics of the war are media (disinformation) and Cyber warfare (aimed at security, economic and national infrastructure). The solution for this catastrophic calamity, should not be based solely on imposing economic sanctions on Russia, but through using the services of an effective mediator as the Israeli PM Naftali Bennett, who visited Russia on March 6, 2022. His initiative can assist arriving at a common denominator of preserving the safety of Ukraine through imposing an immediate ceasefire on the one hand, while acknowledging Russia's red lines of not allowing Ukraine to be aligned with the west, on the other. Meanwhile, until the war will be halted, it is an imperative to define a humanitarian governorate under western control which will serve as a safe haven for the refugees.

In Analytic Black Holes it is advocated to start a new, second, revolution in security and intelligence analysis. After the first revolution, which started in the Netherlands as late as 2006 with the massive training in Structured Analytic Techniques at both the academia and at the MoD (e.g. Defense Intelligence and Security Institute). A new second revolution – that of Augmented Intelligence – is at hand as a result of two developments, the change in data flows and the need for new products. Data are exploding, especially unstructured data. But the majority of the data remains unused in analyses. Furthermore, hybrid threats and real time intelligence for the protection of the critical infrastructure demand a new approach towards analysis. This gap needs to be filled, among others, by data science cells that can process data automatically. This way, a new analytic approach can be reached – that of Augmented Intelligence – in which humans and machines are paired in the analytic process. Human Analysis is likely to develop more to-wards to limit the number of data taken into account, but those data will have a high causal significance. Machine Analysis, on the other hand, will process huge amount of data and focus on correlations in the first place. Augmented Intelligence, will be a merger of both, that can manifest itself by different combinations of both. It will deal with data that now re-main unused. It can fill the gap of the identified analytic black holes. Dealing with the analytic black holes will enhance the security, and make us more effective in protecting our critical infrastructure.

The subject of hybrid threats has been in focus for some time now, for both academia and practitioners in various security and defense-related fields, but research is still unfocused enough and opinions yet too divergent to allow for a joint understanding of the term, as is the case with other terms in the sphere of security, too (the easiest to mention being ”terrorism”). Our lack of a common understanding of the phenomenon with our closest allies is inevitably a weakness, in a world where many categories of threats are closely interconnected and tend to transgress physical and virtual borders alike. Therefore, the need for a closer look at the concept is bound to lead us to more effective approaches in handling the consequences of hybrid threats.

The geopolitical, military, and economic development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) represents a challenge to the world order that international actors will have to manage in the coming years. The destructuring approach of the current international system, based on US pre-eminence, is attacked simultaneously in three fields. It is a method that does not respect the rules of strategic logic and is capable of leading to the collapse of the Chinese regime due to the strong international friction it will create2. The strategic realignment of the United Kingdom, USA, Japan, and Australia that has been in place since 2021 to contain China's international activism is a signal of a highly protective containment strategy currently deployed by the western allies led by Washington, but it is especially proof that Chinese policies are creating counterreactions.

The article explains how the Coronavirus pandemic contributed to the rise of authoritarianism throughout the world. Advocates of the small government fear that the Corona-virus pandemic may lead to the unprecedented rise of government power and the rise of authoritarianism in the universe. The government might take advantage of the crisis and impose a lot of restrictions on the people. Governments use pandemic as a pretext to limit human rights. On the pretext of controlling the pandemic such fundamental human rights as freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly and association, the right to privacy, etc. are massively restricted. Since the outbreak of the pandemic civil space has been severely restricted and press freedom is a thing of the past in many countries. The state of emergency in various countries creates favorable conditions for the government to restrict human rights and impose total control over the society in order to prevent the outbreak of pandemic.

The concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ has gained and continues to gain traction in Western strategic and military circles over the last decade-plus. However, truth to say, it is still a highly contested concept. This article argues that the main reason for this is that the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ has been taken out of its original context over time and applied to new cases that lack essential characteristics of the concept. The mismatch that happens when the concept of ‘hybrid war-fare’ does not fit new cases exemplifies what political scientist Giovanni Sartori has called ‘conceptual stretching’. Using Sartori’s notion of conceptual stretching, this article analyses the conceptual confusion surrounding hybrid warfare and discusses its possible implications for the West’s defence policy.

The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified the use of digital technologies in the name of public health and safety and vividly illustrated how societies, even democratic ones, can tolerate the expansion of executive power and accept restrictions on liberties. In China, the pandemic justified the use of such technologies and policies to a further extent, but also served as a proof by the government, that its model of digital control succeeded in handling the coronavirus crisis. This paper reviews the Chinese model of digital authoritarianism and highlights its implications for democracy and civil liberties, since China is aiming to export its model around the globe. It manifests the rationale and techniques of this model, but also China’s position on internet governance and techno-nationalism. China is leading the way on AI and surveillance technology and is exporting its model abroad, via the Digital Silk Road, the technology component of the Belt and Road Initiative. The exportation of the digital authoritarianism model is targeting mainly states in East Asia, Africa and Latin America, but its implications are global, if digital surveillance and social credit systems become the new normal.

For many years now, the Republic of Montenegro has been facing numerous threats of a hybrid nature that are aggressively attacking its national and state-building identity. The level and intensity of malicious activities has changed over the years, from assassination attempts to inciting (and violent) protests in the streets to influence the election process. This analysis will show how operations of influence, planned and conducted by various actors from Russia and Serbia, with the use of internal freedoms and vulnerabilities, have led to a strong polarization of society and the state.

During the last two decades, the growing threat of Islamic terrorism has raised numerous security challenges for both states and non-state actors. Cyberspace is weaponized by actors who conduct malicious activities, in order to achieve their goals. Terrorist organizations reflect the darker side of cyberspace. Terrorists use cyberspace to collect data, raise funds, conduct propaganda, spread radical ideologies and hate speech as well as for the purposes of radicalization, recruitment and operational planning. Social media platforms provide a fertile ground to extend the radical ideologies, to spread terror and to connect with people who share the same views. ISIS is considered a pioneer in utilizing the benefits that cyberspace offers. The Western Balkans is a region where ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters and lone-wolves. The European Union is the driving force for the activation of Western Balkans in countering cyberterrorism and developing relevant strategies.

Hamas, Hezbollah and The Houthis are terror movements that use sophisticated means of information flow to a general public through TV, radio and New Media channels, while making use of the newest broadcasting equipment, skilled substances and target specific audiences (culminating with western countries). This study will relate through a scrutinization of these terror movements media in specific test cases, to the following hypotheses: These terror movements are guided by Iran as proxies in order to conduct pro-Iranian cognitive warfare. The test cases had proven a use of meticulous planning in broadcasts or New-Media of Hamas, Hezbollah and The Houthis. These broadcasts or New-Media, presented a use of pre-planned targeting of specific substances to designated audiences. There is Irani involvement in the substances and coordination of Hamas, Hezbollah and The Houthis use of media and technology.

The aim of this paper is a review of the conceptualization of national interest in the theoretical assumptions of realism. A review of the literature and its analysis provides an overview of the main findings of prominent realists who shaped the national interest and created a solid foundation for future research: Hans Morgentau, Raymond Aron, and Kenneth Waltz. Consequently, the scientific goals of this paper are to summarize the scope and manner of national interest’s thematization in realist’s research and, to analyze the significance of their scientific contribution to the Science of Security. National interest remains one of the most important terms in Security Science. A prudent articulation of national interests is a key factor for the security of any state, so understanding this concept is extremely important for Security Science theorists. A realistic understanding of the national interest as a key driver, but also a determinant of the behavior of states concerning other states, is still relevant today.

Combining all hitherto known forms and methods of conventional and unconventional warfare, hybrid warfare is increasingly replacing classical military conflicts and is gradually changing into the primary form of realizing state interests, independently or within military-political alliances. No period in the history of human civilization has been marked by such an intensity of war conflicts as the last century. Apart from the two largest war conflicts in history, in which almost all countries of the world were involved, the last century was also marked by the Cold War.

The subject of the paper seeks to investigate the influence of social factors on the intensity of immigration of immigrants to the EU. Among the social factors that significantly influence immigration policies in the European Union, the authors singled out the following: demography, identity-culture, economy, socio-political and security factors. The main goal is to see how these social factors affect the intensity of immigration. The authors opt for MIPEX as an instrument for measuring immigration policy, which expresses political tendencies towards the integration of migrants. Based on the findings from the regression analysis, which determined the regression factor of the participation of indicators in correlation with MIPEX, the authors concluded that all indicators have a positive correlation, which indicates that the indicators were chosen correctly. In addition, the degree of regression factor is higher than 5%, which indicates a significant correlation.

European intelligence cooperation is the most important weapon in the fight against the new threats in the 27 member states. The article emphasizes the reasons that make the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) more towards an independent operational agency into the European mechanism as well as the roles of the Intelligence College of Europe founded in France and the European Intelligence Academy established under the auspices of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) in Athens, Greece. Even though, effective intelligence cooperation is hard to achieve even at the national level as different services compete for resources and attention from the decision makers, past terrorist incidents in Europe served as a wake up for the public and private institutions to promote intelligence sharing and cooperation among European Union institutions and Member States.

This article describes the creeping occupation of Georgian territories and Russian aggression against the local civilian population. It explains in detail how Russia violates international norms and rules and treats the civilian population in the occupied territories of Georgia. Since the occupation of the Georgian territories, Russia constantly discriminates against the local Georgian people and treats them very inhumanly. Many Georgian families were forced to abandon Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to this inhuman treatment. The legal status of Georgians living in the occupied territories considerably worsened after the Russian Federation signed a treaty on “alliance and strategic partnership” with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As time passes, Russia is creating more obstacles and problems for local Georgian people and treats them very inhumanly. Georgians living in the occupied territories are deprived of all human rights and are treated as second-rate citizens by puppet regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian people living close to the occupation line also face enormous problems due to the creeping annexation of Georgian territories. Russian Federation tries to expand the boundaries of South Ossetia at the expense of Georgian lands. As a result of this creeping occupation local Georgian people living close to the occupied territories constantly lose their vital agricultural lands, which are the only source of income for them.

Although as old as politics itself, terrorism as an international security problem has not yet received its unique definition. The purpose of this paper is to consider the necessity having a generally accepted definition of terrorism in the form of political violence as the basis on which terrorism will find its place in international criminal law. The first part of the paper is dedicated to the general consideration of international criminal law and the International Criminal Court. The second part of the paper examines the existing definitions of terrorism and analyzes terrorism as a crime in international criminal law. Terrorism has long transcended national borders and is no longer a threat only to sovereign states but also to international peace and the security of both the individual and society as a whole. With the expansion of terrorism and increasingly brutal ways of expressing this type of crime, there is a need for even closer international criminal cooperation of sovereign states in the development of legal mechanisms for the prevention and punishment of perpetrators of these criminal acts. By reviewing relevant literature concerning itself with such topics and comparing different understandings of the concept of terrorism from legal, political, and security science sources, we conclude that clarifying the definition of terrorism as an international security problem will, lead to its complete characterization as an international criminal act.

Društvene mreže, nove informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije i sustavi za brzo i globalno komuniciranje te razmjenu brojnih informacijskih sadržaja, doveli su do radikalnih promjena u odnosu na procese prikupljanja, obrade, pretvorbe, pohrane i tumačenja obavijesti i na njima utemeljenih odluka i djelovanja. Obavijesti u cyber prostoru te javno znanje koje u njemu nastaje i koje se distribuira korištenjem tehnoloških sredstava, podložno je novim mogućnostima manipuliranja s realnošću. Društvo znanja i sustavna digitalizacija znanja, koja se temelje na točnim i provjerenim informacijama, postala su podložna financijskim interesima privatnih tehnoloških korporacija koje vlastite poslovne modele globalnog komuniciranja stavljaju ispred pouzdane i sigurne razmjene točnih i istinitih znanja. Javljaju se tako novi oblici manipuliranja u digitalnom prostoru, koji iskorištavaju platforme za ostvarivanje vlastitih političkih i drugih srodnih interesa u širem kontekstu unutarnjih, lokalnih, nacionalnih, regionalnih i međunarodnih sukoba. Jedan od mogućih odgovora na zlouporabu tog prostora je u mehanizmima stvaranja, oblikovanja te očuvanja podatkovnog i digitalnog suvereniteta država (i međudržavnih integracijskih zajednica) koji treba biti stvoren na temeljnim društvenim i demokratskim načelima slobode izražavanja, odgovornosti i transparentnosti.

Cyberspace has become an indispensable part in which special operations such as cyber war or warfare take place. The role of special war as the use of so-called soft power was emphasized. The country's number of potential adversaries in cyber warfare is unlimited, making highly endangered aspects of cyber civilian infrastructure, which is essentially military readiness, including the mobilization of forces through the civilian sector, also a likely target. A special type of cyber war or warfare is hybrid warfare. This type of warfare is increasingly resorted to because it is extremely cheaper than the conventional method of warfare and at the same time brings exceptional results. The first thing that affects cyber security policy analysts comes with the issue of neutrality, as well as the huge variety of assessments about future attack and defense technologies. There is also a consideration that the new (problematic) cyber technology will be deployed in a short period of time, in time periods, in just a few days in terms of warnings. Second, is the trends in cyber-attack and defense technologies and who is following those processes. Third, decision making technology having in mind high-performance computers, technologies that are well known, although rapidly evolving, are increasingly seen as a basic means of managing cyber defense at the national military and security level, as well as a new weapon in the hands of opponents. Fourth, role of intelligence in planning future scenarios for defense against hybrid or any other cyber threat/s.

Sigurnosne službe u Sjevernoj Makedoniji imaju dugu tradiciju, počevši od kraja Drugog svjetskog rata. U svom razvoju, a posebno od neovisnosti do danas, sigurnosne službe pretrpjele su nekoliko promjena, neke od njih samo kozmetičke, a neke su ukinute ili transformirane u nove. Te su promjene bile determinirane povijesnim i društvenim promjenama s jedne strane, ali i razvojem sigurnosnih prijetnji i metoda i načina provođenja djela povezanih s terorizmom i drugim hibridnim prijetnjama, s druge strane. Danas, slijedeći svoje tendencije ka članstvu u EU, budući da je već postala članicom NATO saveza, Sjeverna Makedonija daje sve od sebe da sigurnosni sektor, a posebno obavještajne i protuobavještajne službe, podigne na višu razinu i približi se svijetu sigurnosni standardi. Kao rezultat toga, posljednjih su godina uspostavljene nove službe i očekuju se promjene u nekim od postojećih obavještajnih službi.

Umjetna inteligencija (UI), engl. Artificial intelligence – (AI) zasigurno je najrazvikanija i najrasprostranjenija riječ u područjima znanstvenog istraživanja u proteklih nekoliko godina te je postala najzanimljivije područje razvoja. Pravovremeno prepoznavanje UI kao strategijskog opredjeljenja i investicijskog ulaganja jedno je od najzanimljivijih, ali najsloženijih područja ekonomske teorije i prakse. Usko povezana s procesom društveno ekonomskog razvitka investicija svojim multiplikativnim djelovanjem na gospodarstvo kao cjelinu, bitno opredjeljuje praktično sve ekonomske tokove pa i stanja. Strategijsko planiranje bi svakako trebalo podrazumijevati investicijsko ulaganje u UI te se u značajnoj mjeri koristiti kao mehanizam alokacije raspoloživih resursa posebno u malome gospodarstvu koje ima ograničene prirodne i privredne resurse kao što je hrvatsko.

Croatia’s Homeland war and aggression to Ukraine are clear examples that can be described with term Hybrid warfare. Different phases during conflict and war (every conflict is not a war; every war is a conflict) has a lot of similarities, but also has a difference. It is important to make deeper analysis to provide better and efficient lessons-learned preventive and active measures for future conflicts. This article starts with a short overview of Croatia’s Homeland war and continues with short overview of Ukrainian experience. It contains lessons-learned tools and suggestions for future activities.

Hybrid warfare is a significant threat to National Security and Countries in last 10 years. Hybrid activities are not new, but environment of cyberspace is completely different than before. We are witnessing a great expansion of the aforementioned fifth combat space, which knows no borders, fences, social or cultural barriers. Hybrid war as a form of endangering the security of sovereign states is primarily based on subversive activities in order to paralyze the state apparatus with the ultimate goal of changing the political leadership. This change of political leadership in the earlier period of history was far simpler and most often began and ended with armed aggression, the use of armed rebellion, or a coup. As modern societies increasingly turn to reliable alliances, mechanisms of collective security, conventional methods have become for quite some time less effective and outdated. The use of disinformation as an integral method of Hybrid Warfare has its roots in the concept of "ideological subversion". Ideological subversion is a term firstly defined by KGB in 1970th. KGB invented “Ideological subversion” as a tool of special warfare against civilians and administrative employees. To make it easier to follow the case study, the authors of the Hybrid War operation divide it into four phases: Demoralization, Destabilization, Crisis, and Stabilization. For Russia, the Balkans hold significant historic, cultural, and religious connections—shared ties that are actively propagated, and at times exaggerated, by Russian public diplomacy efforts and media narratives.

U tradiciji islama kao religije postoje ekspanzivne ideje i metode. Cilj islamistički orijentiranih muslimana u konačnici je živjeti u jednoj državi sa šerijatskim zakonom. Politički islam je krajnja posljedica takve ideje, te se u političkom islamu islam instrumentalizira u političke svrhe želeći pokoriti sve nemuslimanske narode i države s kojim su u vječnom sukobu (Dahr el Harb - Kuća Rata). U Bosni i Hercegovini, islamizam je postojao tijekom 20.st., a intezivirao se nakon Drugog svjetskog rata djelovanjem Alije Izetbegovića i njegove grupe. Tijekom rata u BiH 1992.-1995.g., u toj su zemlji djelovale mnoge terorističke skupine, obavještajne službe islamskih zemalja, a i uspostavljena je i službena Muslimanska/Bošnjačka stranka SDA. Nakon rata, mnogi teroristi su ostali, a skupine koje ostaju prijetnja su vehabijska zajednica, terorističke organizacije (kao Al Qai'da), kao i skupine povezane s Muslimanskim bratstvom.

This report was prepared on the basis of public source material and presents a summary of the criticisms directed against the various forms of manipulation used by the U.S. organization National Endowment for Democracy through various other private, non-government or humanitarian organizations. Among them, emphasis is placed on four entities: International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), American Center for International Labor (connected with the International Labor Union AFL-CIO) and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). NED was established after U.S. Senate hearings on illegal CIA activities in the 1970s. It was conceived as an organization which having declared itself a private foundation could thus openly finance those activities the CIA had previously used in its secret operations.This involved co-opting politicians, journalists, and other individuals from public life in order to create what were termed in earlier times „agents of influence“. Toppling or installing governments were typical NED activities. This goal was achieved through media campaigns, manipulation of elections, pressure applied on governments, and so forth. Based on examples in this text, Croatia was, from the time of its declaration of independence, a clear focus of such operations.

National Security and the Future; misija; povijest; teme; praksa; teorija; nacionalna sigurnost

U radu je bibliometrijskim metodama analiziran časopis National Security and The Future. Obrađeno je razdoblje od prvog broja časopisa objavljenog 2000. godine do zadnjeg broja objavljenog u 2018. godini. Analizirana građa je prikupljena s portala HRČAK (Portal hrvatskih znanstvenih i stručnih časopisa) ili sa stranice samog časopisa. Ukupno je prikupljeno i analizirano objavljenih 257 članaka, koje potpisuje 134 različita autora tijekom 19 godina izlaženja časopisa. Analizom su obuhvaćeni različiti parametri od autora, čitanost časopisa do ključnih riječi i supojavnosti ključnih riječi točnije pojavnosti i supojavnosti obrađenih tema.

This article analyzes the current state of collaboration between NATO and the EU, with particular reference to the hybrid conflict sector. There has always existed a close relationship of interdependence between the two organizations. In 2016, this interdependence experienced a collaborative surge with the signing of a joint declaration at the Warsaw Summit. Since then,NATO and the European Union have actively collaborated in various sectors, including hybrid warfare. In the future, both organizations will need to improve the exchange of information and intelligence collaboration. However, this analysis aims to point out that NATO and the EU, if they wish to limit the scope of their opponents’ manoeuvrability, since hybrid conflict tends to develop below the threshold of what is generally accepted as the definition of armed conflict, will have to work together to outline a new legal framework that redefines the definition of armed conflict.

New security challenges are looking for new security paradigms in order that state and societies can successfully face with them on preventive level. Due to the rapid influence of hybrid threats to almost all areas of our lives today, we must change our attitude toward those problems and introduce and transform existing intelligence and security studies as a separate science in order to prepare our societies for security challenges that are already here.

An under researched issue in security is screening combined with the insider threat. One of the problems is the lack of data. Human Resource Management (HRM) departments don’t like to disclose cases and modus operandi. Also the filing is incomplete. It leads to a situation in which theory building is hardly possible. Therefore, this explorative essay is written from a more methodological perspective. From the scarce information that was obtained from expert practitioners, there seems not to be such a thing as a standard profile of an insider threat. At the same time, an estimated 75% of the offenders has shown to have been actually bona fide at the original pre-employment screening. It calls for a reflection on current screening practices. Such an approach has its limitations. Scenarios for offenders cannot be built, because the causes are too diverse and the cases too unique. As files are hardly kept – and HRM departments are not so willing to share – a big data approach is also not a likely option. A way out could be to test the loyalty of employees. In such a system, the emphasis will be on a so-called during-employment screening. The interviewer, together with the applicant, will assess the applicant’s vulnerabilities. After this assessment, the applicant will be tested on his/her vulnerabilities during his/her entire career, Also, there needs to be a shift in the culture at HRM departments. They have to change from steering on mistakes, into being a safety net for employees that have (personal) problems. It also implies a change in interaction – from discussion to dialogue. Finally, in a working environment that is evolving towards a more networked way of working – compared to the classic hierarchical office work – the rethinking concerning the screening practices will only be the more pressing.

This Article points to key elements of Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) and how they differ from Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). CIP is still very important and one of the key systems that the society relies upon to ensure the continuity of operation of CI. However, CIP cannot predict an adequate number of major threats that would allow to conduct the preparedness and response at the level which would ensure the sufficient operation of CI in all cases. In that sense CIR sets a new paradigm with a quality that reduces vulnerability, minimizes the consequences of threats, accelerates response and recovery, and facilitates adaptation to a disruptive event. Some selected concepts of CIR with examples are presented in the Article that should assist in further development and enhancement of resilience of subsystems and infrastructures as a whole, resulting in more secure CI.

The maritime trade becomes crucial for countries' economy, security and sovereignty. Side by side to the growth of shipping, the vessels themselves and the sea-ports become more and more sophisticated, advanced and controlled by computerized and automated systems. Most of the maritime industry companies (from sea ports to shipping companies) are not ready and protected enough against cyber-attacks. Furthermore, there are no world regulation for the maritime industry yet, although the IMO (International Maritime Organization) is working on regulation that will fit the maritime industry, focusing on vessels. The IMO regulation is expecting to be implemented during 2021.