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Compilation of Papers
and Studies (1997).
Geopolitical Reality of the Serb Nation.
Belgrade:
Institute for Geopolitical Studies. pp. 606.
ISBN 86-82985-02-0.
"Geopolitical
Reality of the Serb Nation" is a compilation of essays
and studies presented at the Round Table discussions entitled
"The Serb Nation in the New Geopolitical Environment"
held in Petrovaradin in January 1997, organized by the Institute
for Geopolitical Studies. It contains 66 contributions written
and/or presented by Serb philosophers, economists, sociologists,
experts in political sciences, geography, demography, law,
theology, ethics, and professional military personnel from
FRY and Republika Srpska, and other academic institutions.
Even though three years have passed since this symposium
was held, the views expressed by Serb political and academics
draw not only on the spirit of that time but also show the
habitual thinking of the Serb political elite.
These
works have been divided into the following four chapters:
The influence of great powers on the position of the Serb
nation; Positioning the Serb nation in relation to their
direct geopolitical surroundings; Assessments relating to
the influence of domestic factors on the overall Serb position;
Serb responses to their geopolitical challenges.
In his
introduction Radovan Radinović touches on the central thesis
of these works - the view that Serbia is in its currently
unfavourable position as a direct result of America's desire
to dominate Europe and the Balkans. Radinović describes
another geopolitical theory that the newly united Germany
in its attempt to counteract the Turkish expansion towards
Europe and the Balkans, is itself trying to expand its influence
towards the Middle East. The authors are united in viewing
Russia as the only Serb ally, but all agree that in its
present form is too weak to resist Western powers. Radinović
views the states surrounding Serbia, namely Albania, Croatia,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as being anti-Serb orientated.
For the majority of authors, the break up of the former
Yugoslavia has resulted in the loss of "Serb ethnic
territory", and has thus reopened the Serb nationalist
question. Furthermore, they conclude that the only answer
to this question is the creation of a Serb national country.
The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia for these authors
does not represent the final step in the Balkanisation process,
contending that geopolitical tailoring is still ongoing.
According to the authors the process has not been completed
due to the varying geopolitical concepts in the international
community regarding the division of the Balkans. In addition,
they note that each change in relations between these powers
places the Balkans deeper into their "whirlwind of
contradicting interests" (Smilja Avranov p. 49).
The
authors also allege that the great powers, in their view
had by the United States, are endeavouring to minimalize
the geopolitical importance of Serbia. Radinović states
that America is the main obstacle in establishing a Serb
state and realizing their national interests. He lists the
Dayton agreement, Croatia's military operation "Storm"
and western support of "Kosovo Albanian separatist
ambitions" as arguments supporting this view. Radinović
defines Bosnia and Herzegovina in this post-Dayton era as
"an American multiethnic fixation" (p.29). Smilja
Avranov describes the United States, France and Great Britain
as new enemies of the Serb nation emerging from the newly
strengthened ties between the United States and the Vatican.
The United States and the Vatican, according to Avranov,
are together decisively anti-communists coupled with the
Vatican's anti-Orthodox stand.
Mihail
Marković describes the current global situation after the
fall of the USSR as the "New World Order" (NWO),
which has allowed the Americans to dominate, shape the world
and exploit the world's resources. In establishing the NWO
the United States have attempted to create smaller states
incapable of fending off political domination and economic
exploitation. Drago Kalajić holds that Serb territory will
eventually play the key role in determing the success of
the NWO, in other words, the ruling of the "Third American
Imperial" (p. 63). Text contributors criticise the
South European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) as an attempt
by the United States to separate South Eastern Europe and
bring it closer to the demographically larger Turkey and
the Islamic world (pp. 68-69). Marković also maintains that
the United States is emphasising a "Hegemony"
period due to their "painful losses in Vietnam as a
leading world military power making them ill prepared to
handle even the smallest loss of human life and thus, if
the problem is not settled by bombing they retreat in front
of a decisive resistance," (p. 57).
Ratibor
Grujić maintains that the "most painful point in Serb
history is the resistance by the great powers towards united
Serbs and their desire to form a united Serb state"
(p. 72). Marko Marković claims that the aim of the NWO is
to destroy Yugoslavia, Russia and other Orthodox countries
and Orthodoxy as a whole. This NWO would not allow European
countries their independence because "American domination
does not only mean death to a country's independence but
death to its rights and democracy," (p. 86). Following
the destabilisation of Russia, Marković predicts that the
next stage involves the spread of "Pan-Islamism"
to the rest of Europe. Rajko Gnjato believes that Russia
is not only disoriented and lacking the power to stop the
execution of NWO politics, but is also too weak to secure
it's own interest within the NWO.
According
to Dragoljub R. Živojinović, the Vatican is high on the
list of Serb rivals, who have been striving to regain their
dominant religious, political and social power in Europe
since the fall of the USSR.
When
discussing international relations, the authors often stress
the inferiority of the European countries in respect to
the United States. Marko Marković deems that Europe no longer
exists but is rather a group of nations under American control.
Slobodan Samardžić emphasises that the European Union through
bad arbitration has disqualified itself as a competent element
in the Yugoslavia crisis. Contrary to Europe's strategy,
the "American military-political strategy is comprised
of a mixture of ideological multiculturalism and real politics
fuelling the (Yugoslav) crisis at low intensity." Thus
the United States holds state-territorial and international
minority disputes in regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sandžak, Kosmet and western Macedonia as "principally
unresolvable".
Turkey's
influence in the Balkans has also significably destabilised
Serbia. Miloljub Jevtić
describes "Pan-Turkism" as the concept of a Greater
Turkey, where Turkey with the support of the United States,
enters the Balkans, destabilizes first Serbia and then Europe.
In this case Kosovo would serve as the primary foothold
for "Pan-Turkism" while Albania would supply the
second stepping stone, partly because of their historical
ties to Turkey and partly due to the several million Turks
of Albanian descent.
Yugoslavia's
neighboring countries are habitually seen as threats to
the Serb state. Miloš Knežević states that the Serb nation
has the historical fate of suffering "stress-generating
geography". Knežević further claims that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has been forced into the only
remaining portion of the Serb ethnic area located in the
eastern part of the former Yugoslavia. The geopolitical
insecurity of Serb territory lies, amongst other factors,
in the their neighbor's varied ultranationalist goals of
revision, territorial demands and spiritual retaliation.
These countries are viewed as Austro-Hungarian and Turkish
political proxies.
Miloš
Knežević states that the Serb question has not been addressed
and that the division of former Yugoslav territory into
secessionist new states has not been completed. (Unlike
the Badinteur Commission report which concluded that dissolution
of former Yugoslavia as succession, the author claims that
it is secession.) Knežević believes the emergence of smaller
Balkan states is in the face of the two century old Serb
geopolitical goal of reclaiming control of the "Serb
ethnic area" (SEA). The SEA is wider, as constantly
described in their papers, than the currently held territories
of Serbia and Montenegro. "Thus today's confused situation
is not in accordance with the traditional Serb territories
of FRY and Republika Srpska, and in this form geopolitically
unnatural and in the long term unviable," (p. 211).
Knežević states that the Serb area has been reduced by Croatia
(the so called Krajina) by 17,000 km2 and by 10,000 km2
in western Bosnia (p. 211). Knežević states that the SEA
is incomplete because the Serb nation lacks political integrity
and strength.
The
authors see Croatia in an inconvenient geopolitical position
with characteristics of "being exposed and attractive
for take-overs" (p. 231). In short they view Croatia
as being unjustly interested in controlling the Danube right
bank. They go on to term the Croatia's Danube Region (which
was peacefully integrated in 1996-1997 after the signing
of the basic agreement in which the UNTAES aided) as the
Srijem-Baranja region and treat it as a temporary neighbour.
Drago M. Njegovan stresses the importance of the Danube
right bank for the FRY, referring to it as part of the "Serb
Danube Region". According to Njegovan, the "Serb
Danube Region" is wider by including the Danube bank
in both Croatia and Romania (p. 334). The Serbs figured
that in the event of Yugoslavia's break up the Croatian
Danube region would be included in Serbia, however this
plan is temporarily unachievable. "The alternative
would be to retain the status quo, which in the right circumstance
would allow for the aforementioned plan." The authors
conclude that Serb weakness and powerlessness has resulted
in Croatia's superiority in the South Slav area.
Albania
is defined as an "undesirable Balkan infant",
a "Balkan geopolitical neurotic", and most expressively
as the "Balkan Banana Republic". The new Serb
geopolitical enemy has emerged as a result of the separatist
movement by the "unloyal Albanian minority" living
on Serb territory. An additional problem is the fact that
"Serbia was unable to create a state program that would
adapt and include the Kosovar Albanians in the Serb national
state" (p. 215). The problem according to the authors
is not in international relations but rather highlighting
the "Albanian" terroristic, criminal, mafia and
political activities.
Macedonia
is seen as a markedly weak state incapable of sustaining
itself independently. In order to retain it's own state,
Macedonia would have to enter into a favorable alliance
or succumb to the protection of a stronger state. Milovan
Radaković claims that Albania and Macedonia are prospective
for the strongest American military bases in Europe. From
these bases the United States would have the capability
of provoking low intensity conflicts if they assess that
political, economic and military integration is not heading
in a favourable direction, or if a united Europe starts
to jeopardise American interests (p. 350).
The
authors allege that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have
a foundation outside of Yugoslavia. According to Radinović,
Bosnia is the "Balkan black hole" (p. 226) whose
solution lies in a new military conflict and not a peaceful
agreement where the Serbs would have to defend minimal national
and state interests. Bosnian-Muslims are seen as temporary
neighbors while Republika Srpska is seen as an apparent
neighbor (p. 195). FRY-Republika Srpska relations are termed
as an issue of domestic nature rather than foreign affairs.
This question must be answered in such a way as to "name
and confirm it as a complete national and state unity. The
same nation resides in the FRY and Republika Srpska in this
continuous Serb territory" (p. 226). From the Serb
standpoint, according to Rajko Gnjata, Republika Srpska
is the only bright outcome from the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Problems
in relations with neighbouring states lie primarily in defining
the Serb ethnic area (SEA). Jovan Ilia claims that the SEA
is constituted by the following border limits: Drač - Struga
- Prilep - Veleška Klisura -Osogovske mountains to the south
the existing Bulgaria - Serbian border (Stara Planina) -
Đerdap; Černe gorge - Mureš near Arada - Baja - Meček -
Drava at Barča - west Bilogora; Čazma - Sava upstream from
Sisak - Vukomeričke Gorice - Žumberačka Gora (Gornjaci)
- Gornja Kupa - Gorski Kotar - Rijeka - Adriatic Sea. According
to the authors, the SEA encompassed over half of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and a fourth of Croatia at the beginning
of the 90s. During the war they "lost" approximately
12,000 km2 in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a
grand total of 25,000 km2 after the reintegration of the
Croatian Danube region. Radinović goes on to describe the
SEA as including Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska (before
NATO bombing around 70 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
and the Republika Srpska Krajina, with the Srem - Baranja
region (the entire area in the Republic of Croatia controlled
by the JNA and rebel Serbs during 1991-1995). "In the
forthcoming period, the Serbian military elite and the entire
Serb nation will have to invest an enormos amount of effort
to regain this lost area and resettle it with Serbs,"
(p. 411).
Serbs
do not have the strength, state desire, nor the external
geopolitical conditions to return the "lost Serb kingdom"
to its entirety in the near future. "Regardless of
this, no one is allowed, not even the ruling Serb elite,
to permanently re-enunciate their right to that area and
to view this loss as definite," (p. 286). The Serb
nation must continue to regard this area as an inalienable
historical right, and this stand must also be pursued by
Serb diplomacy in their international political and diplomatic
strategies.
Samardžić
views the uniting of the FRY and Republika Srpska as a kind
of national goal unimplementable today, but which must be
projected as a strategic national interest (p. 130). Đorđe
B. Popović thinks that Serbia, to change its position, must
wait for a change in international relations. Serbs in Croatia,
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina "have to try to
survive" until the FRY regains its strength to the
point where they can influence the Serb people in those
areas. However, until then, it is important to work on the
return of refugees, "without whom all talks of Serb
land and demands for it's future are pointless" (p.
139-140).
The
most worrisome issues for the author's are Serbia's domestic
problems. Popović specifies the 700,000 refugees in Serbia
over the Drina and the additional problem of 200,000 military
draftees who fled to the West, as further worsening the
geopolitical position of the FRY. Milena Spasovski claims
that Serbia's natural growth is almost all attributed to
Muslim residents (Muslim, Albanians, Gypsies, and Turks).
The Serbs who have settled between 1991 - 1995 have only
a short-term influence and in the long run they would not
significantly improve the currently negative demographic
development trends.
Miloš
Knežević states that FRY is lacking in political, ideological,
national, party and geopolitical consensus regarding important
issues for their future. The Serb political pseudoelite,
instead of representing Serb integrity, represent "A
Serb based Yugoslav integrity" (p.197). Dragoljub Kojeić
suppresses that the most important goal is to strengthen
their Serb national sovereignty and consequently establish
a Serb national state (p. 271). Željko Poznanović stresses
the importance of the Serb Orthodox Church as a vital internal-integral
Serb leader. Poznanović maintains that their religious belief
cannot be separated from the national, and thus the Serb
nation receives "Godly dimensions through the national
auto cephalic church" (p. 305-306). Petar Stojić holds
Kosovo and Sandžak as priceless to the FRY and that they
must be maintained at all costs, even if that means war.
He suggests that they are threatening war in light of the
direct ties between the ever increasing aggressive Islam
and "Albanian" terrorism.
The
FRY when speaking of Kosovo and Sandžak must not allow itself
to succumb to the demands of the international community
because that would mark the end of its national and state
politics. Kosta Čavoški sees the role of the international
community in Kosovo as supporting Albanians in their aim
of achieving political autonomy and separation from the
FRY, and not as protecting human rights. The Serb political
corpus is deeply divided and shattered according to Andrej
Miletić (p. 371).
Radovan
Radinović sees their goal of defining the SEA as the greatest
challenge confronting Serbs. Their aim is to create a unique
area of Serb land and then stabilising social development,
demographic revitalisation and spiritual renewal. It also
improved integral security system whose new doctrine includes
the capability of offensive responses against all aggressors,
and even against multinational powers with the support of
a strong ally. Radinović feels that the first step is to
clear up the question of the SEA borders and the Serb state.
The mentioned area has external pressures that "refer
to it in different terms, but the area has to be seen as
a unique ethnic area, with mutual territorial connections,
and entirety with clear aspirations that would one day be
included in the unique Serb state" (p. 488). Radinović
asserts that minorities in this state would not have the
right to claim their own national state nor political autonomy.
Forcefully taken and abducted, Serb territory must be viewed
as a temporary loss and thus Serbs must continue to base
their hopes on their historical rights and demand the return
of these areas from the international community when the
moment becomes visible for favorable Serb strategic moves.
The
authors hope that Russia will remain/become a military ally
of the FRY and secure a guarantee for their smallest strategic
interests (p. 497). "Alliance with Russia is a necessary
requisite for avoiding a most unfavorable military situation
of a multinational military NATO or WEU intervention"
(p. 497). Without this kind of alliance the FRY would be
lost in such a military conflict, having to deal with a
large number of casualties, material losses and destruction
(p. 497). In 1999, FRY leaders obviously did not heed this
warning.
Branislav
Đorđević summarizes that the Serb state is surrounded by
hostile countries, of which the Repulic of Croatia would
always play the role of mediator in a war of great powers
against the FRY. However, Albania is viewed as the next
Serb opponent. Serb countries outside of the FRY must serve
the role of vital subsystems for the defence of the FRY
and vice versa.
The
Yugoslav Army (JA) must be capable of starting and concluding
a war, and also be prepared for war activities in neighboring
territories who are conducting armed aggression on the FRY
(p. 496). The military doctrine should allocate means for
devastating attacks to all vital facilities of neighboring
countries if the Serb nation is threatened. The JA must
be prepared to attack all vital facilities of the aggressor
and facilities of neighboring countries involved. The FRY
must have a suitable ally derived from perhaps the Balkan
Alliance, Partnership for Peace or the Alliance of Orthodox
countries in Eastern Europe (p. 571).
Most
of this compilation is persuaded dominated by theories of
American conspiracy sparsed with German and Vatican activities
directed against the Serb people. Their feelings of endangerment
are heightened by Russia's weakness. The authors maintain
that the Serb people are victims due to their geopolitical,
transit and religious uniqueness, which subjects them to
the bullying of great powers. Almost all of their neighbors
are now controlling at least some section of the SEA, while
the national minority in FRY is attempting to divide the
remaining areas and annex them to their base states. The
Serb political elite is obviously still dealing with the
after consequences of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia
and the fact that this state has shrunk in size. However,
their aspirations of constructing a united Serbia using
a somewhat smaller area of the former Yugoslavia still exists.
Regardless of their embitterment towards a number of member
countries of the international community, the Serbs feel
that it is important to obtain support from the world's
central power because it is the only "just solution
to the Serb national question" (p. 430). Even though
the actualization of a new Serb state uniting the SEA territory
(returning parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia
and Albania, etc.) is not possible right now in their new
geopolitical state, this idea must still remain the key
geopolitical aim of the Serb political elite and therefore
their efforts must be directed towards this objective.
Josip
Esterajher, Zagreb, Croatia