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Report of the International
Commission on the Balkans (1996).
Unfinished Peace.
Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. pp. 222.
ISBN 0-8700-3118-X
/Croatian
edition: Izvješće Međunarodne komisije za Balkan (1997).
Zagreb: Hrvatski helsinški odbor za ljudska prava i Pravni
centar FOD BiH. pp. 205. ISBN 953-96343-5-0/
"Unfinished
Peace" is the title of a study, or rather a Report,
published by the International Commission for the Balkans,
which comprises of a group of eminent authors. The Report
was issued in the Croatian language in 1997 in Zagreb by
the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights FOD B-H.
The original Report was published by the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1996, Washington.
The
Report claims to be an analysis of the situation and suggests
its own kind of integral strategy for the international
community toward the area which it calls the "Balkans",
which incorporates Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia,
Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. However,
Montenegro and Romania are hardly mentioned in the Report.
Some countries mentioned in the Report are discussed in
elaborate detail as opposed to others because those countries
represent the two epicentres of conflict in the Balkans.
The first is considered as "being in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which incorporates wider Croatian-Serbian relations,"
and the other being in Kosovo, which is "directly related
to Serbia, Albania and Macedonia… and potentially incorporates
Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey."
The
Report also gives 57 recommendations relating to the conduct
of the above mentioned countries with respect to the activity
of the UN, NATO members, the US, various bodies of the European
Union and international non-government organizations. The
declared wish of the authors of the Report is for their
recommendations to be completely realized, bringing lasting
peace and prosperity to the Balkans.
Two
hundred pages of text are structured in a number of sections.
The Report contains an introduction by Lea Tindemans, the
President of the International Commission for the Balkans,
a summary the Report, an introduction and four chapters
entitled, "Balkan Troubles," "War and the
Reactions of the United Nations", "The situation
in the Countries, Trends and Recommendations," and
"The Region - Conclusions and Recommendations."
Annexed to the Report are easy-to-survey maps, a supplement
about the study mission and encounters by the International
Commission for the Balkans, and the epilogue by Ivo Banac
contained in the Croatian edition.
he first
chapter, metaphorically titled "Balkan Troubles,"
considers the causes of the recent war, or rather a review
of the historical development of the state of affairs in
the countries of the former Yugoslavia which led to war.
As for the historical review of the events in the Balkans
up until the Second World War given in that chapter, we
cannot help but feel that the Report is subject to prejudices
similar to those that we come across in literature such
as "Grey Falcon and White Lamb" by Rebecca West.
As for the analysis of the causes for the recent war in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina given in the same chapter,
the Report does not consider the relevant foreign factors
for its outbreak, and all the more categorically states
that "the causes of this war were not outside of the
Balkans, rather inside of it." The main culprits for
the war, according to the Report, were old "inherited
hatreds", which due to changing international surroundings,
given the disintegration of communist systems, brought about
crude nationalism. The Report rejects the thesis about a
"conflict of civilizations," and accepts that
nationalist politicians skilfully used, rather abused, the
Church and religious symbols for their own aims. According
to this, the Serbs and Croats were ascribed to as being
nationalistic politicians, whilst the Moslems "despite
all their shortcomings and mistakes, came the closest to
defending European principles of tolerance and open societies
from those who, in the name of Christian Europe, endeavoured
to exterminate them," (p. 22). The authors of the Report
do not mention nor attempt to explain the phenomena that
during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Moslems fled
in the hundreds of thousands to those "who endeavored
to exterminate them," i.e., Croatia, which unselfishly
sheltered them. We believe that the failure to mention this
is not accidental as it questions Croatia's tolerance and
openness.
The
second chapter, entitled "The War and the Reactions
of the International Community," analyses the course
of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
endeavours of the international community to end it. It
is telling that the aggression in Croatia is depicted very
briefly and bleakly, without mention of the destruction
(apart from Vukovar and Dubrovnik), while the number of
killed (only 2,000 dead in Vukovar is mentioned) and exiled
(only 247,000 is mentioned) Croats is decreased. Particularly
unrealistic and biased is the part of the Report about the
operations that liberated the occupied regions of the Republic
of Croatia, which the Report describes as "attacks
on Krajina" that was followed by "a campaign of
ethnic cleansing" (p. 41). Most space and statistics
in this chapter of the Report is dedicated to the military
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a whole, given the
way in which the Report presents the course of the war,
it is hard not to think that this part of the Report more
intensely blames the Croats for the fighting in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while it marginalizes the contribution of the
Croatian Army in liberating Bihać and parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from the Serbian aggressors, which were the
preconditions for the Dayton Accords.
The
description of the international community's efforts is
reasonably objective, and at times even overtly critical
of Western countries. The events in Slovenia that preceded
the aggression in Croatia are lucidly assessed as being
the intentions of the Serbian politicians in allowing the
independence of Slovenia, in relation to the nature of the
1991 Brioni Declaration as a means for gaining time for
the deployment of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, i.e. preparing for an aggressive war and
the European Community's failure to recognize the nature
of the problems. An objective but brief depiction is given
of the endeavours of the United Nations between 1992 and
1994 in Croatia, i.e. during the period of the so-called
Vance Plan (the UN Secretary General's envoy, former US
State Secretary, Cyrus Vance), rather the origins of the
Z-4 plan (the draft agreement on Knin, southern Baranja
and western Srijem) which the Serbian side rejected.
The
war and participation of the international community in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed much more widely and
is given much more importance, which is best evidenced in
the statement, "the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina provoked
the most serious crisis in trans-Atlantic relations since
the Suez crisis…" (p. 55). With geographical maps,
all initiatives were reviewed, from the Vance-Owen plan
from January 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan from July 1993,
the Contact Group plan from July 1994, to the Dayton Accord
from November of 1995. Nevertheless, the entire chapter
leaves the perception of a greater contribution by NATO
compared to the inefficiency of the EU, rather the EC. Significant
criticism is given of western countries in not recognizing
the aggression, the indecisiveness and use of force and
generally for inaction in preventing the conflict. Criticism
for belated action in light of defending safe areas is clear
but remains fairly unclear in light of the statement given
in the Report; "no attention was directed toward constructive
ideas for transforming Yugoslavia from a communist federation
to a democratic one…" (p. 56) and even the hypothesis
that Croatia was recognized prematurely as "recognition
excluded from play the important lever with which Croatia
could have been restrained in its conduct toward the Serbs
in Krajina" (p. 60). Does this mean that the authors
of the Report consider that Yugoslavia could have been,
with more determined participation from the West, safeguarded
from disintegration?
It is
particularly worth highlighting the lack of recognising
the decisive role of the Croatian Army operation in 1995
in achieving the Dayton Accord. This most likely stems from
not knowing the principle facts, for how can one explain
formulations such as "the successful offensive of Bosnian
and Croatian forces in Western Slavonia" (p. 73).
The
third chapter, "The Situation in the Countries, Trends
and Recommendations", together with the fourth chapter,
"The Region Conclusions and Recommen-dations",
are the most important and most pretentious parts to the
Report. These chapters, along with an analysis of the situation
and detailed explanations, give 57 explicit recommendations
concerning the function of the UN, NATO, the US, and various
bodies of the European Union, international non-government
organizations and the countries in the "region"
themselves. All the recommendations in the Report can be
organized in a number of groups; security, reconstruction
and development, democracy (civil society and media), inter-ethnic
relations and conduct toward minorities, and regional cooperation.
The recommendations in the third chapter are directed individually
toward the countries in the region, while the recommendations
in the fourth chapter are mainly directed toward the region
as a whole. It is interesting that, judging by the number
and content of the recommendations given in the third chapter,
the Report considers Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic
of Croatia as being the most problematic countries.
Ten
recommendations directly concern Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In stating that in the Dayton solution "there exists
a hidden contradiction" as it "accepts the ethnic
division of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was achieved with
the help of military force" and at the same time wishes
to "protect and reintegrate the pre-war multiethnic
Bosnia" (p. 78), the Report also reveals the meaning
of some recommendations as being a means for supplementing,
rather redefining, Dayton. The final aim of the recommendations
is the entire reconstruction of multiethnic Bosnia, i.e.
avoiding the possibility of separating the three sides in
Bosnia and Herzegovina into three separate states. With
this end in mind, the Report recommends the military presence
of the international community, supporting joint institutions,
i.e. non-government organizations, complying to the obligations
of the tribunal in The Hague, freedom of the media, the
economic reconstruction of the country, strengthening the
civil aspect of the West's presence, achieving the right
of refugees for return, etc.
Five
recommendations relate to the Republic of Croatia. Following
a very critical exposition on Croatia, broad assessments
and inaccurate consternations, the Report concludes how
"much more stringent measures must be applied to this
country" (p. 106). The recommendations suggest that
the US Government demand(s) of the Republic of Croatia an
improvement in its relations toward minorities, the return
of refugee Serbs, the complete freedom of the media, decentralization
and regionalism, and dissolving Herceg-Bosna along with
"taking a share of the economic recovery of Bosnia
and Herzegovina."
Serbia
is termed as the "most important state in South-eastern
Europe" and is given surprisingly little recommendation.
The Report suggests the implementation of the Dayton Accords,
extraditing war criminals, accepting the draft agreement
on succession, freedom of the media, and devising the western
strategy for recognizing a new Yugoslavia and its inclusion
in international institutions.
Four
recommendations are dedicated to Kosovo. They encompass
the return of autonomy, abstaining from independence and
a start to negotiations, and the return of normal civil
life through the work of non-government organizations.
Three
recommendations pertain to Albania: pro-western orientation,
the building of infrastructure and joining with the Balkans
and not Islamic countries.
Macedonia
must increase the proportion of Albanians in its government,
decentralize, and retain UNPREDEP so as to decrease the
tensions around the university in Tetovo.
As for
Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, there are no particular
recommendations. Romania is not at all mentioned.
It can
be concluded that in its review of the situation in individual
countries in the region, i.e. before drafting the recommendations,
the Commission acted with bias and impartially. How else
can the considerably more critical stance toward some countries
in comparison to others be explained, that is passing over
in silence the evident violations of human rights perpetrated
by some and magnified in others. Why is it that for some
countries, where even laymen can perceive great problems,
no recommendations are given at all?
The
28th recommendation given in the fourth chapter is dedicated
to the region as a whole. It relates to the problems of
regional cooperation, economic cooperation, reconstruction
and development, democracy in relation to civil society
and the media, multi-ethnic relations and conduct toward
minorities, and security, i.e. the control of armaments.
All imply the importance of creating a regional framework
for resolving potentially dangerous issues and controversies,
i.e. the need to strengthen the role of non-government organizations
in the region.
Concerning
the abovementioned recommendations, from today's perspective,
four years after the first Report was issued, importance
is drawn to the fact that nevertheless the conduct of the
international community toward the countries encompassed
in the Report coincide in some elements with the recommendations
given in this Report. Realized in particular are recommendations
concerning the reinforcement of "civil society,"
that is the role of non-government organizations. This indicates
that the recommendations of the Commission are taken seriously.
We won't dwell on the question why this is so. What are
the consequences of the moves taken under those recommendations
provokes another question.
It is
particularly important to emphasize the relatively mild
judgements and small demands made upon the Serbs in comparison
to the very sharp judgment of Croatia. In this light it
would be very revealing, in a separate study, to compare
the first Report of the International Commission for the
Balkans of the Carnegie Foundation from 1914 with the events
that transpired later in the "Balkan" region in
the context of the First and Second World Wars. The authors
themselves in the introduction to this Report recognize
the fact that the views of the first and second Commissions
are similar.
The
first Report from 1914 and this one published in 1996 are
equally concerned and have the justified conclusion (and
their lack of will) of the urgency for the timely engagement
of Europe and the US in resolving problems in the Balkans.
Unfortunately,
those who share consideration of the civilizational superiority,
rather intellectual arrogance, prevent an objective, empathetic
perception of the problems in the countries of the region.
What to say about the first Report which states that the
"civilization layer is very thin and that the liberation
of the beast in man is always possible when force turns
patriotism into crime and heroism into savagery," but
that they were prophetic, not only in the relations in the
Balkans but in the relations of all participating countries
of the First and Second World Wars. The objective perception
of the Balkan issues can only be shaped by a commission
that accepts the "thin civilizational layer" as
inherent in every man in every country in the world, even
(as was shown by the events during the two world wars) in
the developed West.
In any
case, the individual moves made by the international community
after 1996, intentional or accidental, coincide with the
recommendations in the Report. At the same time, some important
moves by the international community, such as the bombing
of Serbia because of the events in Kosovo, are not at all
predicted nor suggested in the Report.
Generally
viewed, the Report is superficial where the Republic of
Croatia is concerned. For example, the Report correctly
concludes that "leading international powers, up until
the summer of 1995, were not prepared to convincingly threaten
force so as to enforce a solution", that is that they
were late. However, the aforementioned is written in the
context of the killings in Srebrenica, whilst it does not
mention the recent war crimes during the aggression against
Croatia. Already in this approach to the problem, it is
evident that Croatia is considered within a welter of Balkan
events and whose politics primarily bring about the consequences
in the Balkans, in comparison to Slovenia (which is altogether
not mentioned in the Report). Croatia is not considered
as a country that has powerful roots and powerful contacts
in the Central European region. Croatia is not perceived
as a bridge between Europe and the Balkans, rather only
as an integral part of the Balkans. This sort of consideration
about Croatia does not give the true picture and does not
find a useful solution, not only for Croatia, but also for
the entire Balkans and the Central European region.
In considering
the reasons as to what prompted the establishment of this
study, by all means assuming the commendable desire to assist
the region, the thesis on the possible influence of fighting
in the region and the events in other countries in Eastern
Europe and the former USSR mentioned in the introductory
summary of the Report itself must also be taken into consideration:
"The worsening multi-ethnic relations and the ever
worsening situation for national minorities in the Balkans
would have negative consequences in other parts of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, where demography does
not coincide with political borders. Moreover, the fate
of the Muslims - their political integration or isolation
- could become an acid test of relations between Europe
and the Islamic world." Not disputing the justification
of this argument, it is nonetheless difficult, four years
after the end to the serious fighting in the region and
writing of this Report, to note a more serious link between
the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and current events
in Chechnya.
In any
case, most likely the important reason for writing the Report
lies also in the concern for possible implications of the
events in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an important NATO
member - Turkey. The Report itself states that the "Bosnian
issue has become the powerful weapon in the hands of Turkish
Islamists who at present have the position of presidency
in the government and, who have achieved success upon success
on the domestic political stage, which is without precedence
in Turkish contemporary history" (cit. summary XXVI).
Numerous
incorrect citations in the Report are most likely the fruit
of a number of previously shaped strong stances, so strong
that they have become the prejudgment and limit the scope,
and inhibit the freedom and innovation, of the recommendations
themselves.
The
first is the strong beliefs in the incapability of the countries
in the region to solve their mutual problems on their own,
that is the belief that they cannot solve those problems
without various forms, including military, of western intervention.
The Report even directly suggests the "uninterrupted
and consistent military arrangement of NATO" up until
the establishment of the "Balkan Partnership for Peace
association." This stance is expressed at the very
beginning of the Report, already in the second paragraph
of the summarised review in the introduction. Namely, the
statement that, "this Commission believes that, if
we pretend that we do not see the problems in the Balkans,
it will be shown that it will be the equally successful
recipe for a catastrophe at the end to the twentieth century
as it was at its start. Foreign sponsors and even the factors
which forcefully impose peace will have to remain in that
region for a long time," clearly shows that the Commission
does not wish to recognise that the main cause of the problems
in the region even prior to the outbreak of World War One
was not only the historical inheritance of the peoples in
the region, rather the "Balkan ethnic conflicts,"
but that that to a large extent was the interests of factors
outside the region, primarily the Ottoman and Austrian empires
and up until the present day, which obstructs free individualization
and development of the countries in the region.
The
Report foresees that almost all the conflicts in the region
were quickly initiated, primarily at the times of confrontation
of the great powers in this region. In that context it is
completely correct to state that this region is an eternal
battleground for the interests of the great powers, and
when these battles come ablaze they remind us of Samuel
P. Huntington's "conflict of civilizations". As
opposed to that, the Report relativises the aforementioned
by stating that "renewed nationalistic conflicts reflect
the ambitions of the great powers to reinstate their sphere
of influence in the Balkans," merely as an "attitude
in which many in the Balkans believe." At the same
time the theory that "the issue deals with a resurgence
of ancient hatred and a resurgence of repressed nations"
is given as an "interpretation that is widespread in
the West."
Subsequently the authors of the Report synthesize the aforementioned
by stating, "there is some truth to all of this and
nobody should underestimate the importance of history in
the Balkans. However, the main reasons for this war were
that the sparks of aggressive nationalism were stirred by
those political leaders of the Yugoslav federation who,
in their desire to realize their own nationalistic aims,
appealed to ancient hatreds and who intentionally set in
motion their own propaganda machinery…" (cit. summary
p. XVI).
The
second prejudice emanates from the first, which is the belief
in equal guilt for the fighting in the region. One would
have to be truly blind not to be able to differentiate between
the aggressor (Serbia) and the victims (Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina), or not be able to recognize which of the
countries of the former Yugoslavia had the necessary means
for aggression (armament) at the beginning of the nineties
and the aspiration for domination over others (the ideology
of Greater Serbia). There is no differentiation between
the negative aggressive nationalism that was based on a
desire to conquer and dominate over others, and nationalism
as a defensive reaction to protect one's own existence from
the aggression of the other.
The
third prejudice is the belief that the synthesis, rather
various forms of linking and integration as opposed to the
sovereignty of states in the region, automatically contributes
to solving the problem. History tells us otherwise; the
bloodiest conflicts originated directly from the downfall
of old or the formation of new - either forcefully or artificially
created - 'integration' entities in this region (Ottoman
Empire, Austro-Hungary, both Yugoslav states).
Nonetheless,
in regards to regional cooperation the Commission recommends,
but also doubts, in the "possibility of maintaining
an international conference on security in the Balkans,
and even an ambitious conferences that would have the aim
of creating a south-Balkan confederation," (p. 140).
The Commission recommends the formation of "free trade
zones" as being the most realistic and economically
most useful solution, which would in the end become a part
of CEFTA.
It is
even more uncertain of how they plan on implementing one
of the key proposals in the Report in regards to creating
"a Partnership for Peace Balkan association" and
its "linking to the broader structures of NATO,"
(recommendation No. 53, p. 170).
Instead
of the conclusion, let's return to the beginning, the title;
"Report of the Commission for the Balkans."
When
we state "Report" we ask - for whom? Normally,
for those who paid. In this case, among others, the Carnegie
Foundation and the Open Society Institute. Neither is a
government organization or institute, which opens a series
of interesting questions on the mutual relations of the
mentioned non-government organizations and the governments
of specific countries, and even the possible influences
of these organizations on the governments themselves.
When
we state "commission" we ask - what kind? This
one is comprised of undoubtedly eminent experts, intellectuals
and politicians (Leo Tindemans - President, Lloyd Cutler,
Bronislaw Geremek, John Roper, Theo Sommer, Simone Veil,
David Anderson). Our questions in an atmosphere of support
for multiculturalism, equality and objectivity are: why
is it that not one of the seven members of the Commission
on the Balkans does not originate from the Balkans, and
why is it that only one of the Commission's 21 advisors
originates from the countries of the former Yugoslavia?
When
we state "Balkans" we ask - what is it and where
is it? This Report does not even attempt to differentiate
between where Asia begins and where the Balkans ends, but
it does suggest that Europe ends and the Balkans begins
at the Slovenian-Croatian border. This is an assertion with
which numerous Croats would not agree, and which could evoke
antagonism toward the Report, regardless of the value of
the work of the Commission and the usefulness of individual
recommendations, notwithstanding a certain intellectual
arrogance within the Commission.
Predrag
Haramija, Zagreb, Croatia