The US undertook the
Kosovo campaign without an appropriate coordinated military
plan, for political reasons. The proper basis for Kosovo
intervention was a valid strategic concern. Europe needs
the US to operate out-of-area: only the US has the aircraft
carriers, the lift capacity, the cruise missiles, the
overhead reconnaissance capability, and other indispensable
components of an out-of-area campaign. These are sensible
criteria, which could help frame all debates about NATO
intervention. Blair's address on April 22, 1999, offered
a proposed doctrine for NATO intervention in non-member
countries. It had five parts, and might be described as
a NATO Powell Doctrine. "Are national interests involved?"
Here, Kosovo qualifies fully as to the underlying reality.
The Balkans remain a powder keg. The Vance-Owen Plan of
cantonising Bosnia made sense, and should not have been
dismissed by Secretary Christopher. The Russians have
been essential to a solution. Wherever the Russian troops
had been in control, the Albanian refugees would not have
gone back, meaning a potentially unstable Macedonia. But
with the NATO occupying force in place, NATO could dictate
the terms of Russian participation.
The
US undertook the Kosovo campaign without an appropriate
coordinated military plan, for political reasons. Had
we deployed troops on the border at the outset, as we
did in the Gulf, this manifestation of resolve would have
avoided some of the genocide and ruin that took place
after we started bombing. Unfortunately, President Clinton
felt too weak politically to mount a ground campaign.
All
the US wars in this century, including the Spanish-American
war and this one, have been presented to the American
people as humanitarian endeavors, to forestall or roll
back aggressors. However, the US should in general hesitate
before making war on humanitarian grounds. Sometimes our
intervention just flattens the landscape, making things
worse than the worst case had we not intervened.
Our
duel with Milosevic seems to be an example of underrating
your opponent. If the outcome of the game means everything
to one contestant and much less to another, the contestant
most concerned will think of expedients and desperate
moves that the one who is less involved will not have
worked out in advance. We did not anticipate that moving
from diplomacy to force against Milosevic to achieve a
humanitarian purpose would result in the same humanitarian
catastrophe that we were trying to avoid.
The
proper basis for our Kosovo intervention, which needs
to be understood, was a valid strategic concern: preventing
the flames of war from engulfing the whole area. That
was a further good reason to deploy troops early.
We
can take some consolation from having whacked Milosevic,
however things come out. The next dictator on NATO's periphery
will realize that he can't just gobble up a neighboring
territory, put his hands in his lap, smile blandly, and
hope that everything will blow over. He and his advisors
will realize that they run a most serious risk of condign
punishment.
A
paradox of this war may be the revival of the distracting
arid expensive conception of the Western European Union,
Europe's "independent defense pillar." Everybody
has now seen in action why Europe needs the US to operate
out-of-area: only the US has the aircraft carriers, the
lift capacity, the cruise missiles, the overhead reconnaissance
capability, and other indispensable components of an out-of-area
campaign. We are NATO's out-of-area specialists, since
for us everything is out-of-area. A pretense to the contrary
is whimsy. On the other hand, controversy over the bombing
campaign may encourage the French, Germans and others
to favor the notion of the independent pillar. This will
involve sharply raising all the other members' military
expenditures as a share of GNP (now only 60% of ours),1
switching from a conscript to a professional military,
duplicating part of NATO's expensive and highly practical
command structure, and many other painful expedients,
including a good risk of losing any campaign so undertaken.
One
hopes several of the NATO countries-and the US-will recognize
from their experience in this war that a major power cannot
manage foreign politico-military policy by following domestic
polls. Fatal! Only a true leader, with broad strategic
understanding and forceful command skills, can manage
a major power's foreign policy. In this affair, Britain
appeared to great advantage, thanks to Prime Minister
Tony Blair's principled and stalwart stand.
Most of the press missed Blair's address on April 22,
offering a proposed doctrine for NATO intervention in
non-member countries. It had five parts, and might be
described as a NATO Powell Doctrine:
- "Are
we sure of our case?"
On the one hand, even humanitarian intervention may
do more damage than good; on the other, some dictators
only respond to force.
- "Have
we exhausted all diplomatic options?"
- "Are
there military operations we can sensibly and prudently
undertake?" Some military operations for humanitarian
purposes are not cost-efficient. Neither Somalia nor
Haiti can be called successes.
- "Are
we prepared for the long term?" Both the war
and keeping the peace thereafter can take more of a
commitment than we expect.
- "Are
national interests involved?"
Here, Kosovo qualifies fully as to the underlying reality.
The Balkans remain a powder keg.
These
are sensible criteria, which could help frame all debates
about NATO intervention.
No
commentator I have encountered has explained the attitude
of Milosevic toward the Kosovars: he doesn't consider
them real people, just riff-raff. He doesn't necessarily
want them dead, he just wants them away, to clear the
area for Serbian breathing room. As we have seen in Bosnia,
this attitude is not going to change in any short period.
To
that extent, the Vance-Owen Plan of cantonising Bosnia
made sense, and should not have been dismissed by Secretary
Christopher. Ethnic subdividing seems to be occurring
spontaneously, and the pattern may surface again in Kosovo,
as the Serbs back away from the just rage of the neighbors
they had subjected to murder, arson, and rape.
The
Russians have been essential to a solution. On Tuesday,
June 1, there was a dreadful marathon negotiating session
in the Hotel Petersberg, the German government guest house
overlooking the Rhine in Bonn, between Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin,
Talbot and their military and civilian advisors. The delegations
migrated from room to room, squabbling. A key issue was
that the Russians demanded a distinct place for their
troops on the ground in the occupation, while Talbot refused.
Wherever the Russian troops had been in control, the Albanian
refugees would not have gone back, meaning a potentially
unstable Macedonia.
The
meeting stalled, and Ahtisaari called a break at 4:30
a.m.
At
8:30 a.m., the meeting resumed, and, astonishingly, an
agreement was quickly reached. Chernomyrdin yielded-the
occupation zone issue would be postponed. But with the
NATO occupying force in place, we could dictate the terms
of Russian participation. Clever...although the sly coup
of suddenly occupying the airport was a deft counter.
Anyway,
Yeltsin, probably informed of the impasse, doubtless preferred
to cave in and get the credit, rather than have the West
force it down his throat at the June l8, G-8 meeting.
Yeltsin remains our best hope in Russia, even with the
sinister baggage of Berezhovsky et al.
