 |
VIEW
THIS PAPER
in its published format
- 38 KB, pdf format
CASE
STUDY
THE
MEDAK POCKET
Miroslav
Međimorec
Basic
Thesis this study should try to prove
The
Croatian Army has successfully executed the Medak Pocket
Operation and thus fortified the Political and Diplomatic
(International and external) position of the Republic of
Croatia
UN
Resolutions have confirmed the Republic of Croatia’s sovereignty
over all of its territories, the country made its internal
affairs more stable, and foreign policy more credible.
But some individual actions, some alleged committed crimes
have made the thesis of “the equal guilt for the war”
possible.
Croatia
has followed the strategy (the “mouse bites, the pinching
off salients”) of returning under it’s sovereignty “the
pink zones” – Miljevac, Maslenica, Peruča, Medak Pocket
– but also exerted diplomatic and military pressure to
re-integrate its occupied territories. Military actions
followed whenever negotiations with rebel Serbs failed;
at the same time Croatia pressured UN to make UNPROFOR
effective in its mandate. The operation called the Medak
Pocket was undertaken in order to lessen the pressure
on the town of Gospić and to repel the imminent danger
of cutting Croatia in half on the Velebit Mountains (Gospić-Karlobag
road). The sources for this thesis/statement are books
and memoirs regarding that period of time, especially
“Sve Moje Bitke” by General Janko Bobetko, Ministry of
Defence documents dealing with the Medak Pocket operation,
UN Security Council documents, witness reports and other
sources. Serb military documents, confiscated during the
“Oluja” operation, speak of an attack on Gospić being
planned to commence 15 (fifteen) minutes before the Croatian
operation started (Croatian Army Archives – a copy in
General Markač’s possession). The book by General Milisav
Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (“Knin capitulated in
Belgrade”) is a valuable source from the other side.
The
planning and the execution of the operation were exemplary
– double encirclement, “throwing off” enemy forces on
the Velebit Mountains and taking the enemy Serb HQ by
surprise. UN forces and the international community were
also surprised and both had not evaluated Croatia’s military
and diplomatic abilities properly. In spite of the general
mobilization done in the so-called Republika Srpska, Serbian
counter-attack and terrorist bombardments of cities in
Croatia’s interior, Croats held the attained frontline
along the river Lika.
The
Security Information Service (SIS) conducted the official
inquiry on the Medak Pocket operation, under the Ministry
of Defense. Analysis has been done on a much later date.
The weekly publication “Focus” writes “…It seems that
the action was conducted without SIS’ knowledge, which
to any person who knows military order, must seem at the
very least laughable…” But this truly did occur. The SIS
Commissioner at the time did not know the Operation was
going to take place. General Bobetko remained tight-lipped
and details were only released to a few planning and executive
officers. Later developments confirmed its secrecy. The
fact is that Croatian military police, which came to Gospić
under the direct order of Defense Minister Gojko Šušak
and at President Tuđman, were not allowed to perform their
investigative duties. An anonymous high-ranking official
at the Crime Branch of Croatia’s army military police
confirmed this. All of that has cast a doubt on the official
version about the Operation. Reports of dissatisfaction,
of possible soldiers’ rebelling, the threats they made
to high state officials, were covered and those reports
on crimes committed were covered up. The successful and,
according to the American military attaché, “clean military
action”, was thus made dishonourable.
Conclusion:
The Croatian Army, by behaving in a modern fashion (according
to the NATO doctrine “maneuver and fire”) successfully
defeated the enemy and achieved the goals of that small
scale military and police operation. Although, after later
exerted international community pressure, the Croatian
Army had to withdraw. Immediately following the Operation,
Croatia gained the favourable UN Security Council Resolution
871 (Resolution by which, without any doubt, its sovereignty
is confirmed over all its territories). After the Medak
Pocket operation, there were no more doubts about what
the new Croatian Army’s abilities were. There was also
no doubt about whether decisive Croatian politics were
justified.
International
Community and UNPROFOR (Canadian – French Military Contingent)
having exerted pressure and meddling with the operation;
they continued to do so after it was completed in order
to protect their national interests; they made up the battle
– a larger scale conflict between Canadians and Croatians
which in fact did not occure.
“The
forgotten Canadian battle”, “The greatest Canadian battle
after the Korean war”, or “The Canadian non-existing battle”
proved that an effort was made to try and “freeze” the
military/political situation in Croatia. (Sources: “Tested
Mettle” and “Chances for Peace”, Canadian sources and
documents, reports of witnesses, UNPROFOR documents, accounts
from “the other, opposing side” that the battle never
took place – General Milisav Sekulić. The document from
Croatia’s Ministry of Defense - spokesperson’s statement
published in the weekly “Nacional” on December 10th 2002).
There were skirmishes, but they also occurred between
the Canadians and the Serb side. An example of this is
an ambush on Canadian troops on September 9th in Medak
by Serb soldiers. Serbian and Canadian soldiers mingled,
their outposts were no less than 50 metres apart. Serbs
provoked Croats so Canadians had to negotiate with the
Serbs in order to make them stop such activities. When
Canadian troops returned fire, when they started firing
on Croatian positions, it happened after a days long firefight
between Croatian and Serbian forces. At night, it was
very difficult to differentiate between a Serb and a Canadian.
All the more so because in front of the Canadian outposts
enemy patrols often clashed (“Chances for Peace”). The
Croats were highly suspicious of the Canadians, (the Western
Slavonia experience), having witnessed the arrogant and
violent behavior of the Canadian contingent. But Canadians
were also hostile towards the Croats (“They preferred
the Serbs, the Croats they didn’t like.” – Jim Calvin).
Incidents, justice that was imposed, prejudices against
“…fucking Croatia, bastards…”, “The Croats remembered
us because of our decision to use force against them in
the Medak Pocket.” All of it was underlined by the Canadian
pressure (the will to enter the Medak Pocket sooner than
it was agreed upon). There were also existing Canadian
reasons – the Somalia scandal, covered up by the military’s
top brass; and the peacekeeping duties, for which no personnel,
hardware or money was provided. Strong military and political
pressure had been used in order to prove equal blame on
the warring factions in crime. (Serbs weren’t the only
“bad guys”, Croats were caught red-handed in “ethnic cleansing”).
There are indications that “special operations” were undertaken
to undermine Croatia’s Army and Croatia itself, as similar
“mischief” was planned against Croats in Bosnia in 1994
(“Tested Mettle” – Sir Michael Rose’s idea). Members of
the SAS were also present with the Canadian troops in
the Medak Pocket (“Tested Mettle”). UNPROFOR’s General
Jean Cot to Lieutenant Colonel Calvin - “[the] UN by withdrawing
loses its credibility; the peace should be imposed by
force.” UNPROFOR therefore suddenly turned into a decisive
force, ready to take risks, no matter what “big mistakes”
were committed in the process. There were also indications
of France and Great Britain threatening Croatia with air
strikes in the “offensive” to expel Croats from the Medak
Pocket.
It
was inadvertently admitted that: “This wasn’t exactly
a battle by Western standards, where enemy lines are attacked
by barrage and maneuver. Canadians skirmished with Croatians
on 20 separate occasions. “There were bullet exchanges
from one and the other side, but there were no casualties
- the direct conflict was avoided writes the French publication
“Le Monde.” “Le Quotidien de Paris” writes: “…it seemed
that the Croatian Army has systematically fired upon UN
forces stationed along the line of fire in order to make
them re-deploy…” In only one UN document – SITREPORT (UNPROFOR
Situation UNPROFOR on September 16th 1993) it states that
Croatian forces have at 22.15 hours engaged Canadian forces
who then returned fire.
Ten
Croatian soldiers in all were killed during the whole
operation – from the beginning on September 9th until
the Croatian withdrawal on September 17th at 18.00 hours.
Where are the 27 bodies of Croatian soldiers killed by
Canadian bullets? At Rijeka hospital, a pathology post-mortem
was done on the bodies of serbian soldiers killed in Medak
operation. I,ve put a question wheather fallen Croatian
soldiers were also treted in the same hospital but there
were no answer yet. If a single 5.56 caliber bullet used
by Canadians was found in their bodies it would be proof
for Canadian version,if not -Canadians are not telling
us the truth?!!
CONCLUSION:
There are strong indications that the international community,
(Great Britain and France using their political representatives
on the ground – Owen, Cot, Calvin, the Canadians, Intelligence
and their Special Services), imposed their interpretation
of the military and political situation in Croatia to
the rest of the world and achieved equating guilt on all
sides and prolonging the existence of a Republika Srpska,
and therefore the existence of Yugoslavia. Accordingly,
that “battle” initially did not have the meaning it acquired
later. This was due to political reasons alone. As Canadian
public opinion was already disgusted by the behaviour
of Canadian soldiers in Somalia (torture and murder),
the Canadian authorities at first covered up the number
of wounded in their peacekeeping operations around the
world. The Canadian Military command hushed up an insignificant
skirmish between Croatian and Canadian soldiers, that
took place when Canadians retook Croatian positions in
order to, a year later, under the pressure of veterans,
transform it into a battle.
After
the official investigation was done on “Harmony” – ROTO
2 Operation (the code name for the UNPROFOR Canadian contingent
operation in the former Yugoslavia, one of Canada’s many
peacekeeping operations), it was discovered that many
former “blue helmets” were suffering from stress, PTSD
(post-traumatic stress disorder) and malignant diseases.
These were allegedly developed after contaminated bauxite
was used in Croatia to build the Canadian defence lines.
After years of denial by Canadian authorities and constant
requests for reparations by Canadian soldiers this became
the question of the utmost importance, to which Canadian
politicians and the Army had to answer. So the skirmish
has become a heroic Canadian battle against Croatian troops,
artillery and three-fold stronger forces. The Canadians
repelled the attack and were consequently victorious over
the Croatians. According to Deputy minister of Croatian
ministry of Defence (taken from minutes from a conversation
between the Canadian Ambassador and him) the Canadian
side wanted to send an investigating team to Croatia which
would freely and independently of Croatian authorities
investigate wheater canadian soldiers were infected by
radio-active soil in Croatia.After the Deputy Minister
refused to discuss the matter in a way which would jeopardize
croatian sovereignty, the Canadian Ambassador in diplomatic
words threatened revenge – political damage Canada could
inflict upon Croatia. It appears that the battle that
did not take place reappeared in questionnaires Croatians
must answer in order to apply for a Canadian travel Visa:
“Did you take part in Croatia’s Homeland war?” This could
very well be the political damage the Canadian Ambassador
threatened. Other examples substantiating this are the
refusal to issue a travel Visa to the former health and
defence Minister Andrija Hebrang, to the former Director
of HIS, Miroslav Tuđman, and many other Croatian citizens,soldiers
in Homeland war, who were supposed to travel to Canada.
The
crime
Though
one cannot deny the existence of victims killed, there
is doubt about whether they were killed outside the theatre
of operations. The tally of victims also varies: from
a few dozen to more than one hundred (as in Croatian General
Bobetko’s indictment). There is a possibility that those
victims were simply attributed to being killed by Croats.
The Serb Army and UN claim that the majority of people
were not killed in combat. The Serbian source “Veritas’s”
numbers mismatch those of the Croatian Helsinki Board.
There is proof that some alleged victims of the Oluja
Operation are alive while some of the living were listed
as dead. There is also the possibility that some people
were victims of in-fighting between Serb forces. There
is a case of this during the night of September 9th 1993
in Medak. The “people’s defence” concept is based on arming
all people – civilians and the army. Civilians mixed together
with the army. Documents exist wherein weapons were said
to have been handed to civilians. A female civilian named
“Danica” was found with a mortar and a machinegun for
example. Documents issued in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia and found with the deceased, question the validity
about the victims on the Serbian side, and therefore also
question the responsibility for causing those deaths –
commanding responsibility instead of personal responsibility.
The
international community and ICTY rely on Sava Štrbac and
“Veritas” – the purpose of which is the criminalization
of Croatia’s Homeland war and Croatia itself. The serious
political consequences that should be drawn from this
are the re-establishment of Republika Srpska’s legality
and the punishment of the Republic of Croatia by narrowing
or withholding its sovereignty and condemning it “to die
in long agony”.
Conclusion:
“All
the available data about the victims should be gathered,
victims should be identified either as combatants or as
civilians, with the exact description of military activities
noted. The truth needs to be established as comprehensively
as possible using official Croatian documents, the Croatian
Helsinki Board, the UN, “Veritas” and the ICTY.
Bibliography
and Annex to the Analysis
- UN
documents, Canadian analysis, Croatian and Serbian sources
- ICTY
documents
- Public
sources
- Foreign
and Croatian press, the electronic media
- Maps
- Photographs
|
|
|
|
|
