Though
there have been many “professional” discussions, memoirs
and military history articles written, there are only
a few in-depth homeland war analyses, and even fewer are
those dealing with specific chapters of the war. The Medak
Pocket Operation therefore has not had a professional
evaluation done yet. The repulsion towards it prevailed
soon after the initial euphoria followed the successful
liberation of temporarily occupied territories. The world
and domestic public opinion were immediately furnished
with data about war crimes committed during the operation.
UNPROFOR, UNCIVPOL, foreign, especially Serb but also
Croat media, started cataloguing the numbers of people
slaughtered, buildings destroyed, animals killed: all
of which General Cot referred to as “the scorched earth”.
Therefore very little space was left for documents and
eyewitness accounts to be inserted and published in order
to complete the Action’s framework, and pull aside the
curtain concealing the truth. Later, the reluctance even
to speak about such “ill-reputed” military operations
became the reason that the history’s “hot potato” was
not touched. And when the Hague’s ICTY came into the picture
with its indictments, the Medak Pocket Operation was avoided
as one would avoid a contagious disease. The events were
being connected with crimes and threatened to become historically
inaccurate and permanently referred to in a negative light.
Therefore,
one had to analyze the Medak Pocket operation. The Operation
was scrutinised within the Croatian Army ranks and at
the Croatian Army’s military academy; but those analyses
were protected as military secrets and were unknown to
the public. Recently some of these documents have been
released and some were used in this case study. General
Janko Bobetko speaks about the Medak Pocket Operation
in his book. He dedicates a whole chapter to it. He is
of the opinion that it was “a brilliantly executed operation”
which together with his HQ, he planned, led and victoriously
ended. In his book, Croatian General Martin Špegelj183
does not write about the Medak Pocket Operation, dealing
mostly with Croatia’s early stages of the war. He defends
his decision to attack JNA barracks, eventhough President
Tuđman considered it to be a strategic JNA trap. In his
book “Rat u Hrvatskoj,”184 Ozren Žunec writes half a page
about the Medak Pocket Operation. Domazet’s “Hrvatska
i veliko ratište” mentions the “Pocket”185 among other
Croatian Army offensives that preceded the “Bljesak” and
“Oluja” actions. The majority of Croatian military analysts,
historians and journalists, agree that the Medak Pocket
Operation was the fourth most successful Croatian Army’s
action. The first being the Miljevac plateau, the second
Maslenica and the third the Peruča Dam, that led to the
final liberation and reintegration of the occupied Croatian
territories. Though small in its range, that operation
confirmed that previous limited actions and victories
were not taken indiscriminately, and that Croatian military
power development was a process that could not be stopped.
Whatever we call it: “the mice bites strategy” or “the
pinching of the salient Serb parastate areas in Croatia”
– that strategy proved viable, and led to the final success.
As main HQ commander General Janko Bobetko writes in his
book, the strategic reasons for undertaking that operation
were confirmed: “the Velebit Mountains were the key factor
to Croatia’s defence – whoever controls the Velebit Mountains,
controls half of Croatia.”186 From that strategic conclusion,
General Bobetko came to the idea of the necessity to undertake
a military operation with attacks spearhead towards Divoselo,
Počitelj and Lički Čitluk, in order to straighten the
Lika defence line and push off the threat imposed on Gospić’s187
civilians. By then taking the key heights on the Velebit
Mountain and preventing a Serb offensive towards the Adriatic
sea, the cities of Karlobag and Zadar; they would stop
the Serb army from cutting Croatia in half. Croatian tactical
and operational goals were decided upon – the danger to
block communication was eliminated, Gospić was secured,
the enemy forces were repelled from “the Pocket”, and
pushed to Medak itself, and the force of Serb artillery
attacks on Lika’s cities was diminished. Now the situation
became quite the opposite – it was the Croatian Army now
who posed a threat to Medak, Gračac, Ljubovo, Udbina and
Korenica. It threatened to cut off the Dalmatian part
of the “RSK”, which actually happened in the “Oluja.”188
“Before the Lički Osik operation was undertaken, the vicinity
of Gospić Serbs have been able to fire on the Gospić-Perušić
main communication indiscriminately. Our positions were
shot at, Gospić was semi-circled and the enemy had its
outposts on domineering positions. Our psychological status
and our patience were coming to an end, the enemy could
have started their offensives whenever it suited them.
If measures were not taken (if there was no Medak Pocket
operation – author’s note) Gospić, would have been completely
destroyed.”189 After hearing what the reasons were to
take on such an action, the Army’s Commander in Chief,
President Franjo Tuđman: “agreed on it, but asked that
it should be quickly and efficiently executed, because
a strong reaction from the international community was
possible.”190
The
battle was fought between Croatian and Serb forces, the
Croatian Army and police won, and the Canadians and French
were mere observers. Medak was about to fall, in front
of it, the commander of the Serb tank company Lt.Colonel
Savić was killed. Therefore it was not just a clash “between
Croats armed to their teeth against barehanded Serb women
and the elderly:” This was the theatre of swift but fierce
fighting in which soldiers from both sides were killed.
On the Serb side, those were members of: the 103rd Lapac
light brigade, members of the 9th Gračac brigade, volunteers
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia,191 as well as
local territorial defence members, which was evidenced
by documents found on them. On the Croatian side, members
of the “Vukovi”, special police, and Lika homeguard brigade
members were killed. “The enemy had been completely surprised
and overwhelmed militarily;” said general Bobetko about
the Medak Pocket Operation.” A large organized political
noise was raised. Pressure was exerted on the President,
the Government, and on me personally, to stop the Operation,
because had we been able to advance further to Gračac,
Medak would also have been taken. The President absolutely
forbid us to, apart from the area taken, move even one
step further.”192
During
and after the Action, the UN, IC, UNPROFOR, foreign press
and Croatian Opposition pressure followed. Cedric Thornberry,
the UN civil representative forwarded the political, and
General Cot the military, requests from the UN Security
Council. They mediated between the two sides. No sooner
did the fierce Serb artillery and rocket attacks on Croatian
cities along the coast and in the interior take place
did the Croatian side insist upon UNPROFOR taking control
of the liberated area – and a ceasefire agreement was
reached. Croatia accepted the agreement on withdrawal
from the liberated territory, which “for each army is
a tragic fact in itself. I had to make an unpopular decision,
I had to organize a retreat. I ordered Domazet and Stipetić193
to go and explain it to the troops, to make them comprehend
state politics and to ask them not to “create any problems
.”Because a man who had lost everything, whose every possession
had been burned, once he had taken a village, you could
not just say to him: “You have to retreat now, if you
please.” How could I explain such a thing to him?”194
General
Bobetko indirectly admits that difficulties arose when
the order to withdraw was given. The soldiers obviously
“created some problems.” They were reluctant to obey,
they voiced their dissatisfaction with the order that
annulled their sacrifice and their fallen friends. An
additional effort had to be made and some persuasion take
place to make the retreat order be obeyed and to consequently
realize the withdrawal. It was that dissatisfaction that
possibly caused unlawful criminal acts, crimes that happened
mainly when Croatian troops were retreating.
“We
held our positions under control so UNPROFOR would not
let the Četniks through. But UNPROFOR did not deter them.
The Četniks continued entering Divoselo. But they stood
no chance because their main force was defeated. From
then on, special police forces dominated the Velebit Mountains.”195
General Bobetko, who with a certain dose of vanity, (allowable
perhaps to the general of the winning side that initiated
and with his HQ planned the action), judged it as a “brilliant”
one and writes: “All our objectives were fulfilled, our
losses were minimal (Croatian casualties – authour’s note)
and a foundation to liberate Croatia was laid. For me,
Medak Pocket is one of the brilliant operations, one enemy
battalion was completely defeated.” (Davor Butković in
Globus quotes Serb sources as saying: “…up to this moment
we traced 107 members of the Gračac brigade who were alive”196).
“The main tasks were accomplished, our casualties were
minimal, the foundation was laid for the future liberation
of Croatia during the “Oluja”. If that Action was not
successful, we would have lost Gospić (the strategic Serb
target), and by that we would have lost the Velebit Mountains.
Those who know how to judge such an event would understand
that in such a case, our position would have been completely
different.”197
I
am of the opinion that this evaluation is the right one,
no matter what price the Republic of Croatia would have
paid, or will have to pay198. The Medak Pocket Operation
showed where the limit of one sovereign state’s patience
was; the Medak Pocket Operation also showed statesmanship,
wisdom and military ability with which such situations
should be dealt with.199 The crimes that were committed
afterwards were awful, and have to be punished, but they
are the consequence of an imposed war of aggression, and
they were done in breach of self-defence. However these
acts were not in any sense a premeditated political or
premeditated criminal act.
And
finally, General Bobetko estimated the UN force commander
General Cot, with whom he had often met during those days:
“Judging by Cot’s reactions, one could not but conclude
they were very surprised by the Croatian Army’s swiftness
and expediency.”200 Bobetko is partly right, UNPROFOR
had been surprised because of its own assessment of the
Croatian Army’s strength, which for quite a long time
was based on statistics, foreign intelligence, JNA data,
outside apparel (uniforms, discipline, armament). The
military behaviour of Serb officers and soldiers, their
apparel, training, discipline, weaponry, strength, the
victories of the JNA and Serb armies in fights up until
that time gave them the advantage over the newly-formed
Croatian Army.201 The Serbians had a well-organized army,
that had secured great territorial gains and it was not
too long before the other two belligerent sides, the Croats
and Muslims/Bosnians were forced to sign peace- the peace
of the losing sides. Croats were (like the Bosnians) a
group of wild, untidy and unconvincing soldiers.202 Therefore
the question: how could “such an army” suddenly start
counting its victories. Therefore UNPROFOR wished to punish
it. General Cot didn’t hide the fact that he liked the
Serbs. He often went visiting Serb General Novaković in
Knin. He felt his moment of decision, firmness and glory
had come. He would impose a peace, he would be that strong
arbitrator able to decide,203 and not the weak, unconvincing
mediator and an aide to help achieve peace and assure
that UN decisions were implemented on the ground. He was
not impressed by the Croatian Army’s efficiency. When
speaking with General Bobetko he did not chose his words
– at the time he thought Croats were stalling (that was
Cot’s understanding). We were asking for more time in
order to withdraw all the Croatian troops (Bobetko’s attitude)
and all of that happened before the first bodies killed
in the Medak Pocket were found204. General Cot wanted
to be the protagonist who would decide how to deal with
the new crisis. He was on the ground and not some high-ranking
UN bureaucrat – they were sitting in New York and Zagreb.
He flew to Knin, Gračac, Medak and immediately knew who
the aggressor and the guilty party was.205
General
Cot demanded Lt. Colonel Calvin be decisive and assert
pressure, even to “bluff” the Croatians, which according
to Calvin, could prove to be a serious mistake.206 That
decisive military attitude, with which Cot wanted to push
civilians out of the UN leadership, led to a direct conflict
with UN Security Council General Secretary Boutros Boutros
Ghali, who at the beginning of 1994 relieved General Cot
of his duties.207 General Cot has, with “hardened” Canadians
and “his” French troops wanted to show and teach the Croats
a lesson for having dared to start “an aggression” against
so-called “RSK”. He was not interested in the fact that
the Croats actually undertook a limited action in order
to protect Croat civilians from terrorist shelling. Cot
asked the UN Secretary General’s permission to use air
force – the “double key” in decision-making and the command
for air strikes be passed directly to the UN military
commander. When Ghali refused, Cot threatened to start
“lobbying those governments who had their troops in the
field and that he would communicate directly with the
Security Council.208 Because of this unseen rejection
of civilians in the UN, Cot had been relieved of his duties.
Ten
years ago, the international community was not that resolute
in judging terrorism. During the wars in the former Yugoslavia,
the policy of leniency towards Serbian President Milošević
and the Serbs prevailed; their attacks were not considered
to be terrorist ones and they were not called criminal
acts. The Croatian action had been defined as an aggression,
as an attack on a UN protected area, and the Serb entity,
which strongly declined all UN and Croatian efforts to
achieve a peaceful solution, most often used artillery
to attack unprotected Croat civilians. Therefore some
individual attitudes that General Cot and UNPROFOR are
to be blamed for the death of a couple of hundred Croatian
citizens which were killed in Croatia during their mandate
are not unusual.209 During the last ten years, a consciousness
about the nature of terrorism has developed, and the need
for pre-emptive strikes to prevent terrorist attacks,
aggression and genocide has risen. The 2002 Pulitzer Prize
authour, Samantha Power, has dedicated a lengthy book
to this problem.210 She has proven that blunders, especially
those in American politics, the terrible consequences
of reacting too late in the case of genocide. Several
countries, the United States primarily since the September
11th aftermath, tried to prevent terrorist attacks at
their roots, in places where they were conceived like
training camps. What else was the Croatian armed forces
intervention in the Medak Pocket, but a pre-emptive strike
to prevent continued terrorism? The fierce, unrelentless
and unpunished shelling of Gospić and other cities and
towns in Lika lasted for two years. Did Croatia not, after
all unsuccessful negotiations, have the right to intervene,
to repel the danger, to show its decisiveness? Everything
that happened after that, all authors agree that incidents/crimes
happened after the military operation had ended, and after
the decision to retreat had been made, therefore the legitimacy
of the action itself could not be questioned.211 The linkage
which many foreign analyst tries to make between the command
to start the action and the crimes themselves can hardly
be proven. General Bobetko admits “the stupidities” that
happened212, but these “stupidities” are far from being
planned crimes.
“Military
Globus HQ”213 carefully followed the Action, and after
it was finished soon made its professional analysis: “The
Croatian Army’s action lasted for five (5) hours; two
(2) Serb tanks were captured (that data differs from the
Ministry of Defence data which states that one tank was
taken), 105 millimetre Howitzer, 10 recoilless guns, 10
heavy machineguns, and an enormous amount of small arms
and ammunition was taken.” According to the quantity of
armour taken, one could approximate the number of soldiers
who manned that heavy weaponry and sophisticated technical
devices. It was not possible that they were manned by
elderly Serbs and women. At least one hundred soldiers
trained in the former JNA were needed in order to put
those confiscated weapons to use. How many more soldiers
there manned the tank company in Medak, the cannons, mortars
and anti-aircraft guns? The numbers UNPROFOR mentioned
in their report are obviously incorrect. The Serb data
about Serbs being killed during the “Ustaša aggression”
in the Medak Pocket revealed that the majority of those
killed were of the right age for recruitment.214 The “Globus
Military HQ” also added that “700 Četniks were forced
to flee” (sic!)215 (According to Croatian military and
police intelligence, in the “Pocket” there were approximately:
400 soldiers/military personnel – 80 to 100 of them were
members of the 103rd Lapac light brigade, 80 were volunteers
from Romania” – among the captured not one of them is
mentioned, there were some other volunteers (persons from
Glamoč and Teslić) killed. Brigadier Krpina speaks of
at least 30 percent of Serb volunteers, among them there
are almost certainly some villagers, members of the territorial
defence, and finally there were civilians. “Globus Military
HQ” might have exaggerated the number of enemy soldiers,
but does the exact assessment of the Croatian victory’s
strategic consequences – the Ličko polje area and the
situation in the Velebit Mountains changed – “after the
Croatian forces took the Velebit Mountains, the majority
of Serb Army forces in Dalmatia could easily be encircled,
and the rebel Serbs couldn’t manoeuvre freely over the
Ličko polje anymore – the Serb garrisons in Medak and
Gračac could be seen by the Croatian Army like in the
palm of one’s hand. The Operation surprised not only Serb
terrorists but UNPROFOR, whose forces had a wide intelligence
network at their disposal, spread from both sides of the
demarcation line.”216 That assessment about the UNPROFOR
intelligence service network was not exact. UN intelligence
reports forecasted that area should be very quiet in the
period ahead – but others, the British, mentioned by General
Wahlgren, (“The English had in the former Yugoslavia an
intelligence network dating back to World War 2- the direct
intelligence is handed to co-president of the peace conference
Lord Owen personally”),217 were more accurate. Why would
SAS members be in Medak if they did not expect anything
to happen?! The “Globus Military HQ” concludes: “On a
tactical level, the Croatian Army showed it could make
the right assessment of its own force, the force of the
enemy, it could plan the action and execute it with precision.”218
“What
was achieved by this action?” – the “Globus Military HQ”
asks: “The effective answer was given to the rebel Serbs
frequent terrorist attacks (on Pakrac, Sivac, Nemetin,
Gospić, Kusonje), the places where (immediately before
the Operation started – author’s note) 11 members of the
Croatian Army and police had been killed – were vindicated.
Seven hundred Četniks ran in disarray, 60 of them were
liquidated and ten rebels were captured. The Croatian
Army now controlled the Medak-Lovinac-Gračac road. Taking
into consideration the previous operations done in the
Dalmatian area, (Maslenica, Peruča), this was the other
end of the pincer movement which the Croatian Army was
closing around the Maslenica bridge, the most critical
point for Croatia. (The first end of the pincer movement
went through Ličko polje towards Gospić, and the other
from Šibenik towards Knin – author’s note).219
Croatian
weekly “Nacional” journalist Robert Bajruši, after speaking
with Milo Kosović the Gospić homeguard battalion commander,
describes the battalion’s engagement in attack that spearheaded
to Divoselo, Počitelj and Čitluk: “The battalion commenced
the attack but the Četniks waited for us, intercepted
us with heavy artillery fire, and we had to, in order
to pull our wounded out, retreat to our starting positions.”220
This was why the 9th brigade slowed its advancements pace,
and why the encirclement (ideated by General Bobetko,
Ademi and Norac) was not completed in time and an escape
route for Serbs to cross the Velebit Mountain woods and
move to Gračac was formed. Later too, in the “Bljesak”
and “Oluja” Operations, the Croatian Army and police deliberately
kept such corridors open for Serb civilians and their
army to pull out. Kosović says he realized: “We wouldn’t
be successful using only small arms. So I ordered a heavy
artillery attack on the enemy, after which we commenced
our advancement. We broke through the Serb defence this
time. They started running away. It was three or four
hours from when the action started that we took our designated
targets.”221 It is possible that among those fleeing were
the 107 men from the Lapac light brigade that were later
found in Gračac. The fleeing Serb soldiers arrived to
Medak where fellow Serbs laid harsh blame for their cowardice
in the battle.222 “When we reached our task designated
by Mirko Norac we stopped. Unlike the 9th brigade, our
battalion did not have a single man killed. During the
second day of the Action I got an order from Mirko Norac
to re-deploy towards Medak because we expected Serbs would
use that place to start their counter-attack. We dug in
near the Kriva Rijeka, expecting a counter-attack, and
instead, two kilometres away two UN armoured personnel
carriers appeared and took that position.”223 From this
account it is unclear whether Kosanović’s soldiers attacked
Medak at all. On that day, September 10th, It is unclear
whether the Croatian Army attacked Medak as UN sources
reported. During the first day of the Action, the “Vukovi”
reached “the first houses at Medak,” then retreated. This
second day of the Action the UN reported that “Serb refugees
started walking towards Gračac” and therefore they were
unable to counterattack as Kosanović and his homeguard
battalion expected them to do. What is important in the
Kosanović report is that instead of the Serbs counter-attacking,
two UNPROFOR APC’s appeared in front of the Croats. This
means that on September 10th the Canadians deployed in
Kriva Rijeka in front of the Serb lines, or mingled with
the Serbs as they had stated, protecting them, and positioning
themselves in front of the “aggressor” – the Croats. All
of this was done prior to any negotiation or agreement
being reached.
Brigadier
General Bo Pellnas immediately rushed to Knin, to talk
to Serbs General Novaković; he conveyed their ultimatum
and demands back to Ademi in Gospić. Where was the UN’s
neutrality there? They considered their neutrality to
be the equal treatment of terrorists and their “parastate”
with the legal army of a sovereign state, and the latter’s
legal defence of civilians to be an aggressive act. Kosanović
underlines: “Back in 1991, on one such occasion we tried
to take Divoselo, but because of the peace talks we had
to withdraw. Back then a couple of houses were destroyed.”224
Houses in Divoselo were also destroyed in an action undertaken
a couple of months prior to the Medak Pocket Operation
in 1993, when local homeguard troops backed by a mechanized
platoon from Gospić took and partly burned the village.
The damage inflicted and the aremd persons(soldiers and
civilians) killed in that action could have been later
mistakenly added by UNPROFOR and UNCIVPOL to the total
number of killed in the later operation.225
When
that data is added to the ICTY depositions of Brigadiers’
Krpina and Merčep, would the number of destroyed houses
for what Croatian Generals stand indicted for be subtracted
by at least a few? Will we be able to put some order in
the given data and make some sense out of them?
“What
is the truth about the Medak Pocket?” a journalist asked
Brigadier and Ministry of Defence Police Department Commissioner
Drago Krpina at a press conference in Gospić. During that
press conference Brigadier Krpina at first tried to justify
the action by explaining the facts that preceded it. “Up
until September 9th we noticed enemy forces bringing in
terrorist reinforcements from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
We had intelligence about the enemy terrorist commando
attacks against Croatia being prepared. These attacks
already happened – in August and in the first couple of
days of September 11 Croatian soldiers and policemen were
killed. In the first days of September, Gospić was under
constant artillery fire. On September 9th the fiercest
attack happened which as a consequence had the Croatian
army counterattack.”226 Brigadier Krpina’s claims were
proven by the numbers killed on both sides. Members of
the 9th guard mobile brigade: Siniša (Cvjetko) Rosuljaš-Oluja
was killed on July 30th 1993 on the Begluk position near
Ribnik; Ivica Jakovac was killed on June 6th 1993 on Medovača
along with Damir Habijanac.227 There were also 2 special
police members killed on the Velebit Mountains. The data
from the enemy side states that Miloš Đuro Rajčević, member
of the 2/9th Gračac mobile brigade was killed on September
7th in the Divoselo, Medak area by a Croatian homeguard
sniper.228 If the Serbs had not resisted, as claimed in
the UNPROFOR report later to become an official UN and
ICTY document and ICTY basis for the indictments of Generals
Bobetko and Ademi, how could there have been victims on
the Croatian side?! Drago Krpina claims the opposite,
“In the Medak Pocket, the Serbs put up fierce resistance.
Ten Croatian soldiers and 22 civilians were killed during
the Medak Pocket liberation. This further proves that
the Croatian police paid a heavy price for that action.229
Krpina has tried to answer the accusations of destroying
and burning houses with credibility stating: “The Serb
houses were military fortifications, so they were destroyed
during the September 9th action. Some of these houses
were destroyed back in 1991.” This statement is corroborated
by Mile Kosović, “And the destruction continued in the
exchange of artillery fire.” Krpina claimed: “Some of
the houses were destroyed by terrorists themselves, the
rest were destroyed later, perhaps on purpose. The iron
beds found within houses were proof of their military
use.” This case study’s writer has himself seen one such
house during the “Oluja” Operation in a village above
Sunja, close to abandoned Serb positions. The first floor
was covered with wooden bunks where soldiers slept while
the cellar was an ammunitions and explosives depot. It
was set up like an army barracks.
The
Croatian Army handed in 52 terrorist corpses.230 “Various
documents were found on. A war diary with artillery co-ordinates
to shell Gospić were found on Stevo Uzelac”231 “The Croatian
army took 10 terrorists prisoners. Twenty people were
hiding in the bushes (they were alive and unhurt and were
brought to UNPROFOR). “Fourteen more people were found
and were escorted from the area and transported to Senj,
where they were sent to relatives in Rijeka, Pula and
Zagreb.”232
We
can calculate the Operation’s data based on General Bobetko’s
data. “The whole battalion was wiped out.” A battalion
in organized armies is 400 to 500 soldiers strong (three
platoons, a logistics unit and command). In the army/police
like the RSK had, the battalion was half that size. The
Croatian army and police assess the entire enemy force
in the Medak Pocket to be 400 men/soldiers strong.
“Globus
Military HQ” says 700 Serb soldiers ran in disarray, 60
of them were killed and 10 were captured”. Krpina states
that 52 were killed, 10 captured, and 20 or so people
were hiding in the woods and surrendered. None of them
were hurt. Fourteen civilians were found in the area and
were left to freely join their relatives. “Globus” quotes
Serbian sources citing about 107 soldiers saved from the
Gračac brigade.In former French OP in Medak wrere sheltered
15 Serbs (Canadian source). In all, 70 or 96 soldiers
and civilians were killed or captured out of 200/400/700
soldiers and civilians in the area before the Operation
started. Of these, at least 107 were safely returned to
Gračac. The UN also points out that on September 10th
the retreat of civilians to Gračac was noted. It was also
known that children had been evacuated earlier. The difference
in numbers appears in Canadian sources as well. Numbers
differ in the foreign, Croatian press, Sava Štrbac’s data
and the ICTY indictments. They also differ in “Veritas”
and the official Serb register. The Serbs were prone to
such inconsistencies in facts, making it is easier to
accuse the Croatian side for disappearances and crimes.
The weekly magazine “Arena”233 did in-depth research on
the numbers game played. Reporters discovered people listed
as dead in the ICTY Gotovina indictment, to be alive and
living in Serbia or in the Republika Srpska.
The battalion in disarray made 400 men, if there was 700
in all minus 60 killed and 10 taken prisoner, it would
have equalled 630 men. According to Krpina, the numbers
killed and captured was 96, plus 107 soldiers saved. The
question remains, are there still any living persons listed
as dead? The numbers differ. We will try to prove if some
of the living were listed as dead in the Medak Pocket
Operation in the Crime and its Victims chapter of this
case study.
Even
if proven, it would not make us less shocked by the killing
of innocent victims and the consequent manipulation of
their numbers. To trace the perpetrators of these crimes
is not the aim of this study. This is to be done by investigators,
prosecutors and the courts. The effort to establish a
precise number of those killed, wounded and those that
survived is the goal one should try and reach. Only then
can one reach the truthful account of the Operation’s
tragic civilian victims.
Two
months after the Operation, when the second anniversary
of the 9th brigade was celebrated, the magazine “Hrvatski
Vojnik” carried a short article explaining the events
that took place: “Gospić had taken the brunt of the Četnik’s
rage because of the Croatian soldiers successes at Maslenica
and the Velebit Mountains. UNPROFOR was powerless. In
some instances it covered up Četnik terrorist crimes.
The worst provocations came from Divoselo, Čitluk and
Počitelj. The Četnik artillery mercilessly pounded the
innocent civilian population. The quick and successful
operation followed – villages were liberated and the terrorists
were defeated. The “Vukovi” showed how they fought for
Croatian freedom.”234
Meeting
with department commanders of the main staff HQ, General
Bobetko summarized the Operation’s development: “The Lika
situation had been solved in a fortunate and organized
manner. The team that went to the area to organize our
forces orderly retreat did it extremely well.”235 The
General would in 2002, deny that part of his statement
and accused the co-ordination staff (General Stipetić
and Admiral Domazet), of “escaping” to Zagreb before their
job was finished. Both of the mentioned officers denied
such accusations publicly and when they were summoned
to give witness reports to the ICTY.236 Sources mention
a report that Admiral Domazet handed to President Tuđman
on another occasion. He admits he gave that report to
the Croatian army HQ ( now it is at the ICTY’s disposal).
In the report Domazet allegedly allowed “the possibility
that during the withdrawal operations, crimes were committed.”237
Without having the document at our disposal we cannot
either confirm or deny the existence of such a claim.
General Bobetko further informed his staff: “We have remained
on the dominant points, which gave us the operative advantage.
I ordered our forces to stay in a strong formation. There
was a danger the Četniks would not enter the UNPROFOR
controlled area, but the UN should not have allowed such
incursions.”238 The Četniks did enter the area and engaged
Croatian forces even after September 17th at 18:00 hours
when the Croatian Army and Ministry of the Interior special
police withdrew to their designated positions.239 Not
only did they sneak in during the night, but they also
used to squeeze in between Canadian and Croatian lines
to shoot at Croatian positions in full daylight.240 The
misunderstanding with the Canadians continued. Canadians
entered the area in a wider depth than agreed upon, bulldozed
Croatian positions and ltcol Calvin did not attend the
meetings where such problems were being solved. The tactics
of the pressure and a bluff, promoted by General Cot,
and put into practice by Calvin continued.
“At
last night’s military council meeting a government body
led by Šarinić and Croatian army representative General
Stipetić was formed. The task of the body was to contact
UNPROFOR forces.”241 It was unusual for General Bobetko
to appoint General Stipetić to such a position, especially
when nine years later he said Stipetić had run away from
the mission. The only excuse for General Bobetko’s statement
was that water had passed under that bridge.
“In
general, the staff and the commanding area of Gospić was
fortified, the tasks had been accomplished. There had
been some errors committed after the mission was accomplished,
some burning was committed after the command to withdraw
was given.242 General Bobetko admits “errors…burning after
the command to withdraw was given.” He repeated the same
comments at a VONS243 meeting. According to the commander
of the chief staff HQ given to the operative army brass,
it was clear that some soldiers/policemen had committed
some “errors”, not in accordance with the decision to
withdraw command and against their commanding officers’
will. This was done against the plan and against their
commanders’ knowledge. It seems logical that these “errors”
were done by some, because of their bitterness in being
forced to withdraw and because of the fear that Serbs
might return out of a blind revenge. There was only a
small possibility that an order was given to commit such
crimes as the ICTY indictment explicitly states. The Croatian
government reacted to those unlawful acts and criminal
acts committed by Croatian citizens wearing army or police
uniforms. Soon some commanders were relieved of their
duties. The second in command of the Gospić commanding
area, General Ademi and Mile Kosović, the Gospić homeguard
battalion commander were relieved of their duties.244
Access to the Gospić area by MP members sent by Defence
Minister Šušak to investigate the possible criminal acts
that had been done by Croatian soldiers during and after
the Medak Pocket Operation was initially prevented.245
A report was written and handed to the Minister at the
beginning of October. The report states that after interviewing
Brigadier Ademi it was concluded the battle with the armed
enemy was waged and there were no criminal acts committed.
The report also stated that the inquiry will continue
in order to discover all the relevant facts and possible
perpetrators of such acts would be apprehended. SIS department
members were not included in either the planning nor in
the Action’s execution or control.246 After UNPROFOR entered
the demilitarized arena, Croatian civil and military police
were prevented any further access. Why any further measures
were not taken – the investigation and prosecution of
perpetrators – was to be decided by a court. According
to the Croatian army HQ situation report, (on the basis
of the district command post Gospić data), the main objective
of the Operation was accomplished. The enemy that had
been deployed on the Gospić-Medak-Gračac perimeter was
now holding an unfavourable position. This would allow
some future Croatian forces the possibility to deploy
in a better operational and tactical position. The possibility
of Serb enemy attacks on Gospić were averted. Apart from
undoubted military and tactical gains, Croatia had, according
to Croatian military analyst assessments, suffered political
and propaganda damage. It had to return a liberated area
(one should underline – under the UN’s protection). “RSK”
was given the possibility to again call Croatia an aggressor
(sic!). At his HQ meeting, General Bobetko concluded his
analysis: “The anti-aircraft defence in Lika failed. This
is where one should look for reasons that led to the uncompleted
mission. I warned that Četniks would take retaliatory
measures, and that in the frame of the command post we
should organize ambushes to prevent any surprise.”247
On several occasions the Četniks had tried, but never
with such strength and determination as before the Medak
Pocket Operation, to retake that area.
Is
the Croatian military sources claim that Serbian forces
were preparing the attack on Gospić and cutting off the
Gospić-Karlobag communication, thus taking the Velebit
Mountains and cutting Croatia in half valid? Is the claim
that the Medak Pocket Operation was an operation imposed
on Croatia correct? From confiscated Serbian documents
it is visible that their forces reconnaissance incursions
were executed and the Velebit Mountains were under constant
Serb military command control. The constant Serb efforts
to fortify Divoselo and the Medak Pocket defence are well
documented, the volunteer reinforcements influx is proven,
as well as Serb appeals to strengthen that important part
of “RSK”. By taking into account the complete military,
political and geostrategic position of the “RSK,” that
suffered a drastic change with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
gaining momentum, and because of the moral and psychological
downfall of that parastate, it was obvious that the “RSK”
did not have the necessary force to execute the planned
action of cutting Croatia in half.
Would
it therefore be possible to say that Croatia and her army
invented the reasons to attack Medak Pocket? No matter
what negative consequences the Operation bore (the breaches
of war and the alleged war crimes), I am of the opinion
that the military/police operation in the Medak Pocket
was a legitimate one. Such was also the conclusion of
the Croatian Supreme Constitutional Court. It was part
of a military and political strategy, led by Croatia,
in order for it to reach its full sovereignty. Sovereignty
was not merely “served to Croatia on a platter” by the
unwilling international community or rebel Croatian Serbs
backed by the SR Yugoslavia and Slobodan Milošević. Only
the strong would know how to take what was rightfully
theirs.
