Some
were taken prisoners, and some were escorted by Croatian
Government forces to their relatives living in Zagreb,
Rijeka or Pula. The accounts of the members of the Serb
103rd Lapac brigade164 prove that Serb resistance was
strong and that the Croatian Army “had targeted house
by house with tank cannons; after which they started a
cleansing operation using armour and infantry.”
General
Norac’s forces (the 9th guard mobile brigade) reached
their start position. Its dismounted infantry backed by
two tank platoons reinforced with artillery carried out
the attack, spearheading Or(a)nice165-Lički Čitluk. After
taking the Or(a)nice-Čitluk road and Rajčevići hamlet,
they reached the Cindrino Brdo-Rogića most line and linked
up with forces of the Ministry of the Interior, which
have been deployed on the Medak-Lički Čitluk166 line.
Authour
Ozren Žunec in his book does a short synopsis of the Medak
Pocket operation: “…it was a relatively small scale operation
correcting the Gospić frontline… during the short attack
some homesteads south of Gospić were taken and Croatian
forces took better positions on the Velebit Mountains”.167
“Serb lines quickly crumbled and they retreated together
with the civilian population. During the swift operation
Serbs had been fighting a withdrawal, trying to hold onto
each house, which had been a paramilitary operation post.
Therefore it was possible that some women, members of
military logistics, had been in the military combat zone
and had been killed, either in crossfire or from hand
grenades.168 “…During the night three women, serving as
terrorist guides who tried to escape through the Medak
Pocket’s difficult terrain, had been shot at close range,
according to Croatia’s deputy Prime Minister Dr. Kostović.169
Ljilja Jelača and two Četniks encountered Croatian forces,
activated a hand grenade and killed all three of them.”170
In his book: “Velikorspska najezda i obrana Hrvatske”171
Božidar Javorović writes about the Medak Pocket Operation
as a preparatory move to stop the attacks on the city
of Gospić and its surrounding area, which had lasted for
738 days. “Politically, psychologically and as far as
security was concerned, the situation had become more
difficult. The Četnik authorities did not want to start
serious negotiation. It was necessary to drag them away
and to show the rebel Serbs that Croatia would not endlessly
put up with their insurgence and the occupation of parts
of the county. The Croatian 9th guard brigade acted like
a hammer while the special mountain police forces from
the south, had the role of an anvil. The Serb forces were
surprised by this attack and were neither in number, nor
in armour, nor organization, matched to the forces of
the Croatian army. In this action there was a lot of destruction
and death. This was due primarily because the Četniks
defended themselves from inside houses. Almost every house
was a firing point. Therefore, killed with the soldiers
were civilians who stayed with them.172”
THE
ATTACK’S SECOND STAGE:
As
the Croatian offensive advanced, the resistance of the
Serb forces to the 3/9th guard mobile brigade at Strunići
grew stronger. Parts of the 9th guard mobile brigade tried
to secure their flanks, advanced and kept the theatre
under control. Up to 12:00 hours parts of the 1/9th and
2/9th guard mobile brigade had taken their next designated
position and linked up with the Croatian special police
units that had destroying the retreating enemy. 3/9th
managed to break the enemy’s resistance and capture Strunići.
THE
ACTION’S CONCLUSION:
At
13:05 hours the Sector HQ received reports about the mission
being accomplished; the Begluk-Drljići-Pjevčeva Draga
line was established, the engineer units of the brigade
started to build bunkers. The remnant Serb units, who
tried a breakthrough from the encirclement were still
being engaged in smaller firefights. The enemy re-deployed
its forces in order to counter-attack and to free those
left in the encirclement. The Serb counterattack was repelled
with artillery fire and the attained line was defended.
The Croatian Army and police forces were ordered to hold
their positions. “They regrouped in order to continue
the attack to the Lički Čitluk-Počitelj line, where they
had to maintain, (prevent – authour’s note) the enemy
forces advancement from the Divoselo encirclement, in
order to reach Pavići-Njegovani-Zaselak towards Memedovo
brdo-Dolovi-Begluk. And after taking the tactically adequate
positions, they had to fortify the defence lines. The
9th guard mobile brigade had to execute a lightning pincer
advance, no matter what decisive action the enemy undertook
in the semi-encirclement. An armoured battalion had reached
the Lika River and cut off the enemy forces that decided
to leave their position and retreat to Debela Glava, where
a Croatian police ambush was already waiting for them.”173
The Serbs were swiftly defeated. They withdrew together
with civilians. The planned action ended the same day.
Occasional fighting continued for a couple of days, ending
in front of Medak, a small town 20 kilometres south of
Gospić. In Medak general panic started, soldiers left
their positions and fellow Serb troops shot some deserters.174
September
10th 1993.
The
enemy Serb forces brought reinforcements175 and consolidated
the Sitnik-Njegovani-Memedovo brdo line, trying to regroup
for the counterattack in order to retake Lički Čitluk
and Divoselo.176 The whole frontline in Croatia, from
Dalmatia to Karlovac had reignited. Serbs started shelling
a large number of Croatian cities. (“Real threat strategy”)
– there were dozens of dead in Karlovac, ground-to-ground
missiles were fired on a Zagreb suburb. A couple of days
after the operation finished, Serbs handed over a list
of some thirty or so targets that would be attacked if
the Croats did not retreat or if they continued to attack
the “RSK”.177 The weather conditions were worsening. It
was raining and it grew cold. On the Velebit Mountain
slopes, Croatian special forces were fighting exhaustion
and night attacks. While on guard, two Captains, J. G.
and S. P. were ambushed and killed. Croatian forces took
cover under limestone shelters and scraps. They were constantly
under a rocket barrage fired by Serb multiple rocket launchers
positioned in Medak. A larger group of Serb soldiers,
policemen and civilians were still encircled in the Divoselo
area. The data about their numbers differ. One-hundred
and fifty-seven according to one Croatian intelligence
source. The other mentions about 100. While a third intelligence
report mentions as many as 300. During the night of September
10th and 11th and during the day of September 11th about
90 soldiers and villagers safely pulled out of the Divoselo
encirclement. According to Serb sources, up to September
12th 79 soldiers and 26 civilians pulled out of the encirclement.
“On September 12th 1993, up to 12:00 hours from the encirclement
in the village of Divoselo, 49 members of the 103rd Lapac
light brigade from Donji Lapac that held their positions
pulled out, and the 40 remaining are unaccounted for.”178
September
11th 1993.
Surrounded
enemy Serb forces backed up by their cannons and tried
in smaller groups to charge through the Vukasi-Vitasi-Bobići
line, but were repelled. At 05:00 hours the Serbian Krajina
Army used the artillery preparation and attacked the new
front in order to enable those encircled to pull out.
The counterattack was repelled and a larger number of
Serb soldiers and civilians were discovered west of the
village of Drljići (the Croatian Ministry of Interior
special police zone of operations). The group was destroyed
in the morning hours: 12 Serb soldiers were killed, two
soldiers and two civilians were taken prisoner. In the
afternoon, around 15:00 hours, one Jastreb J-21 dropped
two bombs on the Ornica area. At 17:00 hours, the same
plane took a reconnaissance mission over the same area.
Serb sources reported the counterattack and reaching the
Vuksani-Njegovani line. But that only marked the approach
to the line Croatian forces have taken on September 9th.
That day on the Velebit Mountains, during a Serb artillery
attack, eight Croatian policemen were wounded. In the
vicinity of Gospić, three civilians were wounded. In response
to this, the Croatian Army’s artillery attacked Korenica
and Udbina.
September
12th 1993.
The
Serb side stabilized its lines, brought reinforcements,
engineers dug trenches, and from time to time they tried
to move their defences. Croatian forces repelled several
attempted offensives. There were no large-scale engagements
in “clearing” the liberated area. The remnant enemy groups
were neutralized. Brigadier Ademi commanded, (according
to the orders of General Bobetko and approved by President
Tuđman), that during the next 48 hours the artillery fire
on major cities should cease, even if the enemy would
engage in that way.
September
13th 1993.
A
verbal ceasefire agreement was reached. In Gospić, one
person was killed and eleven were wounded. The Serbs used
artillery and fired on positions of the Croatian 9th mobile
brigade. The Serb offensive on Brda was repelled, but
three Croatian soldiers were wounded. The Croatian Army
used 120mm mortars to target the Serb 82mm mortar platoon
and Croatian tanks targeted enemy positions in Ljubojevići
and Sitnik. The Serb airplane “Jastreb,” that flew over
and attacked Croatian army positions, was fired upon with
anti-aircraft guns and an S-2M rocket.
September
14th 1993.
The
UNSC appealed for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Croatian
forces. Three persons were wounded in Gospić. The members
of the Croatian 9th mobile brigade answered Serb provocations
with infantry arms. Police special forces repelled two
attacks on the Drljići village.
September
15th 1993.
A
ceasefire agreement and pre-September 9th lines withdrawal
agreement was signed. The Serb signatory was Major-General
Mile Novaković, and the Croatian signatory was Major-General
Petar Stipetić.The agreement stated the ceasefire should
commence at 12:00 hours on September 15th 1993, when control
was to be taken over by UNPROFOR. The withdrawal time
was 24 hours. The Croatian side asked for another 24-hour
extension and a final withdrawal was agreed upon for 18:00
hours on September 17th 1993.
September
15th/16th 1993.
During
the action a confrontation between Croatian soldiers and
the Canadian UNPROFOR contingent occurred, killing some
soldiers, (the details of the events are embargoed).179
September
16th 1993.
At
22:00 hours, the second in command at Gospić HQ (Brigadier
Ademi – authour’s note), held a meeting with UNPROFOR
in the district command post at Gospić, after an agreement
between the Croatian army HQ and UNPROFOR was reached.
At 22:40 Ademi commanded a complete ceasefire and ordered
the Croatian Army and police force withdrawal. This caused
discontent within the ranks of the Croatian Army. According
to one Croatian army report, “The order to withdraw had
a negative impact on soldiers so many of them reacted
in an impermissible way.” Nonetheless, the order was carried
out up to the evening of September 17th 1993. Then members
of the Canadian (and French – author’s remark) UNPROFOR
battalion entered the wider area of Divoselo.180
During
the Action’s imminent aftermath, bodies were uncovered.
Without any investigation they were deemed to be victims
of Croatian war crimes. Strong reaction, pressure and
threats came from the international community.181 Great
Britain and France threatened air strikes from the aircraft
carriers “Invincible” and “Foch,” situated somewhere in
Adriatic waters close to the Croatian coast.29 Croatian
Army reports listed a few minor incidents due to the arrogant
behaviour of UNPROFOR forces and a breach in the previously
arranged agreement. On one such occasion, mentioned by
Canadian sources, the Croatian side used a tank to underline
that Canadians breached the agreement. The Canadians later
used that incident to enforce their thesis about engaging
the Croatian Army, although a firing engagement never
happened. Canadian troops condemned Croatian resistance
to their arrogant behaviour; their display of their “supreme
rights” in a sovereign country. To Canadian troops it
seemed natural to forcibly enter the area in which they
could have entered only after a complete sensitive military
agreement was accepted. On another occasion, UN APC’s
had forcibly passed through a Croatian police checkpoint.
One APC hit a mine and three Canadians were slightly wounded,
transferred to the Gospić hospital, where they received
medical treatment, and later returned to their unit. Because
of the undefined demarcation line, the tension built up
and incidents continued to happen between Croatian soldiers
and police on the one side and Canadians on the other.
