Looking
into official documents, one witness notes the painstaking
move made from one conference to another and the argument’s
over buildings that were always disputed. We see the Serb
headstrong positions and Milošević’s tactics. We discover
the international community/the UN, some states, and UNPROFOR’s
sympathy for the victors, the Serbs71 and antipathy for
the losers. Losers being those who wanted peace to be
reached and those who would achieve a settlement among
two losing sides (the Muslims and the Croats)72.
The
UN at first was reluctant to enter into the Yugoslav crisis
and only after all sides involved agreed did they accept
(UN Security Council Resolution 724 on December 14th 1991)
“Vance Peace Plan”. Resolution73 727 welcomes the Croatian
ceasefire agreement signed in Sarajevo on January 2nd
1992 and implemented on January 3rd. It was as soon as
the February 21st 743 Resolution74 that UNPROFOR was formally
established. The new Resolution stated when its deployment
was set to commence. 743 Resolution75 was very important
for the Republic of Croatia because of its recommendation
to the General UN Assembly for Croatia to become a full
member of the UN, which consequently occurred on May 22nd
1992. UN Security Council 762 Resolution76 agrees upon
the “Pink Zones”77 concept as a temporary solution until
Croatia’s control over that territory was re-established.
The Croatian government’s repeated demands to prevent
the military and logistical help the “RSK” received over
the borders of the Republic of Croatia – the UNPROFOR
control over international borders was established by
the 769 Resolution78. That however did not prevent Serbs
continuing to use those border crossings, so repeated
incidents among UN and Serb military and civilian authorities
occurred.
The
Krajina Serbs controlling the Peruča dam (that supplied
most areas of southern Croatia with electrical power)
would from time to time switch off the power supply, or
threaten to blow up the dam, opening the scouring tunnel
and endangering the lives of thousands of people living
downstream. In order to prevent such a humanitarian catastrophe,
the UN instituted 779 Resolution79 wherein the Peruča
dam was secured by UN forces. Co-presiding Cyrus Vance
and David Owen, two key figures representing the UN and
the contact group, had on the 19th and 20th of November
1992 visited four UNPA zones in Croatia. It became clear
to them that the Vance Peace Plan was not implemented,
and they tried to find out what could be done on the ground.
Owen, in his memories “Balkan Odyssey” writes: “We visited
the Maslenica Bridge, destroyed in the war, and which
should be opened again so that Croatian transport and
tourist vehicles, and businesses could drive down the
highway towards the Dalmatian coast. We climbed the crest
of the Peruča dam carefully, because it was considered
that a large quantity of explosives was planted in the
power station, which if Serbs were to activate would destroy
the dam and flood the area. Both those questions were
discussed thoroughly in Belgrade, Zagreb and Geneva, so
it was useful to see how it looked on the field80”. They
visited Knin and witnessed the headstrong, firm view of
the Krajina Serbs. “In Knin we had a dreadful meeting
with Krajina’s Serbs, who refused to accept anything but
secession and who pretended they were members of an independent
government with their own foreign minister. I said repeatedly,
in order to make them understand, that we were in Croatia,
which the UN with its semantics tried to avoid?! My definition
provoked a bombastic speech about us being in an independent
Serb republic.”81 At the same time, the JNA withdrew from
Prevlaka, but since the FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
claimed that area as their own, the UN Security Council
decided to form a “buffer zone” there, under the supervision
of UN military observers. And then, to the amazement of
many, on January 22nd 1993 the Croatian military/police
Maslenica action occurred in which the Maslenica gorge,
Rovanjska, Jasenice, Maslenica, Novigrad, Zemunik airfield
and some strategic Velebit Mountain peaks were liberated.
The international community’s fear that a simmering conflict
in Croatia could break into a larger scale war had grown.
Three days after the Maslenica action started, the UN
Security Council reacted with its 802 Resolution82, asking
for the immediate cease of the military activities and
the return of the Croatian Army to the pre-Maslenica action
lines. The UN Secretary General report to the UN Security
Council – annexed to the 743 Resolution (1992)83 points
out: “The situation became more serious. After the Croatian
Maslenica operation began, Serbs have stolen heavy weapons,
armed themselves and mobilized the Serb population; a
considerably great number of reinforcement troops have
come from all parts of the former Yugoslavia…” David Owen
soon realized why Croatia had decided to undertake such
a military action, in order to solve the problem of its
communication between the north and south of the country.
“The Croatian Government, understandably from the very
start, tried to avoid the repetition of Cyprus, where
a UN presence de facto cemented the island’s division,
and therefore a ceasefire was never achieved... The Croatian
Serbs were the factor of consolidation in disguise and
the Croatian government the factor of destabilization”84.
But the course of events did not stop there. After repeated
Serb threats they would blow up the Peruča Dam, on January
27th 1993, the Croatian Army liberated it in a swift action.
The Serbs had activated the dynamite in the power station,
but fortunately they did not destroy the Dam completely.
So the Dam withstood the damage and the accumulation lake’s
water did not flood into the valley below. After that
events at the Dam, the military and political situation
became more tense again. Krajina Serbs demanded the Croatian
liberated areas in Ravni Kotari be returned to them, while
Croatians insisted on the implementation of UN Resolutions
and the “Pink Zones” be returned under Croatian sovereignty.
The conditions in the occupied territories gave them that
claim, because the Serbs had through ethnic cleansing
changed the ethnic makeup in the occupied parts of Croatia.
They would not allow the return of Croatian refugees and
instead settled these areas with Serbs coming from all
parts of the former Yugoslavia. Describing that and the
UN role in the peace plan implementation, Owen objectively
and critically said: “The great influx of Serb refugees
had brought about the violence among Serbs themselves.
Their gangs engaged in ransoms and extortions, all of
that happened right under the UNPROFOR CIVPOL noses…whose
role as they had told us, was a passive one, watching
and reporting on local police and local authorities activities,
and nourishing good relations with the population as a
whole. Considering the conditions prevailing in Croatia
at the time, especially after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
had begun…it was impossible to see how the UN could become
anything else but a subject of scorn and a laughing matter
in Croatia. The UN was not liked nor appreciated by anybody.”85
The
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina worsened, so Resolution
80786 had to be voted on, by which the UN Security Council
“Declares decisiveness in securing the unimpeded activities
of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia and other republics.”
The great number of crimes happened in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and victims of the aggression demanded
the court be formed in order to punish war crimes perpetrators
and human rights violators. Croatia was one of the states
asking for the ICTY to be established. The UN Security
Council’s Resolution 808 established the ICTY – or “The
International Tribunal for criminal prosecution of those
persons responsible of serious international humanitarian
laws violations committed since 1991 on the former Yugoslavia
territories.” A very important Resolution 815, confirms
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic
of Croatia and that the so-called “RSK” violated it and
did not take it into account. “The UN confirms its decision
to ensure that the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia,
territorial integrity and other republics in which UNPROFOR
is deployed… the future status of UN (UNPA zones) should
be decided on and those zones are the constitutive part
of the Republic of Croatia’s territory.” Croatia conditioned
UNPROFOR’s mandate extension, asking for more efficient
pressure on rebel Serbs to accept those principals which
had been agreed upon and written in official UN documents.
That opinion is echoed by the UN Secretary General in
his report to the UN Security Council, pending UN Security
Council Resolution 815 (1993) in which the mandate of
UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia was decided upon.
“Serbs
decline to accept the reality – the Republic of Croatia’s
sovereignty and negotiations about their (minority) question
status; they question the ambiguous nature of UNPROFOR’s
future role, the extension of its mandate, the modality
of its mandate and the purpose of it…”
On
the mandate’s extension, the UN Secretary General further
elaborated in the 2nd point of that report: “The future
of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia if both factors
are questioned – if both sides fail, especially the Serb
side’s inability to co-operate in the political process,
would make the solution of all the disputed matters possible.
Despite the co-ordinator’s87 and UNPROFOR’s efforts, there
is no visible progress. The UNPROFOR role is to prevent
rising tension and clashes between the Serb side and the
Croatian authority’s side. The end of the mandate could
result in all out war in the region and prevent humanitarian
aid from being delivered. The UN in the Republic of Croatia
helps the situation development in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
separates the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The UN Security Council therefore declines the option
to withdraw from the Republic of Croatia and leaves UNPROFOR
in the Republic of Croatia. That will not be satisfactory
to the Republic of Croatia but according to the UN Secretary
General’s assessment: the goals which the Croatian government
imposes are impossible to reach without full UNPA and
“Pink Zone” local Serb co-operation. We will therefore
ask the Republic of Croatia for a three-month extension
of the mandate. UNPROFOR has undertaken the difficult
job and decisively executed it. Five-hundred UN members
were wounded, 46 of them mortally, among that number 246
wounded and 25 killed in the Republic of Croatia.”
Because
of the conflicting interests of world powers, the UN lacked
the political will or strength to firmly engage in Croatian
problem solving. In David Owen’s own words: “The UN was
not able to return (Croatian) refugees home, while at
the same time Serb paramilitaries have not demobilized
their troops and the UN lacked the firmness to confiscate
their arms by force. The stalemate position continued
for the following two and a half years…”88 Even the UN
Security Council chairman at the time was worried with
the situation on the battleground development, in that
“all-around, integrated battleground” and delivered remarks
on April 21st 1993 called the “Bosnia and Herzegovina
situation”. Those remarks denounce the new wave of violence,
ask for a ceasefire and co-operation with UNPROFOR and
the co-presider of the International Committee for the
Former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen. David Owen and General Lars
Wahlgren, new commanding officer of UNPROFOR, talked on
April 25th regarding the ways in which to realize the
suggestions of the Security Council Chairman, and how
to materialize “Vance-Owen’s Peace Proposal.” In his book,
Owen describes Wahlgren as a “sensible and calm Swede
with great UN experience”)89. But Wahlgren would also
be unable to break Serb determination, outwit Milošević’s
cunning tactics, Croatian diplomatic skills, and great
powers’ opposing political interests. Soon he would resign
and be replaced by General Jean Cot.
Resolution
82790 established the ICTY, marking the foundation for
an inquiry and consecutive punishment of those individuals
who committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. On
June 3rd 1993, Croatia’s President Tuđman sent a letter
which was forwarded to the UN Security Council Secretary
General. The Croatian President spoke of “the continued
Serb aggression on the Republic of Croatia, now a member
of the UN, about the shelling of towns and cities, the
mistreatment of the non-Serb population, the participation
of FR Yugoslavia citizens in the aggression on the Republic
of Croatia, of the breaking down of negotiations between
legitimate Croat authorities and Serb “Krajina” representatives-caused
by the later, and about the referendum preparations that
would annex “RSK” with the other Serbian territorial gains.
Serbs refused to implement all UN Resolutions and intended
to secede the part of sovereign Croatian territory that
is completely unacceptable for the Republic of Croatia
– according to all resulutions. UNPA’s are the Republic
of Croatia’s integral parts. The dramatic situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina worsens. The Republic of Croatia
asks UNPROFOR to be engaged on the internationally recognized
borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and
between Croatia and FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
The Republic of Croatia should not be a hostage in the
Bosnia and Herzegovina situation. The Republic of Croatia
will accept the UN mandate extension if the methods of
applying Vance-Owen plan are clearly drawn.”
Croatia
continued with its diplomatic efforts. On June 18th 1993
Croatia’s Foreign Minister Mate Granić in a letter to
the UN Security Council Secretary General wrote: “The
Republic of Croatia advocates the separation of the UNPROFOR
mandate into three separate mandates – this apart from
the mandate’s extension (on peace forces for the Republic
of Croatia, for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Macedonia)
because they are three separate states, not engaged in
war with one another. They do not form any political or
any other union – therefore cannot be defined as a unique
territory of operations. The previous mandate of the UN
has ceased being opposite to the UN member states sovereignty.
The existing problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina who is
yet to define its states’ constitution is non-existent
in Croatia; here the effective solution for the UNPA zones
should be found.” The co-president of the international
conference for the former Yugoslavia tried to negotiate
between the opposing sides in both the Republic of Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and tried to enforce a peaceful
conflict solution.”
On
June 28th 1993 the Geneva conference called upon leaders
Milošević, Tuđman, Bulatović, Karadžić and Boban to take
part. President Tuđman again wrote to the UN Security
Council Secretary General. In his letter dated June 25th
1993 he tried to make the mandate extension politically
useful and conceded a peaceful solution was possible and
agreed on further negotiations with the Serb side. He
also warned that the UN was ineffective and pointed out
the consequences of such a mandate: “…I propose a month-long
extension of the mandate, during which time a willingness
of Serb representatives to reach an agreement with Croatian
authorities should be tested. Then another three month-long
mandate and finally the consequent separation of mandates
would be possible. The situation is extremely difficult,
some of the Croatian territory is “de facto” separated
from mainland Croatia, communications are impeded, the
economic situation is difficult… Serb attacks on Croatian
cities continue daily, in spite the signed ceasefire agreement
and UNPROFOR’s presence…”
On
June 30th, the Republic of Croatia’s UN Mission Ambassador,
Mario Nobilo sent a letter to the UN Secretary General
in which he writes: “…I underline the proposal of UNPROFOR’s
separate mandate, propose its new name (UNCRO), the civil
and military section should be separated and the head
of the civilian affairs in the civilian sector should
be appointed.”
Resolution
84791, voted on the same day, deals with the extension
of the UNPROFOR mandate until September 30th of the same
year. The Resolution “…once again confirms the territorial
integrity and the Republic of Croatia’s sovereignty, and
takes into account the Croatian government’s position
on the separate UNPROFOR mandate in the sovereign Republic
of Croatia’s areas.” The Secretary General would think
it over and make his decision at a later date. The Secretary
General’s report to the UN Security Council pending the
second paragraph of 847 UN SC Resolution (1993): “…in
847 UN Resolution dated on June 30th 1993, the three-month
extension of the UN mandate has been decided upon. UN
SC Secretary General has a month to monitor the peace
plan and all the Resolution’s implementation, thus accepting
the Croatian demand.” The presidential Security Council
statement endorsed the re-opening of the Maslenica Bridge
for civilian transport. The Republic of Croatia simply
wanted to open the bridge and Zemunik airfield. Without
the agreement and UNPROFOR’s participation in it, the
situation on the ground would worsen and prevent confidence
building. The UN Security Council demands that Croatia
refrain from such action. According to the Erdut Agreement
(on June 15th/16th 1993) the Croatian Army and police
would have withdrawn their troops from the Maslenica area
by June 31st , placing it under complete UNPROFOR supervision.
In order to achieve the Erdut Agreement’s implementation,
UNPROFOR brought 800 troops into the vicinity of the area
Croats were to withdraw from. Those Croat forces did not
allow for complete UN deployment in this area. On August
2nd Serb shelling sank one of the Maslenica pontoon bridges.
One of the co-presidents was still of the opinion there
was a possibility to continue with negotiations. He asked
both sides to attend the Geneva conference, during which
the elements of the original Erdut treaty would be discussed.
After both parties accepted the invitation, the talks
began. The Security Council Secretary General again expressed
his opinion on the situation: “The questions that should
be solved in Croatia have not yet been solved. Everything
now depends on the present efforts to implement UN Resolutions
and UN Security Council recommendations. Peace could only
be achieved through goodwill and negotiations. I am seriously
considering the Croatian proposal about the mandate separation.
A decision has not yet been made. The proposal needs further
consideration. Co-presidents under the Secretary General’s
instruction, also increased their pressure on all sides.
On June 31st they convened an International Conference
on the former Yugoslavia in Geneva. Soon small steps to
approach a peace solution were made, but it was unclear
whether they were due to Serb side tactics or to the Croatian
government and president’s political moves, made in order
to prepare new diplomatic, political and military manoeuvring.
On
July 15th and 16th 1993 the agreement regarding the Croatian
forces withdrawal from areas liberated in the Maslenica
operation were drafted. In Geneva the following day, July
17th, Milošević and Tuđman met. On July 23rd an addition
to the July 15th/16th agreement was signed. In his letter
to the Security Council presidency (dated August 29th
– as a UN SC document) Boutros Boutros Ghali, for the
first time mentioned war crimes in Croatia and wrote:
“…The expert commission tries in their mandate’s frame
to make inquiry and to analyze information about grave
Geneva convention violations, and other violations of
human rights committed on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. In order to discover and document the existence
of mass graves in the UNPA zones…it is of the utmost importance
the research (excavation) at the place called Ovčara,
near Vukovar in UN Sector West be done.” One conference
is followed by another. The London conference held on
August 26th and 27th 1993 co-presided by the SC secretary
general, prime minister of Great Britain, president of
the EU ministry council and the leaders of the warring
sides. From August 27th to August 30th the same conference
continued, this time in Geneva. It feverishly tried to
find a solution for achieving peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Croatia.
But
the UN Mission to Croatia’s attaché letter again warned
of SR Yugoslavia and RS military aid being given to the
so-called RSK. “The information on Serbian troops from
Serbia proper and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
deployment in the Republic of Croatia… the manpower and
military armament increase in the UNPA and “Pink Zones”…
about 600 armed men (a battalion) from the “2nd Krajiški
Corps of the Republika Srpska Army” had in the middle
of July arrived from the Bosnia and Herzegovina territory
to the area of Benkovac. Recently, another battalion joined
them. At the same time a group of volunteers from Serbia,
about 13 to 15,000 strong, arrived to northern Dalmatia
and immediately engaged in fighting. One hundred and fifty
to 200 officers and lower-rank JNA officers have been
assigned duties in the so-called 15th Lika corps and in
the 7th Knin corps.”92 One battalion of the Republika
Srpska’s Army is deployed opposite of the Cazin krajina,
one RS Army brigade is stationed in Western Slavonia,
six to seven thousand men with artillery and an armoured
battalion (40 tanks) from Serbia have infiltrated the
UNPA and a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina is under Serb
control. The militarization is stepped up in sectors North
and South, which is a sign of a possible military action
planned in Serbia’s political and military centres. The
serious nature of the situation escalates as civilians
are being evacuated in some parts of the Republic of Croatia
occupied by Serbs.”
But
Serbs from the so-called RSK persist in denying Croatia
its sovereignty and territorial integrity. They continue
their terrorist shelling of Croatian cities along the
coast. On August 23rd 1993 the ancient city of Zadar’s
surrounding area (the bridge and the airfield) were shelled.
On August 24th Zadar’s vicinity was bombed. On August
25th eastern Slavonia, Zadar, Maslenica and Pakrac suffer
the same fate. On August 26th and 27th the same cities
were under attack again. The Croatian side in communicating
with the UN Security Council and continues to warn them:
“…the actions mentioned show the unwillingness of local
Serb authorities to solve problems through peace talks,
and they pose a direct threat to the Republic of Croatia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Republic of
Croatia asks for the international community’s severe
condemnation. It becomes obvious that the UN and UNPROFOR
should take stronger and more decisive measures to implement
UN Security Council Resolutions on the Republic of Croatia’s
territory.” But the UN and its Secretary General were
more preoccupied with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Secretary General wrote a letter to the Security Council
presidency on September 1st 1993 the co-presidents International
conference for the former Yugoslavia steering committee’s
report held from August 30th until September 1st in Geneva,
pending the interrupted conference of August 20th: “…we
have taken into consideration the Peace plan for Bosnia
and Herzegovina.” It is obvious that this consideration
did not bring about any results. New talks and conferences
followed in London, Vienna, Geneva and the secret negotiations
in Betostolen near Oslo in Norway. Then on September 8th
a horrific Serbian crime occurred in the village of Kusonje.
The Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentić reported the
details in his letter to the UN Security Council Secretary
General. The letter of September 8th, September 10th 1993
states: “… my government and I would like to draw your
attention to the crime which was committed today in the
village of Kusonje near Pakrac. There was an explosion
of a planted device at a memorial day ceremony held for
18 Croatian policemen that had gone missing two years
ago. Three persons were killed, eight were wounded, among
them an UNPROFOR Argentinean battalion member. UNPROFOR
should be held responsible for this terrorist act, for
not preventing the attacks done in the UNPA zones under
their protection. Therefore the Croatian government warns,
if UNPROFOR continue in its current ineffective manner,
our government will find the legal means to prevent such
terrorist acts. This latest event has stretched our patience
to the limit. Let the Serb paramilitary troops, UNPA zones,
UN forces, as well as the international community know
– the Republic of Croatia has been brought to the very
brink of its patience and dignity. We address you and
ask from you to do everything in your power to prevent
such criminal acts from happening again.” The terrorist
act followed a long series of shelling and diversions
and the Croatian government and public opinion had clearly
lost their patience. The President and the government
concluded that diplomatic means were useless in bringing
security to Croatia’s citizens – they did not reintegrate
the occupied territories, and were useless in achieving
peace with local Serb authorities.
During
the early morning of September 9th, at 6:05 am, the limited
military and police operation in the Medak Pocket started,
and was to be finished on the same day at 13:00 hours.
The UN started reporting the shelling along both sides
of the frontline that morning. General Cot tried mediating
a ceasefire at 11:00 hours and at exactly the same time,
(according to a UN report), the Croatian Army started
an offensive south of the city of Gospić and had taken
the villages of Čitluk and Donje Selo. The next day, on
September 10th, the Croatian Army and special police fortified
their positions and repelled the Serb counteroffensive.
The Serbs intensified their bombardment of civilian targets
in the entire Republic of Croatia. Co-president of the
IC for the former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg, speaking
to President Tuđman proposed the Croatian Army withdraw.
The UN reported that the fighting had continued. Tuđman
replied that Croatia would accept a ceasefire but not
a withdrawal until a comprehensive ceasefire plan was
agreed upon. UNPROFOR extended Tuđman’s message to the
Serb side. Cot sent his own emissaries to both sides,
but Croatia’s Bobetko refused to meet General Cot’s emissary,
and Serb General Novaković, Commanding Officer of the
“Serbian Krajina” Army threatened to attack targets indiscriminately
in all of Croatia if the Croatian Army did not withdraw.
UNPROFOR reported that the Croatian Army attacked Medak
and the area south of Čitluk. The Croatian recapture of
Njegovan was confirmed, and Serb refugees marched towards
the town of Gračac. At 19:40, the town of Sisak was shelled
and Croatian planes bombed Serb rocket launching positions.
UNPROFOR mediated with both sides while the situation
worsened. The conflict had spread to sectors North and
South, to the “Pink Zones” and to the surrounding areas.
These were the fiercest battles waged since the Croatian
Army’s January 22nd Maslenica offensive
September 11th – the intensity of the battles increased
– artillery exchanges followed in Baljak, Medak, Gospić,
Mali Alan and Obrovac.
September
12th – The Republic of Croatia at President Tuđman’s order
unilaterally proclaimed a ceasefire, starting at 12:00
hours. The Republic of Croatia demanded the UN should
implement its own Resolutions. In the evening of that
same day, UNPROFOR’s spokeswoman Shannon Boyd issued a
press release: “The UN is trying to achieve a ceasefire
and Croatian Army withdrawal.” Following a meeting with
General Bobetko, General Cot said he would report to the
UN Secretary General tomorrow (September 13th) about the
situation. The Serb side declined to negotiate while the
Croatian Army offensive actions were in the full swing.
September
13th – a verbal ceasefire agreement is reached.
September
14th – In a personal statement, the UN Secretary General
demands the Croatian Army withdraw to the September 9th
position.
September
15th – the ceasefire agreement was signed by Generals
Novaković and Stipetić.
September
16th – at 12:00 hours the beginning of the agreements
implementation – UNPROFOR started deploying in the demilitarized
zone and Croatian Army withdrew.
September
17th – at 18:00 hours, the Croatian Army has withdrawn
to the pre
September
9th position (before the Medak Pocket Operation started),
the first killed were found and catalogued, the first
destroyed houses and slaughtered cattle registered.
September
19th – General Cot visited the Medak Pocket. UN Spokeswoman
quotes his statement of having seen a “scorched earth”.
September
20th – a meeting takes place aboard the British aircraft
carrier “Invincible” somewhere in the Adriatic Sea – all
political leaders are present – the participants of the
war in the former Yugoslavia. A few days later the Croatian
and “Krajina” side agree upon secret negotiations to be
held in Norway. To the organizer’s surprise Serb representatives
make this information public during TV interviews. That
form of acquired international legitimacy suited the Serb
side. They did not burden themselves with possible meeting
failures and wanted to be recognized as an equal partner.
This is why Owen blames the failure of the talks on the
Croatian side, because the “Croat Army’s forces killed
Serbs in the Medak Pocket. The UN fairly extensively documented
the serious human right violations done in the Medak Pocket,
which inflicted great damage on the Republic of Croatia.”93
Even President Tuđman’s peace initiative, which Croatia
proposed to the UN, was referred to Owen as “a manoeuvre
by which the world’s public opinion should be swayed away
from recently discovered crimes.”
At
the end of September, UNPROFOR’s mandate expired, vivid
consultations followed and a consensus tried to be reached
at the UN itself. In the days that followed: September
30th, October 1st and 4th, three Resolutions were voted
on. Resolution 869, regarded a 24-hour mandate extension.
Resolution 870 enforced UNPROFOR security because its
new mandate was put under chapter 7 of the UN Charter
concerning “peace enforcing”. Finally the third, Resolution
871, UNPROFOR’s mandate had been separated on Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia and three subordinate
HQ’s were established under one central command. This
marked a great Croatian diplomatic success. Croatia, although
being under severe accusations especially after the UNPROFOR
SITREPORT from October 7th 1993 about the Medak Pocket94,
had unequivocally, even in the eyes of UN, become a sovereign
country.
The
diplomatic efforts and negotiations continued. From October
28th to November 31st 1993 Stoltenberg met with Presidents
Tuđman and Milošević in Zagreb and Belgrade. David Owen
met Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak in London on
October 11th. On October 29th EU Foreign Ministers in
Geneva met with Presidents Milošević, Tuđman, Bulatović
and Izetbegović and later with leaders Karadžić and Boban
in Geneva as well. On December 31st , co-presidents of
the IC for the former Yugoslavia again met with the conflict’s
protagonists. The following day, they all met with EU
ministers and co-presidents in Brussels. The international
community’s efforts would bare some deceptive and temporary
fruit – the peace process for Croatia would result in
a general ceasefire agreement and the Zagreb treaty in
1994. But for the Serb side, that would only mean one
more tactical manoeuvre to appease the international community
and make it believe that the Serbs were ready to co-operate.
They had no real intent to return under the Croatian state’s
sovereignty. The so-called “RSK” only wished for a quick
unification with “RS” and with FR Yugoslavia to take place.
The solution that Croatia would take at some future date,
all the diplomatic efforts and successes aside, was again
a military one. In the spring and summer of 1995, the
Republic of Croatia will in the span of only a few days
use the military and police action “Bljesak” and “Oluja”
to solve all the problems the UN and the IC have not been
able to solve for years.
